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Amidst modernity’s expanding electronic social matrix, this cultural-historical 
inquiry explores the technological construction of human being (e.g., cyborgs) and 
sociality in the America Online cyberscape.  A two-tiered critical-hermeneutic method 
enables exploration of the broad rationalizing historical narrative and the localized play 
of virtual discursive practices impacting human meaning construction, selfhood, and 
social practice.  A third and fourth tier of inquiry occasions integration of 
“psychological” meanings found in research participant experiential descriptions and 
interviews.  This four-tier interplay reveals a bodily ethic enabling participants to modify 
subjectifying Internet practices toward meaningful social ends.  Otherwise, eclipsed 
interpretive bodily powers contribute to “undecidability” about meaning constructions 
and identities.  Despite multiple identity solicitations, normalization of objectified and 
schizoid being, and “panoptic” e-surveillance, participants pursued genuine and 
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Naming the “things that are absent” is breaking the 
spell of the things that are; moreover it is an ingression 
     of a different order of things into the established one – “le  
   commencement d’un monde.” 
        Herbert Marcuse 
                                    One-Dimensional Man 
 



























  Introduction: 
The Subject and Sociality as Configured by Modernity and the Internet 
 
A few bytes beyond the cusp of the twenty-first century, Western culture 
increasingly finds itself held within the sway of a cyberspace-human nexus. This 
entwinement has yet to be articulated in a manner that attends to the relationship between 
discourses of modernity and first person accounts of experience.  The following 
culturally informed inquiry seeks to accomplish just that – it seeks to address the 
reciprocal transformations always already occurring when one’s being in the world is 
infused with the possibilities afforded by Internet sociality.  In the words of Kenneth 
Gergen (1991), “As we become increasingly conjoined with our social surroundings, we 
come to reflect those surroundings” (p.49).  The cultural-historical setting for exploring 
the impact of reliance upon basic forms of Internet sociality appears to be optimal 
inasmuch as the explosion of the 3D Web revolution heralded by software architects of 
the 1990s remains largely unrealized (e.g., Kushner, 2004; Hunter & Lastowka, 2003; 
Ronnblom, 2002). 
Catching sight of the recent historical context of lived out transformations 
informed by Internet use can be, in the words of Michel Foucault (1978), a way of 
providing a “history of the present” – a way of contributing to a chronicle of subjective 
transformations which stand as the effects of contemporary historical force-relations.  
When we are able to gaze back upon the historical shifts that coincide with the mobile 
productions of power and knowledge, Foucault suggests that “things appear in a very 
different light” (p.17).  Thus the production of subjects and the meanings they live are 
understood differently in the light of the interplay of force-relations.  Similarly, Martin 
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Heidegger (1962) understands the historical situation Dasein (the human way of being 
there) finds itself thrown into as participating in Dasein’s disclosure.  Dasein as “futural  
. . . is in the process of having-been, [and] can by handing down to itself the possibility it 
has inherited, takes over its own throwness . . .” (p. 437).  Here, Heidegger also 
recognizes the import of history.  In addition, Heidegger understands that an awareness of 
the future (e.g., one’s mortality) can motivate an effort to retrieve the freedom to choose 
and act through the appropriation of marginalized possibilities associated with one’s 
culturally relevant heritage; a potent prescription for a cultural therapeutic which admits 
the return of “repressed” contexts into human science narratives.  It is my presupposition 
that these “repressed” contexts inform human experiences of self, styles of embodiment, 
social practices, and beliefs about truth and reality.  In any case, we see that both 
philosophers think about history as bound up with the present.  One significant way in 
which they differ, however, is in the methodological approach each thinker employs in 
appropriating the past.  Whereas Foucault prefers a micro-analytic of discontinuous 
power relations, Heidegger adopts a macrocosmic analysis of the teleological Enframing 
of Western culture.  Any effort to integrate the interpretive stance of Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic project with Foucault’s genealogical project in a practical manner requires 
some explication. 
A review of theoretical support for engaging in a psycho-cultural-historical study 
informed by a critical-hermeneutics will be articulated in the methodological portion of 
this research project.  At this point, however, I wish to remark that while Foucault and 
Heidegger are rarely paired methodologically, this qualitative research project will stand 
as an exploratory heuristic, or rather, a concretization of the fruitful possibilities 
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associated with the coupling of Foucauldian and Heideggerian praxis.  Accordingly, I 
will outline below a methodological approach to combining broad narratives of history 
(cf. Heidegger) with Foucault’s emphasis on the “history of the present” – or rather, with 
Foucault’s emphasis on efforts to chronicle the competing cultural practices and 
discourses which vie to inscribe bodies, beliefs, and social practices.  In addition, I will 
incorporate Heidegger’s “hermeneutic circle” as a means to expanding research 
participant lived understandings of their Internet based experience.  Thus, I will not focus 
on obtaining an objective understanding of research participant experience.  Instead, I 
will begin my qualitative inquiry with research participant preunderstandings of their 
experience as a starting point for resituating and reinterpreting their protocols.   
To begin, I will apply Foucauldian and Heideggerian thought by first reading 
“protocols,” or first-person experiential accounts, and interpreting them in a manner 
which identifies each research participant’s lived concatenation of meanings.  Second, I 
will interview each research participant in a manner that will allow their life-situated 
meanings to be lifted out from average everyday understandings of language and 
meaning.  Lifting out new significations from the language used by research participants 
will, of course, require an interpretive attentiveness to the plurivocal nature of language – 
an attentiveness to the way in which connotative, non-literal, imaginative, and life-
situated contexts are always already bound up with literal understandings of language.  
After doing so, I will then “circle” back and integrate the interpretations made in Steps 1 
and 2 into a person-centered narrative of research participant’s lived meanings.  The 
Continental thinker, Calvin Schrag (1989), quotes Heidegger in a manner that lends 
support to methodological efforts to privilege a place for the perspective of the person or 
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‘subject:’  “Philosophy must perhaps start from the ‘subject’ and return to the ‘subject’ in 
its ultimate questions, and yet, it may not pose its questions in a one-sidedly subjectivistic 
manner”  (p. 10).  Schrag also quotes the decontructionist, Jacque Derrida:  “The subject 
is absolutely indispensable.  I don’t destroy the subject; I situate it.  That is to say, I 
believe that a certain level of experience and of philosophical and scientific discourse one 
cannot get along without the notion of the subject” (p. 129).  Said differently, inquiries 
into meaning are meant to decentralize the authority of the ‘subject’ in the meaning-
making process, not to erase the relevance of the ‘subject.’  In decentering the ‘subject, 
other contributions to meaning production can then be imported from the margins of 
consideration into the relative center of the interpretive process. 
Thus, I will next shift from a methodological emphasis upon the experience of the 
person or ‘subject’ to an analysis of technology.  Accordingly, in Step 3, I will interpret 
the parameters associated with each research participant’s Internet site of communication 
in a way that identifies forces motivating particular social practices.  Fourth, I will pursue 
a culturally and historically informed interpretive perspective by reading and interpreting 
selected texts which elaborate on Western narratives regarding modern technology – 
Western narratives which provide a background for understanding the experience of the 
Internet.  I will then circle back from Step 4 to Step 3 and integrate the two 
interpretations into a technocultural-historical narrative.  Finally, I will fashion a 
situated global narrative of Internet subjectivity and sociality by integrating the  
person-centered narrative and the technocultural-historical narrative into a unified 
critical-hermeneutic account.  The situated global narrative will therefore stand as an 
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instantiation of how person-centered and cultural-historical processes contribute to the 
construction of meaning, experience, and social actions. 
In summary, the hermeneutic circle will be the interpretive device occasioning a 
synthesis of the four steps leading up to the situated global narrative.  Step 3 will 
concretize the critical contribution to the interpretive process insofar as discursive 
practices converging upon the local sites of Internet communication will be identified.  
The four major steps comprising this critical-hermeneutic approach are reviewed below: 
1)  A descriptive-interpretive meaning analysis of each research participant’s    
lived out meanings; 
2) An interpretive analysis of interview material from research participants 
regarding their understanding of life-situated meanings embedded in their 
respective experiential descriptions.  This analysis will also attend to the non-
literal meanings and life-situated contexts inextricably linked to language 
usage. 
3)  An analysis of the locally situated forces influencing value formations and/or 
social practices insofar as they are associated with the Internet site of 
communication identified by each research participant. 
4)  A thematic analysis of landmark texts that elucidates the cultural-historical 
backdrop of modern technology and its place in human existence 
Partial justification for the achievement of this kind of situated global narrative is 
founded upon the presupposition that while meaning and experiential phenomenon 
appear within the holistic backdrop of discourse, meaning and experience cannot be 
reduced exclusively to discursive production.  Thus, my attentiveness to each research 
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participant’s experiential description and interview is intended to reserve a narrative 
place for the unique, creative, or marginalized meanings lived out by each person.  Such 
moments of creativity might be instantiated as practices linked to motivations 
unsupported by the web of discourses encircling them. 
That said, I as a human science researcher, contend that by taking into account 
technocultural dreams of the future, a current profile of technoculture, and the historical 
horizons of technoculture, we can enrich current understanding about the kind of subjects 
we become amidst the embrace of Internet communication.  By way of prologue to 
articulating this empirical-critical-hermeneutic project, I will first attempt to lay bare 
some of the contemporary representations already implicated in cyberculture rhetoric. 
                                              Literature Review 
Images of the Future Handed Down from the Twentieth Century 
   Sometimes one can draw upon enduring cultural artifacts in order to inspire 
imaginal understanding of ambiguous experiences. In doing so, Edward Murray (1986) 
tells us that imagination, or “imaginizing,” can become an occasion for human being to 
light up the scene of life.  Said differently, imaginizing invites the horizon or ever-present 
backdrop of the cultural imagination to reveal itself in a more differentiated manner.  For 
Murray, human beings are “bequeathed” the foundation of culture and tradition - and 
thereupon the human being often uncritically “builds and functions” throughout everyday 
existence.  In order to articulate the kind of life imagined for us by culture, Murray 
remarks that “having embodied the culture and traditions of our people, we can 
imaginatively distance ourselves from such and in due time move toward an authentic 
owning or even repudiation of the customs, values, or mores” (p. 69).  In doing so, 
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imaginizing speaks in an ornate non-literal tongue by hovering near the site of frozen 
dominant discourses.   Dwelling in this way allows for the retrieval of previously eclipsed 
ambiguities at the heart of things.  In the parlance of Maurice Merleau-Ponty (Madison, 
1981), these kinds of “creative speech acts” (cf. epideictic) can issue forth new meanings 
in the cultural world.  New sounds and perspectives are thereby “torn” from language 
insofar as the muted “intention to signify” is allowed to struggle to articulate its situated 
offering.  Bearing witness to the productive human power of imaginizing may then allow 
for disenfranchised meanings to come into presence – to emerge more fully into 
audibility and visibility.  Indeed, this modest research inquiry acknowledges the pictorial 
basis of language (viz., Egyptian hieroglyphics, ideograms of 15
th
 century China and 6
th
 
century Mesoamerica).  And, as David Abram argues, acknowledgement of image can 
become the condition of possibility for revivifying sensual human powers for knowing 
the estranged “earthly world around us”(p. 94). 
To that end, I will begin by identifying and dialoguing with a few of the 
prevailing metaphors Western culture lives by in the next three sections. That is to say, I 
will start by invoking a movement toward a more differentiated understanding of digitally 
influenced metaphors which infuse average everyday existence. 
The Cyborg.  In the seminal essay “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Donna Haraway 
(1991) characterizes this emerging inseparability of human and machine with the 
compelling metaphor of the “cyborg.”  “A cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction” (p. 
149).  The potent image of Haraway’s cyborg neatly maps onto modernity’s burgeoning 
proliferation of computer-outfitted persons opting to jack into computer-generated 
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structures of reality via the Internet.  Haraway’s feminist treatise, however, muses upon 
such couplings as transgressive and irreverent:  “The cyborg is resolutely committed to 
partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity.  It is oppositional, utopian, and completely 
without innocence”  (p.151).  That is to say that when one is ‘cyborged,’ preconceptions 
about what is natural and what is possible are radically called into question.  Still quoting 
Haraway: 
Unlike the hopes of Frankenstein’s monster, the cyborg does not expect 
its father to save it through a restoration of the garden . . . The cyborg would 
not recognize the Garden of Eden; it is not made of mud and cannot dream 
of returning to dust . . . The main trouble with cyborgs, of course, is that 
they are the illegitimate offspring of militarism and patriarchal capitalism, 
not to mention state socialism.  But illegitimate offspring are exceedingly 
unfaithful to their origins.  Their fathers, after all, are inessential. 
(p.151) 
As Haraway argues above for cyborg uniqueness, resistance, and “pleasure in the 
confusion of boundaries” (p. 150), we can ask ourselves what it is to be confused in this 
way; what is it to be simultaneously fused and con-fused? 
Fusus, to be fused, means to pour or blend (Misch, 1999).  Through the thorough 
mixing of two disparate substances, merger into something new is made possible.  In this 
way, perhaps the fusion of human being with Internet technology gives rise to the 
blurring of boundaries – a disavowal of differences in order to enhance compatibility.  
Con-fusion, standing before or with fusion, may reflect the way in which the 
undifferentiated state of what is near/far, real/imaginary, public/private, vital/fantastical, 
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and human/machine is encountered by the cyborg without protest.  In this disorienting 
realm of previously unthought and unimagined transgressions of traditional thresholds, 
there can be a continuum of experiences ranging from pleasurable immersion to 
precipitous risk.  One’s attentiveness to an ongoing explicit dialogue with this unexplored 
terrain may help illuminate the “way,” that is, the emerging horizon of possibilities.  But, 
while cyborgs may entertain their fascination with the novelty of unexplored frontiers, 
they may do well to remember that attempting to be “exceedingly unfaithful” to origins 
still implies the presence of that which is repudiated.  New fusions may not fully erase, as 
Haraway would have it, the way in which one is bound up with “mud . . . . militarism and 
. . . capitalism.”   
“2001.”  In a distinctive contrast to Haraway’s celebration of “blasphemy,” Joel 
Achenbach’s (2000) millennial New Year’s Eve article in the Washington Post laments 
some of the emblematic images found in Stanley Kubrick and Arthur Clarke’s film, 
“2001: A Space Odyssey.” 
 The technology in “2001” – like much technology today – is 
dehumanizing.  The characters have been sapped of personality.  Several 
astronauts are in suspended animation, a state from which they are doomed 
never to awake.  Throughout the movie the food dispensed by machines is 
disgusting to contemplate – The Future [sic] is intensely unappetizing. 
 Using a “picture phone,” the characters can communicate across 
great distances of space, but it is hollow communication, innately cold, 
burdened with platitudes.  We see a man wishing his daughter happy 
birthday, but he tells her he can’t be at her party.  He has to go to the 
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Moon.  Technology is supposed to ease the pain of separation, but it 
also makes it possible.  Today we are wired to global-spanning networks. 
We can send countless e-mails, work the phone nonstop, even stay in 
touch with wireless gadgets – and never pause long enough to have what 
amounts to a real conversation. 
 Are we masters of our technology – or slaves to it? (p. B5)  
Achenbach’s disenchantment is as much about Kubrick and Clarke’s dystopian prophetic 
images of homeless, insular, disengagement as with the “wired” state of post-millennial 
relationships.  Where Achenbach expresses distress over a putative decline in “real” 
encounters, the reader is left to infer that by “real” Achenbach equates direct physical 
communication with a vital and energized way of being with the other.  And yet, a literal 
and metaphorical protest pervades Achenbach’s characterization of “2001” and its 
lukewarm passion for tête à tête, embodied relations.  Achenbach seems to sense that 
such relations end up pervaded by an implicit understanding that something else trumps 
the importance of direct human encounter – the Moon awaits!  And yet, what might the 
importance of the Moon mean?  In this particular instance, it appears that destination 
Moon is not inspired by some enchanting quixotic quest; it is not inspired by an epic 
(space) odyssey in the spirit of Homer’s Odysseus - but rather, the lunar trip fulfills the 
requirements of the state.  The journey is a work related trip – a functional activity - and a 
dispassionate one at that.  Kubrick and Clarke seem to have poignantly framed the 
emotional/emotionless life of a family by situating its configuration within the context of 
work, virtual communication, and separation. 
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 “The Matrix.”  A third contemporary image rounds out this introduction.  In Joel 
Silver’s (1999) cyberfuture production of the sequel bound film, “The Matrix,” the 
audience is brought to the ultra-cool limits of simulation ecstasy.  The directors transport 
the sedentary spectators into the visually and acoustically stunning future world where 
infants have been permanently and unknowingly wired into computer-generated 
simulations of Earth by tyrannical Artificial Intelligence machines.  A small band of 
renegade revolutionary hackers are aware of this deception.  Collectively, they are able to 
travel back and forth between the simulated world and the post-apocalyptic earth.  They 
do this with full knowledge that the virtual world is more outlandishly real than, for 
instance, Jean Baudriallard’s (1983) “hyperreality.”  For Baudrillard the “real” has 
become a hyperreal world where simulations not only constitute “reality,” they also lack 
any intelligible referent to the “desert of the real” – a desert which is exemplified in 
extreme form by the desolate and despoiled planet Earth of “The Matrix.”  Thus, in “The 
Matrix,” the price of virtual life is the loss of recognition that simulation (simulacra) are 
maps of a territory which stylishly and ecstatically entrance the masses such that they fail 
to see that, “[s]imulation is . . . the generation by models of a real without origin or 
reality: a hyperreal” (p. 2). 
Throughout “The Matrix,” the monotony of the “real” world pales in comparison 
to virtual “life.”  The revolutionary hackers’ computer generated doppelgangers, divested 
of their all-to-human physical bodies, perform tantalizing, earth-defying, posthuman 
martial arts stunts thrilling the moviegoers with special effects which surpass the 
audiences’ theretofore wildest fantasies.  Nevertheless, the hackers stand opposed to this 
mesmerizing illusion, relentlessly attempting to liberate the masses in the name of 
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restoring the freedom to choose between inhabiting a virtual world or facing the stark 
reality of a severely decayed planet.  In a telling scene midway through the film one of 
the hackers, Cypher, foreshadows awareness of this all-important choice.  The Judas-like 
Cypher ultimately opts to betray his freedom fighting comrades.  During a clandestine 
meeting with the Artificial Intelligence constructs at an upscale virtual restaurant, Cypher 
eats a sumptuous steak while aptly summarizing his compelling rationale for being 
reinserted “into” the Matrix and forgetting his life outside the Matrix:  “I know this steak 
doesn’t really exist.  I know that when I put it in my mouth, the Matrix is telling my brain 
that it is juicy and delicious.  After nine years, you know what I realize?  (Cypher gives 
an ecstatic sigh while chewing his simulated steak) Ignorance is bliss” (Silver, 1999).   
What is at ‘stake,’ so to speak, for Cypher appears to be a resounding echo of a 
lived virtual dilemma:  Should one be concerned with the difference between cyber-
dreaming that one is happy and contented over against one’s being awake and conscious 
of “real” (dis)satisfaction?  Moreover, why not plug into virtual happiness if the “real” is 
so unappealing?  If the “real” is analogous to “electrical signals interpreted by your 
brain” (Silver, 1999) and there is no guarantee of existence outside those signals (cf. 
solipsism), then what is the danger of living “inside” a computer-generated program?   
In some ways, cultural icons like that of “The Matrix,”  “2001,” and the cyborg 
amplify a dilemma often evoked by radically new and pervasive technologies - nostalgia 
for the “real” over against visionary rhapsodies calling the polis forward into potentially 
liberating frontiers.  “The Matrix” seems to suggest that a dystopian stance toward the 
gigantic pervasiveness of virtual technologies is called for.  And while “2001” may 
remind us of the potential loss of our humanity, Haraway’s cyborg metaphor references a 
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call to emancipatory transgression and transcendence.  For these reasons, this study 
grounds an understanding of the effects of Internet life through interpretation of 
experiential reports which are understood against the backdrop of cultural, historical, and 
‘imaginatively’ informed perspectives. 
The Scope of the Virtual Mis-en-Scène.  Twenty-first century human beings 
find themselves ensconced in digital technologies that either mediate or replace corporeal 
encounters.  The proliferation of human interchanges with their mechanized counterparts 
include voice mail, pagers, fax machines, wireless Palms, Personal Digital Assistants 
(PDAs) with connectivity, Web-ready mobile phones, Internet Instant Messaging, picture 
email, streaming video/audio – to name a few (e.g., Marshal, 2002; Captain, 2002; 
Rykens, 2002; Rivlin, 2001; Csatari, 2001).  Institutionalized trends involving 
communication technology and human interaction are also evident.  According to Edward 
Cornish (1996) the technosocial movement toward “real time” distance learning classes, 
virtual corporations that rely on mobile communication technology, online shopping, and 
electronic-town meetings are among the many cultural signs that the human technology 
interface has become pervasively entwined in human affairs.  Manifold versions of 
communication technology have become Western civilization’s desideratum.  From the 
viewpoint of cultural commentator, Mark Slouka (1995), humanity has become 
“wrapped” in technology.  As the North American population converges en masse onto 
the electronic frontier - framed by the likes of America Online (AOL), The Microsoft 
Network (MSN), and Netscape - it may be that the rhythms of nature recede in the face of 
the pervasive technological rhythms of “point and click,”  “send,” and “you’ve got mail.” 
According to Don Tapscot (1998) in Growing Up Digital:  The Rise of the Net 
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Generation, the Internet is providing the occasion for  a “communication revolution” 
through its impact on the plugged-in Net-Generation (N-Gen).  The N-Genners comprise 
30 percent of the population in the United States; the largest generational cohort to date.  
This group represents the offspring of the Baby Boomers (29 percent).  Hence, they are 
often referred to as the Baby Boom Echo.  Tapscot argues that the N-Genners (5-25 years 
old), are the first cohort to have grown up with the Net as part of its milieu, or at least 
with digital technology as a familiar part of their world.  Among other considerations, 
Tapscot claims that Net communication technology dissolves traditional notions of 
authority. For instance, as Netgen kids outpace adults in their knowledge of the Internet, 
they have also become more self-reliant and sophisticated in networking through 
personalized home pages and audio/video broadcasting. “Increasingly, young people are 
the masters of the interactive environment and their fate in it” (p. 26).  In addition, the 
movement away from the passivity associated with television viewing, to the more 
interactive quality of the Net has given rise to a generation of youth who are in the words 
of Sherry Turkle,  “empower[ed] . . . to confront, learn, and deal with . . . issues in a 
constructive way” (p. 126).  Patterns of subjectivity and sociality are undergoing 
metamorphosis in the new millennium. 
My interest, therefore, is in forging a culturally situated psychological inquiry into 
the burgeoning expansion of the Internet, as a communication technology.  This research 
is geared toward filling a relative absence of literature which critically examines 
experiential reports of subjectivity and sociality as an effect of barely visible discourses 
of Western culture. 
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As a way of attending to issues of power and enframing, this literature review is 
organized around psychological, techno-cultural, continental, and critical thought 
pertinent to electronically mediated relations (EMRs).  In order to complement or even 
offset the current speculative theory and objective research, this inquiry offers a critical-
hermeneutic perspective providing experience-near renderings of EMR’s as a culturally 
situated phenomenon.  I therefore suggest that research participant experiential 
descriptions will provide insight into both the lived experience and the referential 
“matrix” of those engaged in Internet relations. 
Before proceeding with a discussion of EMR’s, the where and who of Internet 
communication must be clarified.  Popular culture and technoculture literature refer to the 
where of communication as “cyberspace.”  Paradoxically, the place of cyberspace is both 
a somewhere and a nowhere; and though we may associate cyberspace with the computer 
screen, the sense of Internet spatiality seems to both include and transcend notions of 
screenal reality. 
Cyberspace Explored.  The term cyberspace, was first introduced in William 
Gibson’s (1984) cybercult classic, Neuromancer.  In this seminal cyberpunk vision of the 
future, Gibson refers to cyberspace as a “consensual hallucination.”  Gibson’s  ethereal 
rendering suggests that human encounter through the Internet rests upon a mutual 
agreement to ‘meet in’ an unworldly imaginary domain.  Human beings leave Earth and 
join others in the disincarnate realm of fantasy. 
Robert Romanyshyn (1994) further augments the metaphorical understanding of 
cyberspace by suggesting that the astronaut body readied for departure from Earth has 
now become the cybernaut launched to the “inner space” sea of digitized images.  For 
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Romanyshyn, both of these metaphorically lived bodies are no longer animated by full 
sensual immersion in the world.  Each lived-out bodily orientation has been severed from 
its earthly context.  As such, both bodies are poised to explore realms which transcend 
immediate physical surroundings.  Romanyshyn laments that the body, decontextualized 
from its immediate world, becomes a functional tool, a spectator, which in effect narrows 
its sensual hold on the world to visual perception.  According to Romanyshyn, the 
cultural-historical understanding of the body as an anatomical object signified the 
culmination of the dream of technological consciousness “to distance itself from the 
world and from the flesh that ties us to the world” (p. 94).  By extension, Romanyshyn 
observes, that our age is now marked by cyberspace dreams where a new analogue to the 
astronaut body has emerged in the guise of the “dream body.”  The sign of the dream 
body represents a dis-integration into a cybernaut that “does not dwell in the things that 
surround it . . . the cyberbody haunts the things of its virtual world” (p. 95).  Furthermore, 
it exists with “a mind independent of the biology of bodies” (96).  In either case, both of 
the metaphorically lived bodies are not “ensouled” for Romanyshyn.  Each lived-out 
body has, instead, incarnated the (programmed) technological dream or ‘soul’ of its era 
thereby risking the loss of a “sense of home.”  For Romanyshyn, cyberspace becomes in 
effect another occasion for leaving one’s senses and inhabiting denatured dream worlds.  
A third and perhaps more concrete view characterizes cyberspace as set of images 
generated by computer technology, or rather, software generated representations which 
substitute for “reality” (Gelerneter, 1991).  Here the imaginal aspect is conspicuously 
absent and replaced by an emphasis on the materiality of the electronic environment.  
Differences aside, Kevin Robins (1995) would likely agree that all three perspectives 
  26
implicitly or explicitly support the notion that cyberspace solicits the computer user to 
turn “a blind eye on the world we live in” (p. 135). 
In average everyday EMR practice, the Internet opens onto several interactive 
domains.  Specifically, netizens can be found communing in a variety of configured 
social spaces.  A vast array of topical, interest driven, romantic, or cybersex interactions 
comprise the burgeoning number of chat rooms available to those interested in text-based 
modes of relating.  Other text-based environments, like MUDs (multi-user domains), 
invite game playing and linguistic constructions with one or more online persona.  Or, 
one can access a virtual community replete with images of cityscapes and self 
constructed avatars of oneself and one’s electronic interlocutors.  In effect, the online 
user can entertain the belief that he or she has “stepped through” the screen into text-
based or visual landscapes where relational narratives are co-designed, abruptly severed, 
or seemingly precluded by a teeming swirl of disconnected declarative outbursts.  Amidst 
these scenarios, relationships or communities endure or dissolve depending on the nature 
of commitment enacted by its participants. 
In light of the cyberspace discussion hitherto, it appears that cyberspace is a 
liminal term that simultaneously gestures toward the concrete words and images framed 
by technological hardware, while also pointing to the imaginal space solicited by the 
shroud of Internet distance and incorporeality. 
Digital Subjectivity. The next question to be addressed involves the who of 
Netspace communication.  Many Net enthusiasts and academics have designated this who 
with the name of the ambiguous figure known as “cyborg.”  The term cyborg was first 
introduced in 1960 by Manfred Clynes and Nathan Kline (1960), two researchers 
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involved in medical investigations for the United States space program.  Clynes and 
Kline proposed to develop a project with the express purpose of integrating humans with 
machines.  Their objective was to optimize the body’s capacity to survive in alien 
environments; in particular, to survive environments associated with space travel.  
Mechanical enhancements of the flesh were designed to provide automatic or 
“unconscious regulation of the cyborg’s homeostatic functions vis à vis unfavorable deep 
space conditions.  For some cyborg commentators (e.g., Halacy, 1965; Tomas, 1995), the 
erstwhile human, now partially altered or “enhanced,” finds itself freed from factical 
limitations on its way to becoming a “superman” or “superwoman.” 
By contrast, Haraway appropriated the cyborg image into her “informatics of 
domination” and reconfigured its meaning into a metaphor for the feminist subversion of 
oppressive identity constructions.  Haraway envisioned the cyborg as enabling an 
oppositional form of consciousness at the forefront of movement toward a post-gender 
world.  The cyborg became a figure committed to perversity and the transgression of 
totalizing political inscriptions of nature (and the female body).  For Haraway, then, the 
sign of the cyborg was to be extended beyond its coding as a solution to the Clynes and 
Kline body-outer space dilemma.  The focus was, instead, to be shifted to seizing 
oppressive technological tools in order to “interface in nearly infinite, polymorphous 
ways” (p. 163).   Historical constructions of the body could then be overcome by weaving 
together new social networks which provide possibilities for being freed from dominant 
discourses.  Recrafting identities and bodies becomes an active and productive stance for 
Haraway.  “The cyborg is not subject to Foucault’s biopolitics, the cyborg simulates 
politics, a much more potent field of operations’ (p. 163).  Whether or not Haraway’s 
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subversive stance is a part of Internet sociality will be called into question by the research 
protocols employed in this study. 
Haraway’s perspective is certainly not the only way to understand human-
machine fusions.  Thus, I will now proceed to elucidate a variety of representative 
perspectives on embodiment and subjectivity.  I hope to broaden or “deepen” the 
referential context in which the cyborg subject can be located.  This contextualization 
will include discussion of the physiological perspective, technocultural perspective, 
psychological perspective, Continental perspective, and a critical theory perspective. 
The Physiological Perspective  
 In Fred Evans’ (1993) Psychology and Nihilism, he sets out upon a genealogical 
study of the cybernetic organization of the human “mind.”  In short, Evans argues that 
cognitive psychology adopts a computer model of mind as the ideal description of mental 
activity.  Evans claims that the cognitive sciences have reduced mental actions to 
computational processes.  Moreover, cognitivism arose from the hegemony of rationality 
which contributed to spawning the machine model of consciousness – a model that 
effectively denies or devalues other modalities of human existence.  Where Evans locates 
a field of discourses signifying consciousness as cybernetically organized, I suggest that 
the medical field has analogously propagated an understanding of the anatomical body as 
machine-like. 
 Upon consultation of the classic text of the biological sciences, Gray’s Anatomy 
(Williams, Warwick, Dyson, & Bannister, 1989), it becomes evident that the natural 
science study of the anatomical body centers its attention on both the structural form and 
the biological processes which comprise the human anatomy.  With regard to biological 
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processes, the reader is instructed that the organic body is fundamentally a cellular 
organism.  The human body begins as a single cell; it matures towards infancy through 
the multiplication and differentiation of cells; and finally, it approaches mortality not 
long after cellular duplication comes to a halt.  The biological end of cellular division is 
referred to as the Hayflick Limit (Travis, 1998).  When human cells have divided on 
average, fifty times, the cellular clock comes to a halt.  Thus, mortal human destiny is 
posited as genetically coded – finitude, in the form of the Hayflick Limit, is largely 
preprogrammed.  That is to say, the anatomical biological clock places limits on 
longevity; and within those Hayflick parameters we can acknowledge our bodily 
dependence on the external environment for sustaining life long enough to exhaust the 
limits of our biological clock.  The organism’s capacity for ongoing interaction with its 
environment serves not only as an occasion for survival, but also as a significant support 
for the reproduction and maintenance of structural integrity (e.g., skeletal structure). 
 In addition, the reader learns that physiology is the wellspring from which the 
epiphenomenon of consciousness emerges.  The nervous system, which is comprised of 
bioelectrical networks of communication, enables the organism to detect and adaptively 
respond to fluctuations in internal homeostasis.  In scenarios where environmental stimuli 
affect changes in internal states, behaviors are understood as mere communicative 
responses designed to alter the organism’s response to the stimulus. Consciousness thus 
becomes a secondary effect of tension states that serve to trigger behaviors aimed at 
reestablishing optimal bodily equilibrium.  This materialist premise conflates bio-
mechanical processes with an understanding of “mind” in such a way that the “contents” 
of mind merely reflect the data of machine-like interactions with the environment.     
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 The naturalist view of the factical human body outlined thus far suggests that 
physiological discourse posits human behavior, communication, and consciousness as 
linked to the experience of bodily disequilibrium.  This mechanistic view constructs 
human embodiment as dependent upon environmental resources in such a way that 
adaptive responses are merely a montage of wide ranging “instinctual” coping styles.   
In a positive sense, the medical discourse implicitly acknowledges a fundamental 
relationship between mind/body and person/world.  There is a profile of experiential truth 
here.  To be sure, as human beings we do sometimes explicitly acknowledge our 
organismic susceptibility and vulnerability to environmental fluctuations (e.g., blight, 
extreme temperature change).  As such, we are reminded that the project of survival 
compellingly solicits our attentiveness to basic biological processes (e.g., eating, 
sleeping, hygiene).  However, the “survival instinct” will inevitably be thwarted and we 
will eventually encounter our finitude – if not through the contingency of existence or 
disease, then through exhausting our predetermined cellular Hayflick Limit.  This implies 
that the mind presides over a factically flawed body and that human embodiment is lived 
as a vulnerable body in relation to its world.  Do such dualistic assumptions about 
mind/body and nonunitary assumptions about person/world relatedness inform the 
contours of human existence?  We will eventually examine how these beliefs may be 
implicated in one’s participation in EMRs.  Furthermore, we will ask whether the notions 
of dualism and person/world separateness can be supplemented or even modified by a 
human anthropology of lived experience.  But first, we will continue to pursue the 
implications of mapping the human body through the codings derived from machine 
metaphors. 
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 Among the consequences of objectifying the human body as an organic machine 
includes the temptation to view inorganic machines as virtually compatible counterparts 
of human physiology.  Following from this discourse, the cyborg can be understood as 
the seamless marriage of two functionally equivalent forms of matter.  Indeed, Shankar 
Vedantam (2001) reported on groundbreaking research out of the Max Planck Institute 
for Biochemistry (MPIB) in Germany where multiple brain cells from snails have been 
successfully meshed with silicon chips thereby forming a “part-mechanical, part-living 
electronic circuit.”  The preeminent goal of researching this interface between biology 
and technology is to develop prosthetics which function as a more responsive extension 
of the human nervous system (e.g., artificial retinas) than the limited computational 
functionality of silicon chips. Given the MPIB objective of overcoming mechanical 
circuit insufficiency, it is interesting to note that the assumption of body-machine 
equivalence is not a founding principle of the MPIB project.  Quite the contrary, organic 
embodiment is seen as much more versatile: 
Nerve cells in the brain find each other, strengthen connections and 
build patterns through complex chemical signaling that is driven in  
part by the environment . . .  
Silicon chips, on the other hand, can perform specific functions 
with great reliability and speed, but have limited responsiveness to the 
environment and almost no ability to alter themselves according to need. 
(p. A3) 
A compelling phenomenological explanation of bodily complexity can be found 
in Merleau-Ponty’s (1942) work, The Structure of Behavior.  Therein, Merleau-Ponty 
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provides a rigorous demonstration that the physical order (e.g., ions, chemicals) and the 
vital order (e.g., tissue, organs) of human existence are not intelligible without due 
consideration given to the human order. It is the human order, in situ, where experiences 
of context bound meaning subsume and organize biological functions.  Hence, a molar 
analysis of embodiment in its relation to environment can shed light upon the failure of 
silicon chips, in and of themselves, to achieve the same adaptability and versatility of a 
human nerve cell.  The silicon chip requires an interface with the context infused vital 
and human order.  “The idea is to combine the mechanical abilities of electronic circuits 
with the extraordinary complexity and intelligence of the human brain” (Vedantam, 2001, 
p. A3).  
 In either case, the existential truth of the biological and the phenomenological 
perspectives is that human embodiment is mortal.  Naturalist researcher’s may, however, 
be in pursuit of research designed to enhance the human body in a way that surpasses its 
taken for granted organic limitations.  Preoccupations with human exemptions to bodily 
finiteness have brought medical researchers to the threshold of “posthuman” possibilities 
promising to overcome bodily frailties.  Borrowing from Immortality, Ben Bova’s (1998) 
upbeat and credulously optimistic overview of biomedical research, one encounters a 
fantastical vision: 
 As the American immunoligist William R. Clark put it, “Death is  
not inextricably intertwined with the definition of life.”  Just because 
human beings have always died does not mean they always will die. 
[D]eath from old age, death as the inescapable end of life, will   
            become a thing of the past, a dark memory of primitive days. 
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 You might be one of the immortals (p. 3). 
Throughout his book, Bova goes on to recount life-extension research breakthroughs 
associated with gene therapy, embryonic stem cell research, fetal tissue transplants, 
telomeric regeneration, and nanotechnology.  For Bova, each of these research domains 
holds out the promise that immortality “is within sight” if conservative institutions such 
as law and religion give up the need to maintain the status quo.  From my perspective, it 
follows that where humans are understood to be like machines, or at least as structured 
like machines, we may well find that the fantasies of transcending finite existence 
continue to abound – whether that be in the form of overcoming everyday limitations, or 
in the form of entertaining beliefs that one can shed the mortal coil.  The notion that 
malfunctioning organic or mechanical body parts (e.g., pacemakers, mechanical hearts, 
computer chips that restore vision), can be repaired, replaced, or upgraded ad infinitum 
may sustain efforts to promote human-machine fusions.    Do such aspirations partially 
inform the current migration onto the electronic frontier? 
To be sure, when human being joins with technology, one’s powers can be 
extended, but to what degree and toward what meaning?  Dreams of immortality 
notwithstanding, what else might we consider about the possibilities afforded by human-
technology fusions?  Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) cogently underscores a lived 
perspective on the relations between humans and technology in The Phenomenology of 
Perception.  “Sometimes, finally, the meaning aimed at cannot be achieved by the body’s 
natural means; it must then build itself an instrument, and it projects thereby around itself 
a cultural world” (p. 146).  If this is the case, to what sociocultural end might humanity 
poise itself when imagining “bodily synthesis” with machines and, moreover, when 
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uncritically donning the “bodily auxiliary” of Internet garb?  Sigmund Freud (1961) 
discussed the implications of human-machine fusions in Civilization and its Discontents.  
At the time of its publication, Freud was commenting upon the significance of the 
technology of the 1930s.  Advanced instruments like the Internet did not exist.  Thus, it 
might be said that Freud’s words were remarkably prophetic:  
Long ago he [sic] formed an ideal conception of omnipotence and 
omniscience which he embodies in his gods.  To these gods, he attributed 
everything that seemed unattainable to his wishes or that was forbidden 
to him.  One may say, therefore, that these gods were cultural ideals. 
To-day he has come very close to the attainment of his ideal . . . 
Man [sic] has, as it were, become a kind of prosthetic god.  (pp. 42-43) 
In light of Freud’s far-reaching notion of the “prosthetic god,” is it not fair to ask 
if Western culture has been seduced into striving for a supracultural ideal which extols a 
new mode of being aimed at surpassing bodily finitude (e.g., overcoming space-time 
barriers)?  By extension, are Internet users implicitly or explicitly gratified by the 
experience of making interpersonal connections with others beyond the reach of the 
“body’s natural means?”  And if so, following Merleau-Ponty, then what cultural world is 
projected around humanity?  Specifically, as the North Americas becomes E-mericanized 
through embracing the transborder (space-time defying) technology of the Internet, is 
Western culture in the process of producing a human abode where mediated relationality 
is meant to serve as a satisfying substitute for shared bodily presence?  In order to address 
such a question in this study, it was methodologically productive to expand upon 
Merleau-Ponty and Freud by reading research participant protocols and wondering about 
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the ways in which EMRs participate in organizing human relatedness to one’s embodied 
self and that of embodied others.  Where the Internet allows human beings to overcome 
the strictures of geography and time, an experientially informed inquiry into the kind of 
psychological, social, and cultural world provides grounding for abstract theoretical 
speculations about the electronic world projected around humanity.  Embarking upon this 
kind of inquiry may allow for eclipsed aspects of human existence to be illuminated in a 
manner which might more effectively situate naturalist discourse on physiology. 
Technocultural Veiw 
 Just as the cyborg neologism may locate part of its lineage within physiological 
discourse, the cultural past of the Internet shares part of its ancestry with the military 
industrial complex; specifically with that of the Department of Defense.  The 
technoculture observer, Mark Dery (1996), recounts how a grant awarded to the 
University of California, Los Angeles, led to the spawning of a military communication 
network known as ARPANet (a.k.a. the Internet) in 1969.  During and after 1983 the 
Internet was subdivided into military, civilian, and National Science Foundation 
networks.  It was not until the 1990s that commercial services like America Online and 
Compuserve came into prominence. 
 Mind-bogglingly, the Internet is itself a part of a still larger complex of 
 interconnected networks commonly called the Matrix, which also includes 
 UseNet (a buzzing hive of discussion groups called “newsgroup”), FidoNet 
(a constellation of over twenty thousand BBSs scattered over six continents), 
and BITNET (Because its Time Network, an academic network) among 
others.  (pp. 5-6)  
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With the then influential magazines like WIRED and Mondo 2000, the anarchic 
cyberspace culture found a partial outlet for the recording, recoding, and dissemination of 
its birthing process.  For instance, with the civilian portion of the Internet free to develop 
without direct military purview, the early 1990s became a time when the emerging 
commercial space of the Internet was largely unregulated.  According to Douglas 
Rushkoff in Cyberia:  Life in the Trenches of Cyberspace (1994), the new frontier of 
cyberspace in the early 1990s attracted virtual reality entrepreneurs, psychedelic 
experimenters, underground computer hackers, neo pagans, and other pioneers. The 
fringe quality of the first-stage social demographic comprising cyberspace formed a 
backcloth for unusual ideas about consciousness and embodiment.  The question 
concerning transcendence, as a form of E-volution, was pervasive. 
Robert Romanyshyn (1989) provided a sober historical account of the relationship 
between transcendence, embodiment, and technology in Technology as Symptom and 
Dream.  Romanyshyn spoke of the body as a social construction.  He described the dream 
of technology as one which prepared the body to abandon nature, hence, to abandon 
earth.  Romanyshyn demonstrated how estrangement from the fundamental ground of 
nature was perpetuated to such an extent that the human capacity for seeing in a richly 
meaningful was eclipsed.  For example, the origin of the linear perspective in the art of 
fifteenth-century Italy became an occasion for human beings to experience the spectacle 
of the world at a distance.  Through this detachment the spectator became a passive 
participant.  The imaginal eye withered while at the same time the world died in the wake 
of its newly signified irrelevance.  In turn, the body became a “corpse” as its sensuous 
attachment to the world was no longer held to be pertinent, and as the anatomical gaze 
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took precedence in defining the body.  Ironically, the view of the body as corpse – along 
with related Cartesian implications - has become hyperbolized in some of the current 
mythopoetic rhapsodizing of cyberculture. 
In a manner analogous to Romanyshyn’s thought, Dery documented the liberal 
contemporary speculation encouraging Net dwellers to embrace the dream of “escape 
velocity” – the speed required by one body (e.g., space craft) to overcome the 
gravitational pull of a larger body (e.g., planet) and break free from the larger body’s 
gravitational pull.  This belief has been translated into a project of technological 
transcendence where cyberia (an interesting acoustic neighbor to Siberia) is endowed 
with the potential to open a space for “mind” to jettison the body and immerse itself into 
the global network of cyberspace.  Pure Cartesian mind leaves the body and merges with 
machine.  As a result, the illusion of overcoming corporeal finitude is symbolically 
achieved.  Immortality is thought to be attained.  This subculture folklore, which 
denigrates bodily existence, stands in antipodal contrast to Irwin Straus’ (1952) 
phenomenological understanding that the “human physique reveals nature” through the 
upright posture and its corollary coordination of motility, gesture, and lived body 
sensorium.  By contrast, the cyberian view of the body is one in which the body is 
somehow an impediment to the realization of one’s full potential to transcend finitude. 
Simon Perry (1994), professor of Art and Robotics at Carnegie Mellon 
University, has addressed the relationship of the embodied computer user’s relation to 
sophisticated virtual environments.  As software programming increasingly mimics and 
“organic” feel and “greater mimesis” in graphic representations, the computer user may 
be more inclined to view his or her body as a “meat body.”  This meat body operates in 
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the limited service of pressing keys in order for action to occur within these compelling 
computer generated landscapes.  The “mind” wanders across the seductive images of 
cyberspace while the body is left to perform mundane keyboard tasks.  Here, Perry seems 
to echo Romanyshyn and Dery’s sentiment that the computer user’s body reveals itself as 
an impediment to full imaginal immersion in cyberrealities.  If this is typically the case, 
the overcoming of finitude indeed becomes a lived awareness of the body as a nuisance; 
as an obstacle to transcendence.  Perry may have failed to recognize that the wandering 
“mind” in cyberspace implicates the use of vision to perceive images and text; and this 
necessity for seeing suggests the profound impossibility of entirely jettisoning 
embodiment in cyberspace. 
Moreover, it has been suggested that as cyberdenizens become accustomed to 
watching worlds through electronic windows, the value of the natural environment has 
also been demoted in status (Slouka, 1995).  As if prefiguring the dramatic tension 
between the real and the virtual in “The Matrix,” Slouka suggests that the first hand 
experience of the embodied world pales in comparison to contemporary electronic 
simulations of encounter.  According to Slouka, an ontological inversion has occurred 
where inside has become outside and absence has become presence.  It may be no small 
coincidence that the denigration of direct encounter on the Internet is analogous to the 
military industrial complex privileging of technological advancement over the 
preservation of nature. To be sure, a critical-hermeneutic inquiry can be an effective 




 In Kenneth Gergen’s (1991) The Saturated Self, he announces that, “A new 
culture is in the making” based on a competition for relational time (p. 3).  According to 
Gergen, the proliferation of communication technologies (e.g., electronic communication 
technologies) “make it possible to sustain relationships – either directly or indirectly – 
with an ever expanding range of other persons.  In many respects we are reaching what 
may be viewed as a state of social saturation” (p. 3).  In light of this social saturation, the 
challenges afforded by competition for relational time can initially leave one “numb” and 
overcome by “unfulfilled obligations” according to Gergen.  In the long run, however, 
Gergen suggests that the invitation to immerse oneself in opportunities for global social 
connection can give rise to significant psychological and social transformations.  
Gergen claims that mild forms of social saturation began in the low-tech 
nineteenth century with its reliance on the railroad, the telegraph, and the public postal 
service.  In the twentieth century, America was introduced to the telephone, the 
automobile, the airplane, radio broadcasting, television, and motion pictures.  For Gergen 
these technological innovations increased the number and broadened the range of 
relational others available to the individual.  As the self was increasingly populated by 
“an infusion of possible identities,” dilemmas of identity followed (p. 6).  Romanticist 
and modernist notions of the self, as respectively “deep” or “rational,” were called into 
question as technologically informed social arrangements highlighted a plurality of 
voices and selves clamoring for recognition and legitimacy.   This plurality of selves and 
differing perspectives subverted notions of certainty and thereby inaugurated a 
postmodern awareness that assumptions regarding bounded identity were unfounded.  
  40
Gergen goes on to outline the features of a communal landscape where increasing 
involvement in electronically mediated interactions have saturated everyday sociality to 
such an extent that a broadened “range of fractional relationships further dissipates family 
functions” (p. 180). 
In summary, Gergen argues that relational time in the postmodern world is 
frequently embedded in technological forms of relating.  This accelerating trend is 
resulting in increased numbers of fragmented incorporeal relations which are gradually 
replacing face-to-face involvement in “deep” connections.  Furthermore, exposure to the 
burgeoning multiplicity of postmodern perspectives, hitherto unavailable in the pre-
Internet era, has made possible the erosion of the essentialist experience of a core or 
“true” self.  Instead, people become “fractal selves” who engage in fractal relationships 
thereby setting the stage for a diminution of committed relationships and “authentic” 
encounters.  The need for self-coherence finds itself impeded by technology’s exposure 
of the individual to an increased range of perspectives that transcend viewpoints held by 
one’ local community.  The individual becomes multivoiced on a surface level leading to 
a “multiphrenia.”  By multiphrenia, Gergen means an expansive “acquisition of multiple 
and disparate potentials for being” which has arisen, in apart, from the individual’s 
engagement with technologies of relationship (p. 69).  Thus, the co-constructive process 
gives rise to an individual who is “populated” by many voices and who in turn exploits 
technology for its potential to provide increased numbers of relationships.  A 
multiplication of fractal selves are thereby engaging in fractal relationships which set the 
stage for a diminution of committed relationships and “authentic” encounters.  For 
example, the monogamous lover might become an individual with a number of “friendly 
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lovers.”  The individual engaged in depthful local community connections could become 
the globally linked cyborg networked in “social saturation.” 
 In contrast to Gergen, Mark Poster (1995) claims that the dream world of 
cyberspace can evoke a “narcissistic stupor.”  Poster employs Wim Winder’s film, “Until 
the End of the World,” where the characters become mesmerized by a technological 
device allowing them to view their dreams.  Their absorption is so compelling that they 
live in utter disregard for the lives of others in the world.  As Romanyshyn (1988) 
cautions in an earlier work, this loss of corporeal communion can lead to depression; but 
not depression qua medical illness.  Depression for Romanyshyn signifies a path to be 
trodden.  It “is a matter of going home . . . it is not an illness to be cured” (p. 227).  Here 
again, the implication by both Romanyshyn and Poster is that excessive engagement in 
virtual spaces may result in a depletion of involvement in one’s shared corporeal world.  
Hence, immersion in these simulated representations, may lead to a path-ological 
condition which can be overlooked with regard to its potent meaning. Following from 
Heidegger (1962), the ensuing depression might be understood as an uncanny mood of 
dis-ease signifying that one’s neglected relational possibilities have been passed over in 
favor of immersion in a tranquilizing form of alienation from one’s genuine possibilities. 
 If there are dystopian aspects of cyberspace with the potential to evoke alienation 
from one’s own being, it would seem that the task of an Internet culture psychology 
would be to demystify the romanticization of the Internet as a tool for transcendence, self 
realization, and genuine forms of relating.  An understanding of the unsalutary potentials 
concealed by overly optimistic marketing and misinformation can serve the psychology 
field and Net dwellers in both proactive and reactive ways.  Cyborg responses to the 
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economic and philosophical discourse on the nature of the self may concretely illuminate 
the lived significance of these trends. 
 Kevin Robins (1995) is a critic of the utopian flights of fancy heralding the 
cybertechnology revolution as a domain for glimpsing “heaven” and reviving conviviality 
amidst a world gone wrong.  Within this context, Robins views cyberspace as an 
imaginary realm where cyborgs are invited to dwell in communally constructed fictions.  
He argues, however, that the fantasies of cyberspace promote infantile omnipotent 
strivings associated with the domination of nature.  These fantasies can be particularly 
compelling in a world where individuals may feel dis-empowered and perhaps politically 
insignificant.  The virtual sense of omnipotence solicited by cyberspace engagement 
becomes a condition for the possibility of acting upon potentially volatile delusions about 
possessing supreme magical powers.  When these fantasies are conflated with the crisis 
of identity invoked by the ontological reframing of the self as multiple, fluid, and 
alterable, identity confusion may set in.  Understanding oneself as an unbounded 
cyberspace body may engender experiences of fragmentation.  As a result, cyberworld 
relationships may evidence a deterioration of normative ethics and confusion around 
social meaning.  It is within this kind of social terrain that Robins envisions regressions to 
narcissistic forms of relating as commonplace.  Pushed to an extreme, the privileging of 
impulsive gratification of wishes and desires may for some evoke overwhelming anxiety 
in the face of a postmodern dissolution of identity resulting in a retreat to the hallucinated 
omnipotence of childhood. 
 If and how often some of these cyber scenarios are enacted was a question in this 
study.  In the foregoing work Robins offers what seems to be a plausible conjecture 
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grounded in mainstream psychological theory.  This critical-hermeneutic inquiry shifts 
the focus away from a theoretical inquiry to an experience-near illumination of the 
various subject-world dialogues extant in cyberspace. 
 Having demythologized the utopian potentials of cyberspace, Robins goes on to 
consider generative transformative possibilities.  Robins acknowledges Donald 
Winnicott’s understanding of imagination as a “potential space” which gives rise to 
creative capacities and to creative infantile illusions which work in the service of 
“maturation.”  For instance, incremental maternal failures to gratify the omnipotent 
desires of a child become the occasion for that child to encounter limitations in a 
minimally traumatizing manner.  The deflation of illusory omnipotence eventually opens 
the child to forming interdependent relations with others.  Here then, Robins is 
acknowledging that the Internet can present itself as an opening onto a Winnicottian 
“transitional  space” which enhances possibilities for egalitarian relations insofar as the 
disincarnate feel of cyberspace does not supplant the understanding that an embodied 
other is always implicated in EMRs. 
 Unlike Robins theoretical approach to understanding virtuality, Sherry Turkle 
(1995) provided an interview based cyberculture analysis in her landmark work, Life on 
the Screen.  Turkle utilized observation, participation, and interview methods in her 
investigation into modern day cyborgs.  She put together a cultural profile informed by 
self-reports of lived out experience.  Turkle found that the Internet has become the theater 
for individual and collective communication and enactment of fantasy (e.g., intellectual, 
romantic, erotic).  The cyborg can explore a variety of social possibilities as either a 
spectator or participant.  Participation in these disembodied social scenes (e.g., WELLs, 
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MUDs, MUSEs) affords the netdweller an opportunity to reconstruct a dizzying number 
of alternate self (mis)representations.  One simply has to create and “project” these 
representations onto the “other side” of the screen.  The postmodern decentered self is 
afforded the opportunity to experiment with previously unexpressed identities (e.g., 
gender swapping).  For some of Turkle’s interviewees, the opportunity to “morph” 
allowed one to step into and perhaps gain insight into another worldview.  As one female 
interviewee described it, morphing on the Internet becomes a form of “simulation as 
consciousness raising.”  Re-representation of oneself holds out transformative 
possibilities.  Disembodied states expand one’s range of relational possibilities and calls 
forth theretofore unlived modes of living one’s identity. 
 Turkle found that the establishment of relationships in various cyber communities 
did not necessarily guarantee happy self-transformations.  In the case of Stuart, he 
enjoyed a rich fantasy life in one of the interactive MUDs.  His involvement in the MUD 
eventually led to a “cyberspace marriage.”  Even in the face of establishing a “marital” 
connection, Stuart felt that despite his lengthy and deep involvement in the MUD he 
experienced no alteration of his identity, nor did his relational way of being with 
embodied others change.  Stuart described his experience as an “addictive waste of time.” 
 Another interviewee, Robert, described a more fulfilling experience.  He found 
that involvement in cyberspace relationships shielded him from addictive behaviors in his 
everyday life.  Moreover, by escaping to a virtual community, Robert found that the 
relational opportunities for creative play on the MUD became an important milestone in 
his personal development.  Robert was subsequently able to develop new ways to 
appreciate troublesome aspects of his life. 
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Turkle interpreted the divergent experiences of Stuart and Robert through 
identification of the different projects each brought to their respective MUD 
communities.  For instance, Stuart’s preexisting sense of self was “withdrawn, 
unappealing, and flawed.”  Given Stuart’s tenuous sense of self, Turkle understood his 
immersion in MUD relations to be motivated by the attainment of reassuring constancy 
and reliability provided by its members.  The dependability of the community stood as a 
marked contrast to the unpredictable nature of relationships available to Stuart with 
embodied others.  Thus Stuart was using the MUD to “act out” rather than “work 
through” the insecurities and ambiguities pervading his corporal relations.  Robert’s 
project, however, differed from Stuart’s insofar as Robert’s intention was to apply what 
he learned from his EMRs to his life outside the MUD.  Turkle thereby concluded that 
cyberspace communities could contribute to personal development if one brought the 
motivation and capacity to move beyond habitual ways of being. 
Turkle’s viewpoint on Robert and Stuart preserves the phenomenological 
understanding that there is a co-constitutive process always already operating in person-
(cyber)world dialectics.  Constrictions in living are not merely a product of deterministic 
discourses embedded within Internet social spaces.  Instead, transformational outcomes 
are informed by the ways in which the individual takes up a free relationship to what is 
encountered.  The world of the Internet can be an occasion for alienation or renewal and 
reintegration. 
Continental Philosophy Perspective 
One way to appropriate a fuller meaning of EMRs is to take a look at the broader 
significance of contemporary technology.  Heidegger (1977) does this in his essay, “The 
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Question Concerning Technology.”  Heidegger questions technology in order to 
understand its relation to the disclosure of the truth of being.  Manifestly, Heidegger is 
interested in the “essence” of technology – the way in which things “come to presence” 
in an enduring way.  Upon reading Heidegger’s text, one begins to understand that 
Heidegger is not so much concerned with the hardware of technology, as much as he is 
interested in the way disclosure occurs amidst technology. 
For Heidegger, the meaning of technology etymologically links back to the early 
Greek term, technē.  Technē referred not only to the skill of the craftsperson, it also 
referenced an aesthetic sensibility.  The craftsperson task was to set free, or allow 
something to arise “from out of itself” (physis).  The efforts of the artisan were 
understood as a kind of “bringing-forth” (poiēsis) which allows “the growing things of 
nature as well as whatever is completed through the crafts and the arts to come at any 
given time to their appearance” (p. 11).  This coming forth is released or set free in 
revealing (alētheia) truth – not as a correct judgment, but as a revealing of the being of a 
thing.  Upon fuller inquiry then, Heidegger understands the meaning of technology as a 
way of revealing the ongoing happening of alētheia. 
By contrast, the way of revealing that holds sway in modern technology does not 
bring forth in a way that allows poiēsis or the revealing of alētheia to blossom.  “The 
revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [Herausfordern], which puts to 
nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as 
such” (p. 14).  There exists a “setting-upon” nature in order to expedite the challenging 
forth of its energy.  “Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen, the earth to yield ore, ore to 
yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy, which can be 
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released either for destruction or for peaceful use” (p.15).  Modern technology gathers 
humankind together in an orderly mode of revealing nature as “standing-reserve.”  This 
orderly gathering at the heart of modern technology is, for Heidegger, an Enframing (Ge-
stell).  By Enframing (Ge-stell), Heidegger means that humankind is set upon to reveal 
nature as standing-reserve (Bestand).  Thus, the essence of modern technology sends 
humankind into a way of revealing “the real” as standing-reserve. 
In On the Internet, Hubert Dreyfus (2000) claims that the Internet carries forward 
the essence of technology.  Despite the unpredictable nature of future Internet uses, 
Dreyfus suggests that the essence of the Internet “is to make everything easily accessible 
and optimizable” (p. 2).  Dreyfus then goes on to consider what might happen if the 
Internet became central to everyday living.  What would become of human being if a 
large part of one’s existence took place in Netspace?  I might rephrase the question by 
asking, what happens to human being if it participates in an enframing that orders it to 
make its relationships “easily accessible and optimizable?”  Moreover, how is the 
revealing or bringing-forth of the other changed through reliance on EMRs? 
When humankind is sent on this way of revealing, Dreyfus notes that the body is 
left behind in a manner that disavows its perceptual hold on the world.  Dreyfus takes a 
cue from Friedrich Nietzsche’s privileging of bodily instincts and passions.  From there, 
Dreyfus draws upon Merleua-Ponty’s understanding that the body’s “maximum grip” on 
the world allows for indeterminacy and ambiguity to become more determinable.  In 
order to crystallize differentiated perception from out of ambiguous experience, the 
appropriation of maximum grip involves a tacking back and forth between specific details 
and the broader context.  Unfortunately, when one is engaged in Internet exchanges, 
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much of the perceptually rich background is lost to the conversational partners.   As a 
result, the ongoing task of interpreting meaning is significantly hampered.  Dreyfus 
claims that reliance on email or the telepresence of others contributes to a declining 
attentiveness to a fundamental aspect of maximum grip.  One’s bodily hold on context 
and the immediacy of shared mood is significantly foreclosed from engagement.  Thus, 
the silent background of one’s ongoing perceptual movement is partially put out of play 
in cyberspace relations.  This loss might then lead to a diminishing sense of the “reality 
of people and things” perhaps leading to a diminution of trust.  And with long-term 
reliance on EMRs, Eva-Maria Simms (2001) might agree that our situated bodily powers 
for disclosure may begin to atrophy after prolonged engagement with the stylized social 
order of the Internet.  Particularly if one acknowledges the point that the “medium is the 
message” – that the Internet’s extension of our senses occasions a numbing of our human 
capacities as technology takes over bodily functions in order to increase power and speed 
(McLuhan, 1964; Levinson, 1999).  Moreover, the experience of poiēsis, or “wild 
thinking,” may suffer a loss in power and relevance as its disclosure suffers from a lack 
of connection to the full context from which it might arise.  The technological Enframing 
(Ge-stell) of the imaginal and of meaning may lapse into distortion and frequent 
misinterpretation.  Said differently, the limited understanding of others as standing-
reserve may not be the only consequence of the Internet’s essence. 
Critical Theory Perspective   
In the next section, a rare example of Internet research based upon the critical 
thought of Foucault will be reviewed.  In order to situate this example of Foucauldian 
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research, we will first begin with an extended discussion of Foucault’s perspective on 
power and the production of subjectivity. 
According to Paul Rabinow (1984) Foucault has positioned himself “close to, but 
apart from” thinkers like Heidegger who have addressed the “rationalization and 
technological development of the world” (p.13).  Foucault’s effort was not to indict 
reason per se, but rather to understand its historical effects, limitations, dangers, and its 
relation to power.  “The relationship between rationalization and the excesses of political 
power is evident.  And we should not need to wait for bureaucracy and concentration 
camps to recognize the existence of such relations” (Foucault, 1983, p. 210).  Thus, for 
Foucault reason was not to be studied as a grand totalizing force which worked its way 
through history with a singular continuous telos.  Foucault was sensitized to more 
specific considerations: 
[I] would suggest another way of investigating the links between 
rationalization and power. 
It may be wise not to take as a whole the rationalization of society 
or culture, but to analyze such a process in several fields, each with 
reference to a fundamental experience:  madness, illness, death, crime, 
sexuality, and so forth.  (p. 210) 
Rationality was to be studied in relation to various modalities of power which operated 
discontinuously within different localized domains (e.g., mental illness, cyberspace).  
Foucault thereby sought to develop a revisionist history which recuperated oppressed 
knowledges typically barred from admission into discourse by traditional universalizing 
historical accounts. 
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Taking a cue from Foucault, I go on to “analyze” the evermore “fundamental 
experience” of EMR social spaces in order to understand the culturally configured 
contours of subjectivity and sociality presently emerging under the moniker of the 
cyborg.  Further impetus for this research inquiry was gained by noting that although 
Foucault was clearly engaged in exploring the horizon of power relations, Foucault 
explicitly stated that the keynote of his work was otherwise: 
 [T]he goal of my work during the past twenty years . . . has not been to 
analyze the phenomena of power . . . . 
 My objective, instead, has been to create a history of the different 
modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects . . . 
 Thus, it is not power, but the subject, which is the general theme 
of my research.  (pp. 208-209) 
In articulating a revisionist history of the modes by which subjects have been created, 
Foucault shifted from the traditional understanding of subjectivity as situated in relation 
to production toward locating the subject within a framework of mobile and complex 
power relations.  Moreover, Foucault’s aim was to formulate a way of developing a 
concrete understanding of power relations: 
  . . . a way which is more empirical, more directly related to our present 
situation, and which implies more relations between theory and practice. 
It consists of taking the forms of resistance against different forms of 
power as a starting point . . . [and] using this resistance as a chemical 
catalyst so as to bring to light power relations . . . (pp. 210-211) 
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Here, Foucault gestures toward the assertion that resistance can illuminate that 
which is resisted.  More to the point, resistance references that which attempts to produce 
subjects or docile bodies.  Thus, under certain conditions of inquiry, the disjunctions 
which are brought about by noncompliant practices can make visible discourses which 
are intertwined with disciplinary power (1978, 1979).  Whereas Heidegger demonstrated 
how the referential context of one’s project becomes transparent when taken-for-granted 
goal oriented activities become unready-to-hand, or breakdown, Foucault specified how 
noncompliant social activities vivify the power relations at play within the local 
referential matrix.  I would supplement Foucault’s claim that power relations come to 
light through instantiations of resistance by adding that compliant social practices or 
beliefs, as well as breakdowns in carrying out the injunctions of dominant discourses may 
reveal background social structures.  For example, in The History of Sexuality, Foucault 
studies the mobilization of power when sex is “put into discourse:” 
. . . how [discourse] penetrates and controls everyday pleasure –  
all this entailing effects that may be those of refusal, blockage, and 
invalidation, but also incitement and intensification.  (p. 11) 
Foucault seeks to specify how the “will to power” negates or supports “the truth” about 
sex.  Rather than supporting a universalist notion of truth, Foucault explicates the 
historically contingent quality of truth as an effect of power.  In short, power creates 
value; and in the case of The History of Sexuality, power works to assign the meaning and 
significance of various sexual practices.  Under such conditions, subjects become agents 
that carry out valued practices in bodies which have been shaped and marked by power.  
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It can then be argued, from the perspective of Hans Kögler (1996), that a reconstruction 
of individual behaviors and beliefs can “refer back to what directs and orders praxis” 
(p. 31). 
How does the power knowledge nexus produce truth?  For Foucault, “regulatory” 
or “normalizing” judgments are engaged when sex is introduced into discourse.  The 
domains of medicine, psychiatry, religion, jurisprudence, and so forth, constellate around 
a “bio-power” which centers on life by “inciting” disparate sexualities.  
Power/knowledge wishes to hear sex being spoken about.  In this way, normalizing 
judgment can then signify what is deviant or perverse.  “Confession frees, but power 
reduces one to silence” (p. 60).   
Insofar as regulatory discourse about the body is effectively “internalized,” the 
subject becomes an efficient site of self-policing.  In addition, where the family exists as 
an extension of various modes of control by “proliferating, annexing, creating, and 
penetrating . . . bodies in increasingly detailed ways” (p. 107), the “deployment of 
sexuality” becomes more comprehensively installed in daily life by normalizing 
discourse.  Under these conditions, power does not attempt to enslave bodies, but rather, 
power encourages the affirmation of a certain kind of self.  Power acts in a productive 
manner.  Finally, where bodies are further situated amidst ongoing surveillance beyond 
the family (e.g., institutions, administrative machinery), “sexuality [becomes] a set of 
effects produced in bodies, behaviors, and social relations . . . Eventually the entire social 
body [is] provided with a ‘sexual body’” (p. 127).   
In short, Foucault has provided us with a “history of bodies” as they are invested, 
produced, and subjected.  Can practices of resistance or freedom occur where bodies are 
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so thoroughly permeated by nonsubjective intentionalities?  Foucault inclines: “The 
rallying point for the counterattack against the deployment of sexuality ought not be sex-
desire, but bodies and pleasure” (p. 157).  For Foucault, it is the creative enactment of 
new bodies and pleasures which enables the subject to surpass its subjection.  Where this 
was the case in this study, the ways in which the creative power of the imaginary came to 
pass in the language of research protocols about EMRs was noted.  And in a (cyber)world 
where the privative mode of imagination – fantasy – was sometimes solicited, it was also 
noted just what it was that came to signify resistance over against compliance.  That said, 
what follows in this next section is an example of critical research on the Internet which 
in part attempts to interpret social practices in a manner that discloses precognitive 
background assumptions and the cultural-historical social structures linked to those 
assumptions. 
Critical Internet Research.  In a rare example of Internet research grounded in 
Foucault’s work, Alan Aycok (1995), engaged in a Foucauldian based study of the 
Internet as a “technology of the self.” In this case, Aycock viewed the Internet as an 
instrument for occasioning the social production of identity.  Aycock performed a 
qualitative content analysis of “several weeks of postings” from the Internet newsgroup 
rec.games.chess (rgc) where participants discussed issues pertinent to advancement in 
their mastery of the game of chess.  “For most of those who post to rgc, the goal of 
personal transformation is the formal mastery of chess” (p. 6). 
Interpretations of rgc postings were based on Aycock’s Foucauldian inspired 
“model of the online fashioning of identity.”   Aycock appropriated Foucault’s notion of 
“self fashioning” for his interpretive foundation by emphasizing the following:  (1) the 
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identification of the substance developed by the individual  (a deep inner self – indicated 
by discussion of skill and strength); (2) the mode of individual subjection to a 
disciplinary rule (commitment to particular activities – indicated by knowledge of 
techniques, ownership of chess products, etc.); (3) the ethical labor transforming the 
substance (discipline or routine employed to transform self – indicated by intensity of 
personal chess routines); and, the outcome of self care (the goal of personal 
transformation – indicated by mastery of chess).  Aycock’s Foucauldian view of Internet 
discourse allowed Aycock to locate newsgroup speech acts and social practices as 
situated within the disciplinary technologies linked to romanticism and modernism.  
Whether an experience of shared freedom prevailed at the rgc. Web site was for Aycock 
not just a function of rgc norms embedded in online participant speech acts.  Rather, 
Aycock indirectly suggested that the framework of Internet surveillance/panopticism 
(e.g., mainframe caveats advising authorized users that their activities may be monitored) 
was designed to normalize Web site activity by serving as a background form of 
discipline. 
A corollary to Aycock’s conclusions about the fashioning of a deep inner self can 
be found in Discipline and Punish.  In this historical account, docile bodies are 
reproduced by centering the attention of a new form of power, disciplinary power, on 
something other than social practices. 
As the prison system evolved over time, the tactics of normalization shifted from 
torture, to punishment, and then to discipline.  For Foucault, disciplinary practices 
attempt to create docile bodies through the imposition of social controls.  This historical 
form of discipline took as its “object” the representation of the “soul.”  The soul was to 
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be infused with a set of right beliefs and emotions.  In this way, modern forms of power 
designated what counted as normal and abnormal.  “[M]echanisms of power . . . are 
disposed around the abnormal individual, to brand him [sic] and to alter him” (p, 199).  
Prisons attempted to requalify inmates as normal members of society by investing them 
with beliefs which were consonant with the agendas of power.  The techniques of such 
discipline included observation, surveillance, examination, normalizing judgment, and 
panopticism.  Foucault described Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon as an architectural 
manifestation of an efficient form of disciplinary power.  The Panopticon stood in a 
prison as a centralized observation tower with a full view of all the inmates who were 
housed in isolation from each other.  The prisoners were fully visible to the guards.  The 
guards however, were hidden behind smoked windows.  Hence, the prisoners were 
unable to discern whether or not they were being surveilled.  Foucault explains: 
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, 
assumes responsibility for the constraints of power; he makes them play 
spontaneously upon himself; he inscribes in himself the power relation in  
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his 
own subjection.  (pp. 202-203) 
The unremitting gaze of an invisible power heightens the self-conscious process by which 
the surveilled monitors his or her conduct. Here, Foucault strengthens his case for a 
nonessentialist view of subjectivity.  In this particular instance, bodies are being 
subjected through a disciplinary attentiveness to the inner substance of the “soul.”  
Without the inmate’s proper attention to modification of the self, mechanisms of 
examination, training, and/or further exclusion might be invoked.  Rather than severely 
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punish the inmate, instead, a sophisticated and detailed examination of the “soul” by 
power is employed as a means to rehabilitate and reinsert the prisoner into the larger 
social order.  Thus, Foucault demonstrates how malleable subjectivity can be when the 
body is saturated by the techniques of power. 
In this way, Aycock’s study of the rgc Internet newsgroup postings served as an 
impetus to read research protocols from a perspective which sustained an interpretive 
attentiveness to the workings of power upon deep selves and social practices.  
Accordingly, the research method employed in this study, following from Foucault, 
maintained openness to the possibility of locating analogous panoptic structures during 
EMRs.  Consequently, it was interpretively valuable to make note of the moments where 
seemingly docile bodies experience the contours of Internet interactivity as problematic. 
The kind of clearing for sociality carved out by power was more readily articulated when 
subjects thematized relational or experiential discord. The relevance of thematized 
disjunctions within an EMR clearing was not to be the only means of disclosing the EMR 
horizon.  The experiences of fluid, harmonious, or even pleasing EMR interactivity 
sometimes reflected a docility which lent itself to the disclosure of the “internalized” 
effects of power. 
In the article, “Being and Power,” Dreyfus (n.d.b) described Foucauldian power 
as a social clearing or positive field of action which produces a reality that informs the 
beliefs and actions of social agents.  Comparing Heidegger’s thought to Foucault, 
Dreyfus remarks, “A culture’s understanding of being allows people and things to show 
up as something . . . Thus the understanding of being creates what Heidegger calls a 
clearing (Lichtung) . . . [T]he clearing both limits and opens up what can show up and 
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what is done” (p. 1).  In either case, culturally and historically informed everyday 
activities (e.g., Internet praxis) both produce and limit what can be revealed to and about 
culturally positioned subjects.  Thus, in effect, the social clearing facilitates and 
constrains practices of freedom and efforts to expand understanding of everyday 
experience.  Consequently, Dreyfus wants to underscore that social agents can benefit 
from a reflective engagement with their situated experiences.  Quoting Dreyfus (n.d.a) 
from “Heidegger and Foucault on the Subject, Agency, and Practices,” Dreyfus states, 
“[I]t will turn out for both thinkers that each person can modify his or her cultural 
practices by openness to embeddedness in them” (p. 1). 
How was Dreyfus’ latter claim concretely addressed in this research inquiry into 
EMRs?  First, the graphic interface design were interpreted in the section concerning 
“local site” issues. It was decided that this feature participated in comprising the clearing 
– or rather, Internet window - which opened onto possibilities for e-text writing and other 
forms of social exchange to occur and have meaning (cf. Johnson 1997; Aarseth, 1997).  
Second, it turned out that the “code,” or programmed architecture of the differently 
constituted cyber-spaces, was pertinent to the amounts of perceived freedom associated 
with Internet practices (Lessig, 1999). 
Lawrence Lessig objects to first-generation Internet user thoughts that, 
“Cyberspace . . . cannot be regulated.”  Instead, Lessig states, “If there is any place that is 
constructed, cyberspace is it” (p. 24).  Lessig argues that cyberspace codes instantiate 
values which are the outcome of diverse concerns found among social norms (e.g., 
stigmas a community embraces), the law (e.g., through legalized punishments), and the 
marketplace (e.g., through price structures).  As a result, some cyber-spaces are open and 
  58
nonproprietary (no identification needed for access), and others are closed and 
proprietary (access is granted with tight control).  Behavior becomes more or less 
“regulable” insofar as technologies of identity (e.g., cookies, passwords) eliminate 
opportunities for user anonymity. Thus in proprietary cyber-spaces, for instance, 
monitoring entities are thereby empowered to identify if a violation has occurred and who 
engaged in the violation.  In a Foucauldian sense, cyberspace users in proprietary cyber-
spaces become visible whereas the normalizing gaze of power is veiled, even if it is still 
acknowledged as a background presence (cf. Panopticon).  Even in nonproprietary spaces 
a host of constructive forces exist including the social norms imposed by community 
sanctions and government attempts to limit computer user privacy by requiring authors of 
encryption code to “build into their code a back door through which the government 
could gain access” (p. 49) thereby nullifying aspects of privacy associated with 
encryption. 
Philosophical Grounding of the Method 
In early phenomenological psychology research, the research participant protocols 
were interpreted in a manner which assumed that human beings constructed meaning 
unidirectionally, and that researchers could bracket their assumptions in order to access 
the essential structure of each participant’s lived-experience (Giorgi, 1975, Wertz, 1983).  
The maintenance of researcher “fidelity” to experiential phenomena, as lived through by 
research participants, served as a guiding tenet.  The emphasis upon phenomenological 
faithfulness to lived experience was, still, however, beholden to assumptions pertaining to 
the subject’s centrality in constructing lived meanings.  In contrast, this study jettisons 
any assumption which equates the event of signification as residing exclusively within 
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the constructive power of a meaning-giving subject.  By challenging the notion of human 
exclusivity in constructing meaning I am not, instead, adopting a structuralist stance 
which eviscerates humanity of its signifying powers and thereby grants priority to rule 
governed systems as the producers of meaning and social action.  Instead, it is the 
fundamental dialogue between person and world which I maintain as the primary unit of 
meaning creation.  Even more to the point, I seek to combine aspects of hermeneutic and 
critical inquiry in a manner which intelligibly preserves the understanding of meaning 
production as occasioned by the ongoing reciprocity inhering in the person-world unity.  
Before advancing further, however, I will address some meta-methodological concerns 
with respect to the compatibility of Heidegger and Foucault. 
Methodological Differences?:  Heidegger and Foucault on ‘Depth” 
Hans Kögler (1996) discusses the value of bringing Foucault’s critical thought 
and Heidegger’s hermeneutic thought (later developed by Hans-Georg Gadamer) together 
methodologically in The Power of Dialogue.  Therein Kögler argues for the hermeneutic 
claim that presuppositions held by interpreters are mediated by culture and history.  As 
such, Kögler claims that these culturally and historically mediated presuppositions both 
produce and constrain the interpreter’s “consciousness.”  In my research on EMRs, the 
role of the interpreter includes both myself as a researcher who “analyzes” data and the 
research participants who implicitly disclose their presuppositions about lived experience 
in protocols and in interviews with me.  Kögler wants to argue that one’s “consciousness” 
can be expanded if one’s presuppositions (e.g., researcher and research participant 
presuppositions) are linked to both the broad cultural-historical framework of one’s 
heritage and to the localized cultural-historical perspectives that contribute to one’s 
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presuppositions.  Specifically, Kögler suggests that a fuller understanding of the 
experiential dimension is gained through an acknowledgement of the power relations 
always already at work in one’s immediate community.  Thus, hermeneutics is made 
more complete when the context of macrocosmic historical narratives are linked to 
community level power relations. 
Power, for Foucault is not to be understood as “hidden” from view.  Instead, 
power is profoundly visible in the form of social practices.  In order to demonstrate the 
compatibility of Heidegger and Foucault on this point, I will discuss, in the next section, 
how Heidegger’s emphasis on “deep” truths is typically misunderstood as a reference to 
knowledge “hidden” beneath appearances.   In the subsequent section, I will examine 
how ambiguities in Foucault’s understanding of history as discontinuous may belie a 
common ground Foucault shares with Heidegger on broad narratives of history. 
Influenced by Nietzsche, Foucault was not in search of “deep” meaning, nor did 
Foucault believe that there was any intrinsic “deep” meaning to be sought.  For Foucault, 
“deep” meaning came to signify just another social construction propagated by power.  
Heidegger, on the other hand, purportedly exposed a history of Western metaphysics 
which covered over the “deep” meaning of being.  Does this impasse between these two 
thinkers necessarily preclude any productive synthesis between critical thought and 
hermeneutics?  I will examine Heidegger’s hermeneutically informed approach to 
disclosing meaning as a way to clarify how Heidegger employs the term “deep.”  This 
approach, I believe, facilitated a practical resolution to the perceived division between 
Heidegger and Foucault on the issue of “depth.”  It also paved the way for justifying my 
approach to studying the observable cultural-historical contexts of EMR experiences by 
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utilizing scholarly works with a technocultural-historical perspective.  To begin, I will 
review Foucault’s criticism of hermeneutics. 
Dreyfus and Rabinow (1983) discuss two types of hermeneutic practices which 
have been challenged by Foucault – commentary hermeneutics and the hermeneutics of 
suspicion.  For Foucault, commentary hermeneutics limits itself by simply thematizing 
each actor’s perspective on the intersubjective meanings embedded in his or her 
encounter.  In doing so, according to Foucault, commentary hermeneutics reproduces or 
uncritically expands upon each actor’s limited understanding of shared meaning.  
Consequently, practitioners of commentary hermeneutics fail to notice the broader 
contexts which produce the meanings and truths lived through by the actors.  In addition, 
this privileging of the actors’ production of meaning restricts the hermeneutic scope of 
analysis from examining the actors’ social practices and their subsequent effects.  
Commentary hermeneutics thereby suffers from a kind of interpretive myopia.  In order 
for me, as researcher, to avoid reproducing an overly narrow EMR analysis, the data I use 
will include the perspectives of research participants as well as my interpretation of 
discourses operating in each research participant’s Internet community. 
With regard to a hermeneutics of suspicion, Dreyfus and Rabinow state that such 
suspicion assumes that actors engage in distorting “hidden” truths.  Consequently, these 
distortions render the actors unable to access concealed truths without the aid of an 
“authority”  (e.g., the psychoanalyst role in uncovering repressions).  Since, however, the 
actors’ view of surface meanings is a falsification, a hermeneutics of suspicion presumes 
that an “authority” will enable the actors to unmask the deep meaning hidden behind 
surface understanding.  The interpretive capacity of the “authority” leaps ahead of the 
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actors’ possibilities in a way that facilitates the disclosure of the actors’ concealed 
meanings. 
            In this case, Foucault objects to a hermeneutics of suspicion insofar as it seeks 
“deep” meanings behind distorted surface understanding.  Quoting Dreyfus and Rabinow: 
Foucault’s basic objection to the hermeneutics of suspicion is  
that these secrets which the actors can be forced to face must not be  
understood as the true and deepest motivation of his [sic] surface  
behavior. (p.124) 
Here, Foucault would maintain that it is problematic to retain the presupposition that 
“true” meaning is hidden from view beneath psychological awareness or behind 
appearances.  Instead, Foucault argues that surface appearances, such as speech acts and 
historical practices, are audible and visible sites of meaning production.  That is of 
course, notwithstanding a person’s effort to withhold or ignore certain significations.  
Even if such a person were motivated not to reveal meanings to others, it would still be 
the case that meanings are produced and sought out in and through observable 
phenomena, not by searching out deep truths.  In The History of Sexuality Foucault wants 
it to be understood that the notion of “deep” truth is a construction of cultural-historical 
processes linked to power: 
[It is through the organization of power] that we became 
dedicated to the endless task of exacting the truest of confessions 
from a shadow. 
The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our 
“liberation” is in the balance. (p. 159) 
  63
By extension, Foucault subjects the hermeneutics of suspicion to the same critique he 
applies to commentary hermeneutics.  Both forms of hermeneutics fail to acknowledge 
the relevance of symbolic frameworks in the interpretive process.  Moreover, these 
background frameworks are not concealed, but rather, are present on the surface.  For 
Foucault there are only surfaces in the realm of meaning constitution.  The belief in 
hidden depths is a conceptual error.  As a result, my research into EMRs will avoid the 
interpretive act of constructing meanings which are not well grounded in the observable 
data used in this study. 
Given Foucault’s claim that the production of meaning is a visible phenomenon, 
the question arises:  Is it possible to overcome Foucault’s objection to Heidegger’s 
emphasis upon “deep” meaning?  In order to respond, I will begin by examining 
Heidegger’s discussion of meaning as a way to demonstrate that Heidegger and Foucault 
both attend methodologically to the observable matrix of meaning production.     
In Being and Time, Heidegger describes the meaning of meaning as “the ‘upon 
which’ of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it 
gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight, and a fore-conception ” (p. 193).  In 
speaking about fore-structures, Heidegger suggests that one’s initial understanding of 
what is encountered is informed by one’s presuppositions.  By speaking about meaning as 
the “upon which,” Heidegger is also suggesting that what one encounters in everyday 
dealings derives its intelligibility from the way in which what is encountered is embedded 
in a “totality of involvements.”  In my research on EMRs, I will attend to the totality of 
involvements by examining scholarly texts about technocultural-history and by exploring 
  64
discourses (e.g., through graphic user interfaces and Internet documents) associated with 
the Internet sites used by research participants. 
At this point, it is important to note that both the totality of involvements and 
fore-structures are public and accessible ways to understand meaning.  For example, 
Heidegger discusses how a hammer is not initially understood as a decontextualized 
object.  The meaning of a hammer is informed by cultural-historical presuppositions 
about such objects, as well as by an understanding of the work produced by employing 
the hammer.  And this work, for Heidegger, “bears with it the referential totality within 
which the [hammer] is encountered” (p. 99).  To be sure, the usability of the hammer can 
be understood more fluidly when one considers that the context of a hammer’s meaning 
for a carpenter is far different than the context of a hammer’s meaning for someone who 
is being attacked.  For the carpenter the hammer is a building tool, for the potential victim 
of assault it is a tool for protection, a weapon.  In both instances, the meaning of the 
hammer is assigned by the entities which are “discovered in using it.”  It is one’s 
openness to the changeability of referential totalities which allows presuppositions about 
the hammer to be modified in a manner which acknowledges the impermanence of 
meaning.  Thus Heidegger, not unlike Foucault, attends to the indivisibility of meaning 
from the world or social clearing of background significations.  Meaning is not, as it 
were, to be found behind the phenomena of the world.  Meaning is understood through an 
awareness of the worldly weave of references.  Hence, for Heidegger, meaning is not 
“deep” in the ordinary sense of the word.  In Being and Time, Heidegger remarks: 
[I]f we are inquiring about the meaning of Being, our investigation 
does not become a “deep” one [tiefsinnig], nor does it puzzle out 
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what stands behind Being.  It asks about Being insofar as it enters 
into the intelligibility of Dasein. (p. 193) 
Here, depth pertains to the intelligibility of what is encountered.  Dasein understands 
what is encountered through its holistic awareness of the entwinement of being and 
world.  In understanding depth beyond conventional understandings of spatiality, we can 
then see that breadth might be a more apt term.  Depth qua breadth is a profoundly visible 
contextual phenomenon for Heidegger.  Albert Hofstadter remarks in his translation of 
Heidegger’s (1982) The Basic Problem of Phenomenology : 
 We must not think of being, Sein, as a being, ein Seiendes - as, for 
example, some deep principle behind all other beings, serving as their 
source, their ground, their creator.  This confusion started with the 
beginning of philosophy in the West with Thales . . . and has continued 
down to the present . . . The necessary implication is that being cannot 
be understood in the same way as beings.  I can understand the hammer 
by understanding functionality, but functionality is not another being, on 
a higher plane than the hammer, which then has still another mode of 
being on a higher plane of being as its being, by which it is to be 
understood.  (pp. xxiii-xxiv)                                                                                     
If the being of a phenomenon is not to be understood as “deep,” nor is it to be retrieved as 
“higher” for Hofstadter.  Again, the meaning of the hammer (its functionality) is found in 
and through the weave of references it gathers.  This is a non-essentialist view of 
meaning which does not take recourse to “higher” Platonic ideals or to “deep” and 
original truths linked with a metaphysics of presence. 
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Given Hofstadter’s additional remarks upon the meaning of depth, how then does 
one make further sense of Heidegger’s elucidation of depth?   Robert Romanyshyn 
(1983) offers us, perhaps, another profile of insight illustrated by the notion of depth as 
“lateral depth.”  Turning to Merleau-Ponty as a source of clarification, Romanyshyn 
remarks: 
 [C]onsider the phenomenon of depth.  It is not the visible, and yet as 
 invisible it has no other way of appearing except as of the visible.  The 
 painter, for example, who paints depth must paint things, and it is between 
 and among things that depth appears.  The depth of a thing is not that which 
 is inside it but that which the thing is in and through its existence among 
 other things . . . (p. 234) 
Romanyshyn points to a quality of depth as residing in the “between.”  Thus, the meaning 
of depth arises from one’s submission to the dialogic movement always ready to happen 
between things and situated ‘subjects.’  The depth of meaning remains invisible only 
insofar as there is a failure to deliver oneself over to the understanding that one is thrown 
into a world already populated by a system of references which awaits meaning-ful 
engagement.  Moreover, this web of references is conditioned by the histories, cultures, 
discourses, and power relations which inform the plentitude of meanings awaiting 
thematic articulation by situated agents.  It is the situated agent who possesses the human 
power to creatively appropriate such “repressed” or “oppressed” significations and 
frameworks.  Recuperation of the power to imagine novel meanings makes possible 
practices of freedom consonant with the therapeutics of culture informing my research 
into EMRs.  For example, my imaginal interpretation of the EMR protocols, followed by 
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an interview with each research participant, stood as a provisional effort at 
collaboratively re-appropriating depth/breadth dimensions.  Once the collaborative re-
appropriation of depth/breadth dimensions were thematically rendered, such research data 
in effect cleared a space for netdwellers in general to more readily identify, reinterpret, 
and modify background orders subtending their virtual and everyday existence.  
Methodological Differences?:  Heidegger and Foucault on Historical Continuity and 
Discontinuity  
 
As I mentioned in the Introduction, Foucault and Heidegger appear to have 
adopted divergent positions with regard to narrating history.  Where Heidegger locates a 
rationalizing telos occurring at a macrocosmic level of history, Foucault argues for the 
existence of historical discontinuities and ruptures best observed at the local level of 
historical events.  In this section, I ask if the historical perspectives of Heidegger and 
Foucault are as divergent as they appear.  And, if they are not - if their perspectives 
instead turn out to be interrelated, my interpretation of EMR experiences can 
accommodate discoveries suggesting that power relations may sometimes reproduce the 
dynamics associated with broad cultural-historical narratives.  That is to say, the fluidity 
of power relations at various Internet locations may not always signify a rupture from the 
dominant cultural-historical themes.   
To begin, I suggest that there exists an ambiguity embedded within Foucault’s 
sustained emphasis upon privileging local versions of history.  Specifically, Foucault 
claims that the process of subject formation is consistently informed by something akin to 
“regulation” and “normalization.”  In other words, Foucault contends that amidst the 
discontinuous unfolding of power relations throughout history, normalizing forces are 
always already at work.  According to Dreyfus and Rabinow: 
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In Discipline and Punish and in the part of The History of Sexuality  
devoted to bio-power, Foucault begins his diagnosis by pointing to the  
peculiar way modern norms work, which he calls normalization. 
Among all the rich assortment of techniques, practices, knowledges,  
and discourses Foucault has discussed, normalization is at the core. 
(p. 258)  
Moreover, in Discipline and Punish, Foucault declares that when legal power 
commingles with the human sciences, a “legal-scientifico complex” (cf. bio-power), or a 
formidable union of discourses arise which combine to develop normalizing practices and 
docile bodies.  In the face of the legal-scientifico complex, Foucault suggests that the 
subject is vulnerable to subjection by micropractices of domination.  Although an 
opposing argument might aver that these regulatory norms change over time, according 
to Dreyfus and Rabinow, it remains the case that the subjection of bodies to regulation is 
an enduring background presence for Foucault. 
Our norms are always on the move as if their goal was to bring every 
aspect of our practices together into a coherent whole.  To this end 
various experiences are identified and annexed as appropriate 
domains for theoretical study and intervention. (p. 258) 
It is this continuous progression of normativity which I believe links Foucault to 
Heidegger.  I argue that although Heidegger was blind to the play of power relations due, 
in part, to his emphasis upon examining the implications of Western metaphysics, 
Foucault’s emphasis upon a plurality of discontinuous power relations fails to integrate 
the existence of historical continuities embedded in Foucault’s own historical accounts.  
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Specifically, Foucault may have not fully understood the significance of his claim that 
regulatory practices are continuously co-present with power relations across the way 
stations of history.  Such a foreclosure may have prevented Foucault from articulating a 
commonality he shared with Heidegger.  For instance, in Dreyfus essay, “Heidegger and 
Foucault on the Subject, Agency and Practices,” he points out that Foucault’s historical 
narratives may contain an emphasis on continuity: 
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault tells a rather unNietzschean 
continuous story of how the gradual development of confessional 
practices in the West produced a very stable, unified subject . . . . 
  [T]hese confessional practices linked up with totalizing 
scientific practices in the early seventeenth century . . . and finally two 
centuries later, a science of sexuality that was supposed to hold the 
clue to human agency. (p. 9)  
Thus, mapping Foucault’s discussion of the historical continuity of normalization 
processes onto Heidegger’s understanding of Enframing (Ge-stell) as a continual 
“ordering” of practices has merit, though it is not without its challenges.  Certainly 
Foucault is clear that this process of regulation is a non-subjective intentionality, or 
rather, occurs as if there were a “strategy without a strategist.”  However, it remains 
possible that social clearings may instantiate hierarchies of power relations which may 
become frozen for indefinite amounts of time.  When imbalances in power are 
concentrated in this manner, persons or things may indeed come to presence in enduring 
ways for extended periods of time – particularly when the limited cultural-historical 
consciousness of a people contributes to a marginalized awareness of sites for enacting 
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resistance.  As such, it rested upon Foucault’s shoulders to explain how the normalizing 
telos of rational discourse has achieved a relatively dominant status in Western culture.  
Insofar as there are situations where Enframing (Ge-stell) has not achieved a grand scale 
ordering of the social clearing, I would agree with Foucault that the fluidity of power 
relations gives rise to social clearings in flux.  At the same time, it is also possible that the 
broader mode of revealing referenced by Heidegger’s notion of Enframing (Ge-stell) can 
promote a world ordering or backdrop which sets the parameters within which power 
relations are at play.  In either case, the interpretation of the data in this research study 
illuminated some of the ways in which broadly concentrated discourses of power 
produce, constrain, or coexist with a plurality of power relations.  Moreover, the data 
suggested some of the ways in which persons come to presence in an enduring way, 
while also recognizing that the coming to presence of ‘subjectivity’ can also be a fluid 
phenomenon. 
Summary of Research Purpose and Guiding Presuppositions 
Purpose 
The purpose of this study, by way of review, rests upon an inquiry into EMRs and 
the kinds of ‘subjects’ potentially co-constituted through immersion in Internet 
communication.  Thus, my core question pursues an inquiry into the kinds of 
transformations undergone in the experience of self, other, and sociality during Internet 
communication.  In this way, I contribute to a reexamination of utopian and dystopian 
claims regarding the impact of the Internet.  Four kinds of qualitative data are 
incorporated into this inquiry regarding subjectivity and sociality. The data include 
experiential descriptions, interviews with research participants, cultural-historical 
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accounts about the significance of technology, and an analysis of discourses constellated 
around sites for EMR communication.  An integrated interpretation of these qualitative 
data rests upon my preconceptions regarding the structure of meaning. 
           From a hermeneutic point of view, the act of naming presuppositions allows the 
researcher to overcome the belief that bias-free perspectives are attainable – “In every 
case . . . interpretation is grounded in something we have in advance” (Heidegger, 1962, 
p.191).    Restated in critical terms, it is understood that the researcher is an agent 
inevitably situated within a particular power/knowledge system invested with value – 
“We are inescapably and fundamentally bound up with power saturated 
preunderstanding.  We can’t escape it, we draw on it in order to understand” (Kögler, 
1996, pp.105-106).  Thus, when the “taken for granted” assumptions at the heart of 
preconceptual understanding are acknowledged, the act of interpreting meaning can be 
understood as a situated outcome of the dialogue between culturally and historically 
embedded researchers and research participants.  
           Methodological Presuppositions 
           In asking about how human beings currently live the metaphor of cyborg 
subjectivity as a fusion of human and machine, I adopt Heidegger’s (1962) notion of 
“being-in-the-world” and Merleau-Ponty’s (1961, 1968) understanding of the “subject-
object dialogue” and “flesh” as renderings of the interdependent and indivisible nature of 
person and world.  Thus any traditional notion of the human ‘subject’ is recovered as 
distinguishable but not divisible from its lived horizons.  I therefore contend that the 
meaning of the being of cyborg ‘subjectivity’ will arise through attention to the broad 
referential unity gathered by human-machine fusions, as well as, by the ongoing play of 
  72
significations always already waiting to emerge when solicited by phenomenal 
perspectives.  Consequently, I have introduced the guiding presupposition that a 
contextualization of empirical ‘subjective’ data (viz., protocols) should incorporate broad 
historical narratives, local force dynamics, and the acknowledgement of imaginizing as 
fundamental constituents of the interpretative process.  Otherwise, uncritical adherence to 
the constricted disclosures encouraged by rational discourse and the assumption of a 
subject-object split would sever what exists as a fundamental unity.  It is an organic and 
holistic mode of understanding human existence that can occasion a richer thematic 
articulation of lived meanings and culturally inscribed bodies and practices. 
 Since this research project is meant to be rigorously qualitative in nature, I also 
presume that some meanings, typically marginalized by more traditional research 
inquires, can be foregrounded through a researcher’s recovery of the “meaning-
bestowing” structure of interpretation and perception.  When the narrow perceptual 
openness of the ahistorical and decontextualized clearing of rational thinking is brought 
into dialogue with the ground of imaginative thinking - which is free to grasp synthetic 
interrelations - I presuppose that the reinstatement of imaginative thinking allows for a 
richly integrated articulation of lifeworld considerations.  Moreover, integration of such 
latent lifeworld considerations and meanings into cyberspace theory makes possible a 
cultural therapeutic.  This therapeutic of culture may then pave the way for identifying 
circumscribed and prescribed regulatory practices in a manner which allows one to freely 
retrieve and act upon productive and constraining forces.  In this way, any prereflective 
enactments of “normalizing” or “disciplinary” strategies (e.g., Nietzsche’s life denying 
nihilistic repetition) might be overcome. 
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Literature Review-Based Presuppositions and Research Questions 
The research and theoretical literature reviewed in the Literature Review provide 
a backdrop for the research questions.  The presuppositions subtending my research 
questions revolve around utopian and dystopian views of technology, the value of “real” 
experience over against simulated experience, the social and psychological impact of 
increasing engagement with EMRs, the loss of connection to one’s bodily and earthly 
context, the project to overcome one’s finitude, the expanded opportunity to explore 
different identities, the expanded opportunity to explore different others, and the 
importance of attunement to aesthetic experiences amidst modern technology’s 
Enframing (Ge-stell).  It is in and through mindfulness to these presuppositions that a 
research clearing is established where I can interrogate the research data about the 
construction of ‘subjectivity’ and sociality undergone during EMRs.  By also attending to 
research participant meanings and symbolic orders, I am able to await the revelatory 
unfolding about cyborg existence.  As such, I will now go on to outline the overall design 
of this research project – a methodological design which will bring my presuppositions 
into dialogue with the empirical data I obtain.               
                                                         Research Design 
The phenomenon at hand called me to lay out a form of inquiry into its 
conditional nature, into its situated being.  As such, I was invited to faithfully and 
rigorously construct a way in which the phenomenon can show itself. Consequently, I 
developed an empirically grounded critical-hermeneutic approach to the study of EMRs.  
I did this, in part, because it appeared that in order to render “unconscious” aspects of 
EMR experience more visible, such a project necessitated an acknowledgment of how 
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lived meanings and social practices are infused with the impress of locally and 
historically co-present discourses. 
Phenomenon to be Studied 
 This research project interrogated the historical and modern technocultural 
backdrops linked to the Internet’s emergence into the public domain during the early 
1990s.  This research project also explored human participation in the social possibilities 
afforded by the Internet in order to illuminate the emerging co-constituted 
transformations of human existence.  Donna Haraway’s metaphor of the cyborg served as 
a touchstone for illustrating how the notion of human-machine fusion may participate in 
gradually refiguring the human world and one’s sense of self.  
Research Participants and the Protocol Question 
 Persons who believed that they use the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful 
connections with others were asked to participate in this research project.  I solicited 
research participant involvement through the distribution of flyers, advertisements, and 
word of mouth by persons acquainted with this research project.  The solicitation was 
worded in the following manner: 
If you would like to participate in a research study about socializing on  
the Internet, please contact Andrew at the following number (telephone 
number provided).  Any and all correspondence will be kept confidential. 
If you choose to participate in the study, you will be asked to fill out a 
questionnaire that will be mailed to you.  You may also be asked to 
participate in a voluntary interview.  Additional details can be discussed 
when you contact me at the telephone number listed above. 
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 Research participants were asked to respond to an author-designed survey which 
included seven short-answer questions and one protocol question intended to illuminate 
EMR experience.  The survey questions read as follows: 
For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In order 
to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen 
name. 
 
1) Female ____  Male ____ Other ____ (check one) 
 
2) Age ____ 
 
3) Ethnic background  
_________________________________________________________ 
 






5) Windows user ____  Macintosh user ____ (check one) 
 
6)  What is your Internet provider name? __________________________ 
 
7)  What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address  
of the site where your encounter took place? 
____________________________________________________________ 
 
8)  Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an 
intimate connection with another person on the Internet.  Include in your 
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person 
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person.  Also, 
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful 
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the 
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships 
with others. 
 
*Please describe your experience in enough detail so that somebody who has never 
had the experience would know what it was like.    
 
 In the protocol question (#8), the research participants were being asked to 
describe how their experiences of self, other, and the process of socializing on the 
  76
Internet were experienced.  In effect, they were being asked how their Internet 
experiences mattered to them. 
Research Components 
 As I mentioned in the above section, some of the research materials included 
research study advertisements, an author-designed survey, and the provision of an 
Informed Consent form to research participants.  I also used a second set of materials.  
Specifically, I selected scholarly works (supra) addressing pre-Socratic, Socratic, and 
fifteenth to twentieth century cultural-historical perspectives on the human engagement 
with technology.  Each of these works was consistent with my methodological 
presupposition that human beings exist in a co-creative relationship with technology.  
Each of these works also recognized the way in which the cultural-historical world 
participates in constructing human experience.  The perspectives offered in each text 
were, however, as different as they were similar.  The differing cultural-historical vantage 
points taken up in each text allowed me to more fully assess the participation of the 
Western world in producing human experience. 
All of the scholarly texts I employed have been reviewed in the Literature 
Review.  Martin Heidegger’s “The Question Concerning Technology” opened up 
“thinking” about a broad historical narrative regarding modern technology - enframing.  
Here, Heidegger meditated upon the way in which the modern technological mode of 
revealing clears a space for a narrow understanding of things as “standing reserve.”  In 
Technology as Symptom and Dream, Robert Romanyshyn examined the vision of modern 
technology and its relationship to historical events from the fifteenth century up to the 
twentieth century.  In doing so, Romanyshyn worked out how the historically informed 
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dream of technology contributed to a particular psychological way of relating to one’s 
body and to one’s earthly abode.  In The Saturated Self, Kenneth Gergen examined 
human being’s expanding engagement with communication technologies.  Gergen 
described how increased EMRs with people have inaugurated a shift away from the deep 
self of romanticism and the rational self of modernism toward the plurality of postmodern 
selves and the concomitant impact on social relationships.  Finally, in Code and Other 
Laws of Cyberspace, Lawrence Lessig challenged the notion that cyberspace is a space of 
freedom and, instead demonstrated how cyberspace has no nature.  Lessig argued that 
cyberspace is, more or less, a regulable space subject to the immediate local impact of 
software code, laws, norms, and markets.  Moreover, the degree of cyberspace regulation 
is contingent upon the degree to which people attempt to influence the values shaping the 
architecture of the Internet.      
Procedure 
Research participants will be asked to respond to a protocol question intended to 
illuminate EMR experience.  Informed by the work of Giorgi (1975) and Wertz (1983), I 
will conduct an interpretive thematic rendering of the experiences described by each 
participant. In order to do so, I will adopt the stance of psychological reflection.  I will 
then engage in multiple readings of each protocol in order to gradually articulate the 
psychological themes which reflect the relationship between the research participant and 
her experience of EMRs.  This attitude of psychological reflection will first require me to 
get a sense of the meaningful whole of each protocol as a starting point.  From there, I 
will be able to identify the smaller units of meaning comprising the whole protocol.  
After identifying these smaller units of meaning, I will then organize them into a 
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narrative that reflects the meaningful whole of each protocol.  Throughout the process of 
psychological reflection I will incorporate Murray’s (1986) “imaginizing” by attending to 
the cultural-historical imagination (or discourses) structuring the meanings lived through 
by each participant.  I will also attend to ambiguities in each description as well as to the 
potential surplus of meaning embedded in the language of the protocol.  The 
incorporation of imaginizing will allow me to retrieve marginalized meanings, consonant 
with research participant descriptions, and place them into the narrative.  In Step 2, I will 
contact each participant (e.g., face-to-face, telephone) for an interview.  Where meanings 
of their respective protocols are vague or portions of the protocol seem to suggest 
“breakdowns” in communication related to compliance with or resistance to Internet 
practices or discourses, I will read those parts of the protocol to the respective participant 
and ask for clarification.  I will then “circle” back and integrate the research participants’ 
clarifications into the meaning units pertaining to their protocols.   
It is noteworthy that my reading of successive protocols led to the discovery of 
themes I had not previously identified.  In such cases, I re-read the other protocols with 
the intent to locate the newer themes.  Where appropriate I added these new themes to the 
respective protocol narratives.  After completing a full analysis of all the protocols, I 
organized the themes pertaining to each of the protocols into a general person-centered 
narrative. 
In Steps 3 and 4, I shifted my thematic analysis to the analysis of technology.  In 
Step 3, I conducted an interpretive analysis of the texts and “window” (e.g., graphic user 
interface) associated with the site of Internet communication.  The purpose here was to 
identify themes, practices, and discourses typifying the local site of communication.  In 
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Step 4, I conducted an interpretive analysis of the broad narratives of history at work in 
the scholarly texts I discussed in the “materials” section.  The thematic analyses were 
conducted in a manner similar to the approach adopted in Step 1.  Thus, in Steps 3 and 4, 
I familiarized myself with entire site of Internet communication and the scholarly texts.  I 
then noted the cultural-historical themes potentially linked to Internet sociality.  I then 
“circled” back and integrated Step 4 and step 3 into a technocultural-historical narrative.  
Finally, I fashioned a situated global narrative with regard to Internet subjectivity and 
sociality by integrating the person-centered narrative and the technocultural-historical 
narrative into a unified critical-hermeneutic account.  The situated global narrative 
therefore stood as an instantiation of how person-centered and cultural-historical 
processes contribute to the construction of ‘subjectivity,’ meaning, experience, and social 
actions. 
Results 
 The Results section contains the critical-hermeneutic analysis of data pertaining to 
the construction of subjectivity and relatedness in cyberspace.  Data Section I consists of 
a Person-Centered Narrative re-presenting the integrated interpretations of each research 
participant’s protocol and telephone interview.  The unabridged protocols and the 
transcripts of the telephone interviews can be found in Appendixes D-K.  Section II 
culminates in a narrative regarding Local and Cultural-Historical Data.  Whereas Section 
I instantiated an analysis of the  “subject” pole of lived experience and social praxis, 
Section II re-presented interpretations of the “worldly” contribution to experience.  The 
AOL local site common to the research participants’ online social interactions was 
analyzed along with scholarly texts addressing the cultural-historical backdrop of 
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Western technology.  The AOL local site data can be found in Appendixes L-O.  Finally, 
Section III concludes with a Situated Global Narrative which stands as an integrated 
description of how cyberspace subjectivity and sociality are bound up with broad and 
local trends in technocultural history. 
The benefit of partitioning the Results section in the three-part form described 
above allowed the process of “subject” formation and social practice enactment to be 
considered in a richly differentiated manner.  The dynamic interplay of multiple 
processes always already making contributions to the construction of meaning, 
subjectivity, and virtual social practices were thereby illuminated.  For example, 
interpretations of the Person-Centered Data allowed the life-situated meanings of each 
research participant to be disclosed from their own lived “psychological” perspectives.  
The incorporation of research participant interview perspectives into my interpretations 
allowed research participant voices to occupy a valued place in the construction of 
meaning units.  Furthermore, combining my interpretation of the written experiential 
descriptions with input from research participant interviews allowed me to revise the 
presuppositions guiding my interpretations vis á vis the hermeneutic circle. 
Section II allowed for the consideration of local and broad cultural-historical 
forces contributing to the meanings, virtual social practices, and experiences of “self” 
undergone by the research participants.  In effect, the production of discourse-laden 
social practices in cyberspace were illuminated in this section.  Moreover, a hermeneutic 
circle was built into the form of Section II as well.  The inclusion of the local Internet site 
analysis allowed the presuppositions at work in the grand narratives about technological 
culture and history to be reworked by circling back and forth between discourse laden 
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practices at the local level and those articulated at the macro level of analysis.   The end 
result was the technocultural-historical narrative.  At the same time, this two-tiered 
cultural-historical analysis also paved the way for Section III’s decentralization of the 
person-centered process of meaning construction and culture/history making.   Thus, it 
was in the situated global narrative that the holistic backdrop of discourse and the 
situated influence of the “subject” were brought back into a dialogic unity.   
By way of review then, the three data sections are organized in the following 
manner: 
1)  Section 1 contains an integrated interpretation of Person-Centered Data (viz., 
protocols and interviews) culminating in a person-centered narrative. 
2)  Section II contains an analysis of AOL Local Data and Technocultural-
Historical Data culminating in a technocultural-historical narrative. 
3)  Section III integrates the person-world data of Sections I and II into a situated 
global narrative. 
Section I:  Person-Centered Data 
Here, in Section I, I interpret the protocols written by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn 
re-presenting their lived attempts to form meaningful relations in the world of 
cyberspace.  In effect, their stories provided insight into the process of being swept up 
into the excitement and promise generated by AOL’s dream to sell and normalize virtual 
interactivity.  Examination of the meaning units flowing from Rochelle, Bryce, and 
Dawn’s protocols revealed that they do indeed give themselves over to the space of AIM 
social practices with hopes that virtuality will provide a fertile landscape for intimate 
relationships to thrive.  In a sense, each of the research participants literally and 
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figuratively bought into the expansive virtual social practices.  Moreover, each of the 
research participant’s discovered that virtuality allowed them to overcome the finiteness 
of bodily facticity and access people who would be otherwise unavailable through 
reliance upon bodily powers alone.  However, further thematic examination of Rochelle, 
Bryce, and Dawn’s protocols led to the disclosure that they did not continue to passively 
act as docile subject’s willy-nilly delivered over to social practices prescribed by AIM.  
Instead, their initial acceptance of AIM eventually led to breakdowns in communication, 
resistance to certain virtual practices (e.g., multiple identity expansion) and modification 
of AIM practices by importing other communicative practices (e.g., telephone, offline 
meetings) as a way to offset the loss of carnality in cyberspace.  The three research 
participants’ assertion of individual autonomy, therefore, lent support to my 
methodological presupposition that virtual space was a co-constructed landscape. 
The co-constructive process occurring between the research participants’ and the 
cultural-historical world of social practices and discourses have been elaborated, further 
ahead, in Section III’s situated global narrative. The situated global narrative revealed 
that the linkage of cultural-historical forces to virtual social practices was not sufficient to 
guarantee that individuals would submit to such practices.  Mere submission to available 
social practice would have suggested that dominant discourses maintained a 
unidirectional impact on the kind of “self” research participants become amidst the 
practice of virtual social intimacy.  Thus, the voice of subjectivity served as a 
counterbalancing force influencing how relatedness would occur in cyberspace and 
informing what practices and discourses would be enacted or ignored. 
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That said, further development of the Internet experiences of Rochelle, Bryce, and 
Dawn have been developed in the person-centered narrative articulated at the end of this 
section.   
Protocol #1:  Internet related themes – Rochelle, 21 y.o., Caucasian, female 
 
1.  Offline interpersonal stress, followed by an introduction to Internet social spaces and 
practices, occasioned exploration of online social experiences 
In the midst of family upheaval, Rochelle was open to the encouragement that she try out 
a new form of social interaction. 
 
• “My parents had just moved to Provo, I was living with my aunt . . . who . . . was 
diagnosed with a serious medical condition . . . My best . . . friend had just discovered 
the Internet and she introduced me . . .” 
 
2ahn.  The lure of inhabiting taboo or otherwise unavailable social (cyber)spaces can lead 
to a transgression of ethical and legal offline norms eschewing identity alteration 
Rochelle was enthralled with the privilege of access to alternative virtual life spaces, 
which she attained by assuming a different identity.  Rochelle’s identity revision was 
enabled by the absence of carnality in cyberspace.  However, during the interview, 
Rochelle stated that once online, she generally preferred to withhold aspects of her 
identity rather than completely morph into an altogether different online persona.     
     
    • “Using my aunt’s credit card, I authorized the use pretending to be her.” 
     
    • “You could portray yourself any way you want, make a completely different life for 
youself [sic].” 
 
3b.  Internet fascination turned into a self described “addiction” to the standing reserve of 
available (and forbidden) virtual males to socialize with 
The opportunity to access communities of virtual people, considered taboo or 
inaccessible offline, became irresistible. 
 
 • “ . . . with in that month and a half was addicted.  I would sneak on late at night, and 
talk to a lot of older guys.” 
 
 • “ I was sneaking online after my parents were asleep and after I got home from 
school when they weren’t home yet.” 
 
• “ . . . all the guys I talk about were way older than I was at the time . . . I’m not going 
to analyze why that is at this time and point but at the time it made me happy so I just 
went with it.” 
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4c.  At the beginner stage of Internet communication, Internet based re-presentations of 
online others were accepted as accurate portrayals of their offline embodied “selves” 
Rochelle did not initially anticipate that virtual others posed with identities untethered to 
the facticity of their offline identities. 
 
• “I was naïve at the time, so I believed pretty much anything they told me . . .” 
 
5d.  At the beginner stage of Internet communication, intense emotions of affection were 
felt toward the personas of online others encountered during cybertext chat 
Rochelle found herself swept up in intense emotions of hope and love after feeling 
affirmed by the virtual others she encountered. 
 
• “Then there were a couple others, and of course I was in love with all of them.” 
 
6g.  The world of Internet chat provides one with the power  to be immediately 
transported away from the “reality” of everyday life concerns as well as the stress of 
virtual world conflicts  
Rochelle found that cyberspace provided her with an increased power to control the 
kinds of social experiences she underwent.  Rochelle felt as if she was able to replace the 
stressful “reality” of her everyday world and “self” with that of the more appealing and 
absorbing “reality” of virtual intimacy. 
 
     • “. . .  It’s like you are in your own little world, nothing matters except you and the 
person/persons you are talking to.” 
 
     • “ . . . It’s a relief from everyday life, because you can just be your [sic], and live in   
a fantasy world if you wanted to online.” 
 
     • “Nothing bothers you, if you don’t want to talk to person, you can very easily block 
them from your buddy list or just ban them from talking to you at all . . .” 
 
7e.  Cybertext chat can be less stressful if one prefers to be evaluated on the basis of 
social presence rather than physical presence 
Rochelle’s fear about being judged primarily in terms of her bodily appearance were 
allayed   during e-text chat. 
 
• “You feel really special inside, like you have nothing to be afraid of because the 
person you are talking to isn’t judging you for looks, just solely on how you interact 
online.” 
 
• “ . . . It lets you open up to someone without them staring at you . . . you don’t have 





8f.  Difficulty interpreting online humor and sarcasm can interfere with safely immersing 
oneself into online chat 
Rochelle found that when the virtual other’s humor tilted toward sarcasm, it was difficult 
for her to know if she was still in a secure social space or if she had exposed herself to 
the possibility of malicious judgment. 
 
• “It’s hard to tell someone’s sense of humor online, but usually it goes through.  
Sarcasm is a big one though.  Sometimes you can’t really tell whether or not the person 
is being just mean, or sarcastic.” 
 
9i.  The remoteness of disembodied sociality clears a social space for virtual others to be 
more   socially insensitive 
After some painful online experiences, Rochelle developed the belief that the physical and 
social distance, intrinsic to online chat, invited hurtful social behavior from online 
others. 
 
• “I guess that’s why it is easy to be jerks online, because they aren’t face to face with 
you, so they just do what they want . . . it hurts just the same.” 
  
10j.  The computer screen, as a symbolic barrier between self and other, may not 
diminish the emotional injury from being “verbally” aggressed in cyberspace 
Rochelle experienced the emotional wounds inflicted by virtual others no less intensely 
than she would in a face-to-face encounter.  
 
 •“But in reality no matter if you are behind a computer screen or in person, it hurts 
just the same.” 
 
11.  The computer screen, as a symbolic barrier between self and other, may not diminish 
the emotional difficulty of undergoing conflict in cyberspace 
Rochelle found arguments with virtually present others no less unpleasant than such 
conflicts would be face-to-face. 
 
 •“I’ve had my share of fights online as well, and believe me, they were just as hard as 
they would have been if the fights were in person.” 
 
12k.  Transitioning from a virtual relationship to an offline embodied encounter can 
require deliberation and screening 
Rochelle put effort into securing her parent’s approval to pursue a date with someone she 
made an acquaintance with online.  Rochelle’s parent’s insisted on first screening 
Rochelle’s virtual acquaintance. 
 
  • “. . . I finally asked them if I could meet someone in person form online.  It took 





13.  The first e-enabled offline “date” with a virtual other occasioned more frequent dates 
of a similar kind with different virtual others 
Rochelle increased her efforts to meet virtual others offline after her first e-enabled 
offline date. 
 
• “ . . . that was just an icebreaker.  I met guys more often after that.” 
 
14lx.  Impressions formed about virtual others online turn out to be disappointing re-
presentations of what virtual others will be like in the flesh 
Rochelle’s e-enabled dating disappointments were chalked up to her naiveté and her 
belief that most males were lacking in character and forthrightness about their intentions 
despite their benign virtual representations of “self.”  
 
• “And the one person that you do find may look good online, but then you get them 
on the phone and they are completely different, it’s a real let down.” 
 
 • “ . . . Out of all the guys I met online, there weren’t too many “nice” guys . . . “ 
 
• “ . . . I didn’t really know what I was getting into with those kinds of situations . . . It 
was kind of an emotional roller coaster for me, but I soon learned that guys are like 
that.”   
 
15m.  As a heterosexual female, it can be a relief to encounter a virtual male whose “self” 
seems to manifest similar qualities 
Rochelle was relieved to meet a virtual other who she perceived to be dissimilar to 
previously encountered virtual males and, at the same time, more similar to her. 
 
 • “ . . . it was almost as if we knew each other, we had a lot in common and I was jus 
[sic] so glad that he wasn’t into the types of things all the others had been.”  
 
16n.  A decision to correct an online mis-representation about one’s offline “self” occurs 
when the virtual other may be significantly mismatched with one’s offline “self” 
Rochelle was able to be straightforward about the difference between the age she 
assigned to her online “self” and her actual offline age.  Rochelle was able to do this, in 
part, because she perceived that the “older” online other might be concerned about the 
age discrepancy. 
 
• “He was older . . . You had to be 18 in order to place an ad, so I told a white lie, but 
in my second e-mail to him, I did tell him that I was only 17, and that in two weeks I 
would be 18.” 
 
17o.  Where e-text rapport turns into enthusiastic telephone (voice-based) space rapport, a 
long-term relationship becomes possible  
Rochelle engages in a long-term relationship with her e-enabled date.  The offline 
relationship did not ensue until Rochelle felt extremely positive about the “self” of the 
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virtual other.  The sustained sense of rapport both persons established were developed 
through their extensive virtual interactions across different electronic mediums.  
 
• “We hit it off, even on the phone.  We talked on the phone almost every day, for 
hours at a time.  Finally, we decided to meet . . .” 
 
• “When you finally get a hold of someone who is stimulating you feel a connection.  
You think, “Oh wow, we have something in common.”  And you want to know more 
and more about this person . . .” 
 
18p.  Caution about the character of the “self” of an online other can lead to a sketchy 
agreement to meet offline 
Rochelle’s next long-term offline relationship first began online with a feeling of caution 
and a tepid sense of rapport and interest in the “self” of the virtual other.  Moreover 
Rochelle found herself to be scarcely motivated to meet offline. 
 
 • “ . . . For some reason though, I thought he was too “shady” . . . He, at that time, was 
I guess too boring for me . . . We arranged to meet eachother [sic] there, or just in 
passing, say maybe we’ll see eachother [sic]there . . .”  
 
19.  Misinterpretation of intentions can result in a failure to communicate further 
Rochelle feels misunderstood when the virtual other claims that Rochelle intended to 
avoid further contact with him. 
 
• “He swears that I blew him off, but if I did, it wasn’t intentional . . .” 
 
20q.  The level of attraction or interest in the “self” of a  virtual other does not necessarily 
re-present a reliable impression of what the offline experience of the other will be 
Rochelle found that impressions of online others do not translate well into experiences of 
the other offline. 
 
• “ . . . So I guess it goes to show that even if we hit it off online, doesn’t mean we will 
hit it off in person, and vis versa.” 
 
21r.  The degree of enjoyment experienced during online chat varies depending on the 
virtual space chosen and the kinds of virtual others chatted with 
Rochelle did not find online chat to be a consistently pleasurable experience due to the 
variety of Internet spaces and virtual others she experienced. 
 
• “ . . . In general when you are talking to people in chat rooms its kind of fun.  
Depends on the chat room, and what kind of people you actually engage . . .” 
 
22r.  In chat rooms, the virtual “self” of others tends to come into presence as puerile 
forms of chat 
Rochelle experienced most chat room social practices as immature. 
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• “The whole problem I had was just talking to people who were mature . . .” 
 
23su.  As a female, the decision to allow virtual males to view photographs depicting her 
physical appearance can be experienced as risky – particularly if she believes that her 
body image does not match Western culture ideals   
Rochelle sometimes experienced emotional injury when receiving feedback about the 
posting of her picture online. Rochelle found herself needing to prepare emotionally for 
anticipated judgments about her posted image 
 
• “ . . . I’m not a Barbie . . . so I rarely gave out my picture and when I did I had to 
prepare myself mentally.” 
 
• “After a few years of that I got tough, or bitter . . .” 
 
24t.  In personal ad sites, it felt less traumatic to share the picture of her embodied female 
“self” since it was assumed that disapproving others might simply pass over the image 
without comment 
Rochelle felt less attacked by unkind judgments in a personal ad site because she 
assumed that disapproving others were more likely to pass over her picture without 
bothering to comment.  In this way, Rochelle felt that her feelings were “spared.” 
 
• “When I posted personal ads I did have my picture on there, but that wasn’t as bad as 
the chat rooms . . .” 
 
25v.  A female’s wish to merely chat online was frustrated by the perceived intention of 
online males to pursue sexualized objectives 
Rochelle eventually decided to resist and reject the sexualized practices of online males. 
 
• “ . . . I’m sure the guys had a different frame of mind, but I wasn’t going to play their 
games anymore.” 
 
26y.  Though one can adopt multiple identities and indulge in fantasy online, it was 
learned that “true” intimacy cannot be sustained where such  “false” re-presentations of 
self occur 
When the pursuit of love is embarked upon, Rochelle decided that the online other’s 
failure to be what s/he portrays him/her “self” to be online can lead to rather large 
disappointments. 
 
• “ . . . You can live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are really looking for true 







27z.  The practice of virtual sociality can dramatically decline when one successfully 
transitions to establishing a fulfilling offline relationship  
Rochelle found that her involvement in a rewarding romantic relationship reduced her 
Internet use to the function of briefly checking email and playing games.  Chat room 
involvement no longer filled a prior emotional need.  
 
 • “ . .  . I still use to [sic] Internet to play games, but I don’t go into chat rooms.  There 
is no need to, I have everything I need in a person.” 
 
 Protocol #2: Internet Related Themes – Bryce, 27 y.o., African-American, 
male 
 
1a.  Enthusiasm and fascination surface during early encounters with modernized 
electronic communication equipment and practices 
Bryce’s exploration of and learning about the unprecedented Internet communication 
practices gave rise to early feelings of exhilaration.  It was enjoyable and socially 
liberating to interact without seeing or being seen or known by anonymous virtual others. 
 
•  “It was fun, and exciting, and innovative to me.” 
 
2bh.  The “self,” perceived as socially inadequate and vulnerable, opens up to practicing 
sociality through a distanced and disembodied modality 
With regard to embodied self-image, Bryce experienced his everyday “self” as impaired 
in the arena of face-to-face encounters with new people.  However, with no-body present 
during Internet chat, Bryce experienced the Internet as offering a safer horizon in that he 
could  practice a less immediate means of interacting with others.  Thus, the absence of 
Bryce’s online physical presence, freed Bryce to display an e-text identity able to engage 
in more expansive social “self” practices. 
 
• “I am a shy person at first . . . . the Internet gave me an outlet.  I could say almost 
anything without feeling odd . . . ” 
 
• “I’ve found that socializing on the internet has impacted my personal growth by 
giving me more opportunities to meet people that I wouldn’t normally talk to, or be 
able to talk to because, of my shyness.” 
 
3c.  The “self” feels freer to re-present itself through dialoguing about personally 
meaningful topics 
Bryce felt liberated to practice “self” expression by “chatting” about typically 
unexpressed matters of personal interest – especially sexual matters.  
 






4d.  The Internet is initially viewed as a relatively effortless instrumental means to 
accessing a desired resource - knowable others 
Bryce initially discovered that Internet chat encompassed fewer obstacles to succeeding 
in his project to meet others seeking social opportunities.  Moreover, the knowledge that 
a large variety of virtual others also sought to meet new people allowed Bryce to initiate 
interactions with greater ease. 
 
 • “I found that the Internet made it easy for me to become acquainted with someone.” 
 
5e.  An early sense of comfort and mastery with e-relations breaks down when deception 
is encountered 
When Bryce discovered that the disclosive space of Internet chat allows virtual others to 
portray a textual presence incommensurate with the facticity of their offline bodily being, 
Bryce’s feeling of betrayal occasioned a return to the offline world and the semblance of 
visual certitude about identity therein. 
      
• “My first experience to meet someone new on the Internet was horrible because, the 
person lied about his age and appearances.  When that happened, I immediately stop 
[sic] using the Internet as a way to meet a partner.” 
 
6f.  Unsuccess making acquaintances in the incarnate offline world prompted the 
realization that use of the prosthetic-like equipment of the Internet was an indispensable 
aid in meeting others     
Bryce’s repeated failure to connect with embodied others, in the anxiety ridden horizon 
of Bryce’s everyday offline world, gave rise to Bryce’s realization that he was somehow 
incomplete or ill equipped to make acquaintances.  As a result, Bryce chose to revise his 
approach to online social practices thereby reducing the risk of being deceived online.  
This allowed Bryce to shore up his perceived “self” image of inadequacy by donning 
Internet equipment in order to successfully meet a partner online. 
 
• “A few months past and I weren’t [sic] meeting people on my own [italics added], so 
I decided to meet a partner.” 
 
7g.  Success in transitioning from a virtual relationship to a face-to-face relationship 
hinged on utilizing Internet communication equipment, frequent daily e-chat, and efforts 
to know the “self” of the other 
Before meeting his future partner in the offline world, Bryce dialogued online with him 
extensively as a way to fill out the cybertext re-presentations of his potential partner’s 
“self” more fully.  Bryce developed a better online sense of the “self” of his future 
partner by noticing his online social style and emphasis during chat time. 
 
• “. . . I learned many things about him through the Internet so by the time we met I 







8.  The Internet aided in expanding awareness of offline social venues for meeting others 
The Internet allowed Bryce to increase his awareness of places for socializing in his 
everyday embodied world.  
 
     • “’The Internet gave me more places such as clubs . . . to meet people.” 
 
9i.  Embracing Internet equipment and practice allowed “self” confidence and practical 
know-how about offline relationships to emerge  
Bryce was able to successfully integrate practical Internet social skills into the daily 
social “self” practices of his everyday relational life space.  As a result, Bryce felt that 
his embodied “self” image offline had transformed into a more capable and less 
vulnerable offline presence.   
 
• “It has also given me more courage and confidence . . . I now know the types of 
people that are attracted to me and how to approach them.” 
 
Protocol #3:  Internet Related Themes – Dawn, 29 y.o., African-American, 
female 
 
1a.  Job responsibilities impose an unwanted geographic separation from an offline 
significant other.  The decision to use the Internet as a means to communicate harbors the 
potential to ease separation stress due to decreased financial expense  
Dawn found herself disappointed about the imposed physical separation from her 
romantic partner.  The combined stress of financial limitations and difficulty 
synchronizing schedules to talk precluded further use of voice-based long distance 
telephone service.  Dawn thus pragmatically accepted relocation to a text-based Internet 
space (email) for interpersonal connection.  
 
• “Well due to job training updates, I had to interact with my significant other using 
other means of communication . . .”  
 
2b.  The communicative praxis of email space felt distant and created misunderstanding 
and confusion  
Dawn was disappointed with the exclusive use of email space as a way to maintain a 
bond with her significant other.  Email evoked hollow and confusing feelings of 
connectedness which evoked Dawn’s recollection of the lost sensual human qualities 
present in other forms of communication.  Re-presentations of the virtual other’s 
emotional presence (e.g., emoticons) were inadequate substitutes for the other’s bodily 
presence. 
 
• “. . .  I found the emails to be very cold and impersonal.  I would assume one thing 
and something else was implied . . . verbal communication (i.e. tone and voice 





3c.  The initial appeal of Instant Messaging (AIM) chat space rests on its similarity to the 
responsiveness of verbal dialogue 
By switching to the communication medium of AIM, Dawn hoped to retrieve some of the 
valued benefit of immediacy (e.g., real-time dialogue) associated with verbal interaction. 
 
• “ . . . Instant messaging was agreed upon . . . to get back some of what verbal 
communication offered.” 
 
4d.  AIM practice required a tiresome need to calculatively explain one’s concerns  
Dawn found that she was eventually discouraged with AIM communication practices as a 
substitute for the valued benefits of telephone interactions.  The ease and spontaneity of 
verbal speech was replaced by the tedium of cognitively working out the written version 
of Dawn’s utterances in AIM space.  Consequently, the sense and feel of one’s experience 
can get lost in he translation from the spoken word to the e-text mode of signification.   
 
• “ . . . IM started to become tedious . . .” 
 
5e.  The intention to convey supportive feedback through AIM space can be angrily 
interpreted by the recipient as harsh, insensitive, and lacking in understanding about the 
AIM recipient’s situation and character  
Dawn was shocked by the intensity of her significant other’s animosity arising from his 
(mis)interpretation of her text-based instant message to him.  The taken-for-granted 
context of the dyad’s offline repertoire and understanding sometimes failed to inform 
their virtual interaction.  Consequently, ill-attuned assumptions and interpretations about 
e-text communication ensued.   
 
• “. . . I Imed him stating ‘I am surprised at you’.  This statement was interpreted as 
‘How dare you judge me . . . He questioned our entire relationship over my simple 
statement.” 
 
6f.  Conflict resolution becomes possible with the acquisition of an Internet enabled 
prosthetic memory.  Scrolling through earlier exchanges during AIM chat allows the 
AIM sender to retrieve a forgotten context contributing to the conflict 
The technology of AIM archiving allowed Dawn to retrieve her memory of the stress 
informing her significant other’s actions.  The AIM practice of scrolling backwards 
through the “chat” transcript allowed Dawn to respond in a more understanding manner 
to her significant other’s outrage. 
 
• “But before I Imed [sic] him back a response, I scrolled up to view the beginning of 






7g.  The ways in which Internet communication can impede human communication are 
manifold 
Dawn’s experiences with social interaction in cyberspace leads her to conclude that the 
horizon of virtual communication is fraught with a considerable amount of difficulty. As a 
result, Dawn concluded that ongoing involvement with AIM praxis can lead to a loss of 
ease and fluency with face-to-face communication.  Moreover, Dawn found that the 
opportunity to calibrate one’s speech to the nonverbal expressions of the bodily present 
other is largely eclipsed during virtual communication. 
 
• “My example only implied a fraction of how the Internet can handicap social 
interactions with people.” 
 
8h.  Internet communication practices produce deficient social skills.  The listener’s 
assumptions inform understanding more so than the particularities of the conversational 
context 
The upshot of virtual communication for Dawn involves a diminution in the art of 
listening.  In AIM space, people are unwittingly trained in the kind of  social skills where 
hearing takes place without understanding. 
 
• “ . . . Assuming and hearing has taking social skills be it verbal or written out of the 
art of conversing.   Allowing the world to listen with a deafening ear.” 
 
 Person-Centered Narrative 
 
 To begin, the anticipation of embarking upon cyberspace social practices are 
experienced as potentially gratifying.  For, those seeking to make new acquaintances and 
form meaningful social connections, the power to leave behind unsatisfying offline 
interpersonal circumstances and crossover into a virtual world is inviting.  Cyberspace 
sociality is eagerly embraced as an enticing alternative for forming meaningful relations.  
With the aid of the Internet window, one is plugged into a vast standing reserve of ever 
present virtual others seeking social connection.  One becomes hopeful, or even feels 
spellbound by the expansion of “self” and social possibilities afforded by access to the 
electronic frontier.  Where one may have typically experienced uneasiness with the 
extended power to access such an enlarged social horizon, instead, one’s offline social 
anxieties or bodily concerns are significantly diffused in the online world.  The embodied 
anxieties of social life in the offline world are replaced by the opportunity to enact 
previously unlived potentials from behind the seemingly indispensable veneer of a 
cyberself persona.  With the prosthetic medium of computer enabled e-text re-
presentations standing in for the fleshly body of human existence, one believes that new 
possibilities for social being can be lived out.  For instance, it is felt that virtuality allows 
for a liberating contraction of one’s bodily presence.  Unwanted aspects of one’s 
incarnate presence can be excluded from one’s online persona.  At the same time, it is 
also felt that there are new possibilities for practicing “self” expansion.  Such 
possibilities can include taking up the option to enact alternative identities which 
transcend ones factical incarnate existence.  In addition, one finds that one can express a 
typically inhibited sense of “self” more easily after feeling liberated from presenting or 
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encountering bodily presence online.  Thus doubts constellating around one’s embodied 
self-consciousness are muted. However, when one attempts to shift face-to-face 
communication practices with a previously known significant other into the realm of 
cyberspace communication practices – due to unwanted geographic separation – one, 
instead, desires to reproduce the offline experience of the other during online interaction.  
Overcoming the loss of the other’s embodied presence becomes paramount.  Thus, with 
regard to an established significant other, one’s wish for “self” expansion is limited to 
acquiring the extended power to somehow retain a sensorial basis for intimate 
connection (e.g., voice inflection) despite geographic and economic obstacles. 
 After meeting a newly encountered other online, a naïve sense of exhilaration is 
experienced.  Adopting an alternate identity, maintaining ambiguity about one’s factical 
body, or liberating a previously inhibited way of expressing oneself allows a felt ease to 
accompany interactions with virtual others.  Here, virtual relationships are established 
with plans made to transition the encounter into the offline world of embodied others.    
Feelings of hope, or even strong affection, can be felt towards these seemingly ideal 
virtual others.  The virtual other’s “self” re-presentation within the cyber-window is 
uncritically taken up as an honest portrayal of offline identity.  The virtual other’s self re-
presentations are trusted.  One experiences a degree of comfort and mastery negotiating 
the re-presentational signifiers comprising e-relations.  However, a breakdown in the 
smooth unproblematic flow of such re-presentational social practice occurs around the 
time that crossover from the virtual to the “real” world of sociality occurs.  One feels 
betrayed when the illusion that there is a relative match between the virtual presence of 
others and their offline factical being is shattered.  One may even recoil at the thought of 
once again advancing further into the erstwhile safety of the virtual horizon.  Eventually 
one begins to be more thorough in efforts to discern the verisimilitude of the virtual 
other’s online persona (e.g., extended virtual interactions).  Even so, it is learned that 
knowing more about virtual other or screening him or her offers no clear-cut indication 
about offline compatibility or incompatibility.  Even poor first impressions online can 
result in positive offline outcomes.  Nevertheless, the sense of betrayal becomes less of a 
concern if one’s desire to co-author a fantasy relationship was paradoxically co-present 
with the wish to establish an intimate encounter.  The counterbalancing opportunity to 
enter – or even escape – into a creative play space seems to serve as a compensatory 
gratification.  It is the singular wish to form an intimate offline relationship that 
motivates “self” disclosures congruent with one’s offline identity. 
Other disruptions are encountered in the attempt to fashion personal online 
exchanges with new online others.  Despite the symbolic and concrete barrier of the Web 
browser window, online conflicts are still experienced as emotionally difficult.  
Misunderstood online sarcasm, as well as, verbal aggression are still wounding 
experiences impeding further communication.  The disembodied nature of the encounter 
does not necessarily insure that one is protected  from emotional hurt .  The concern 
becomes that the lack of face-to-face interaction serves as a license for online others to 
be more insensitive which interferes with safely immersing oneself in online chat.  A 
significant portion of online chat is also experienced as “immature.”  The experience of 
being a woman online is fraught with concerns about the painful judgments rendered 
regarding femininity after visual images are posted online; particularly when the 
evaluative heterosexual male discourse is founded upon idealized versions of Western 
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female body types (e.g., Barbie). In a corresponding manner, the gay male and 
heterosexual female’s ongoing exposure to sexualized online advances is eventually tired 
of and disliked, or even resisted.  Despite the risks for both online, it is remembered that 
the enjoyment of online chat varies from one space to another and one persona to 
another.    
   For those who come to online social practices after already having established 
offline intimacy, the significant other’s bodily absence fails to be palpably fulfilled by 
electronic presence.  The familiar rhythms of full-bodied intercommunication are 
disrupted by the narrow presence of e-language and the ensuing tedium of increasing 
one’s verbiage as a way to compensate for the missing contexts of bodies in situ.  The 
lack of bodily accompaniments to worded dialogue give rise to incomplete contexts for 
meaning.  Misinterpretations follow, in part, because assumptions lack the gestural 
information of embodied communication.  Sometimes scrolling back through Instant 
Messaging transcripts- a prosthetic memory of sorts - illuminated the cause of 
misunderstandings and lead to conflict resolution. 
 The outcome for those seeking intimacy through online social practices is varied.  
In order to successfully crossover from virtual intimacy to offline intimacy, it is believed 
that fantasy play and engaging in the play of multiple identities must be suspended in 
favor of revealing more honest disclosures about oneself.  Personal growth is achieved 
through developing aspects of oneself online (e.g., confidence, social skills, appreciation 
for accurate self-disclosures) and applying such practices offline.  Moreover, the need for 
virtual sociality seems to dissipate as offline social experiences become more fulfilling.  
When an intimate relationship precedes the crossover to online communication, there is a 
loss of immediacy and a loss of the familiar ease with understanding one another.  
Without the sensible other present, it is felt that e-text language by itself ceases to speak 
as coherently during intimate exchanges.  The loss of the sensual leads to the conclusion 
that online social practices produce deficient social skills and result in creating people 
who hear without listening. 
 
Section II:  Local and Cultural-Historical Data 
 Here, in Section II, I explore and thematize the world horizon of technology and 
the Internet.  The critical moment in this section consisted of combining Foucault’s dual 
emphasis upon local social practice analysis and archival analysis as a way to understand 
the history of the present.  The analysis of local and archival standpoints also provided an 
informed glimpse into the virtual social clearing belonging to Rochelle, Bryce, and 
Dawn’s experiences and interactions. 
For the purposes of my research inquiry into virtual subjectivity and sociality, 
local site analysis was achieved by examining AOL’s description of the AOL Instant 
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Messenger (AIM) window (See Appendix M).  The local site analysis was further 
augmented by conducting a thematic review of Lawrence Lessig’s commentary on AOL 
and AIM itself (See Appendix L).  The inclusion of this dual perspective on AIM 
prepared the way for privileging Foucault’s emphasis upon articulating the play of 
multiple interpretive forces vying to assert reality claims – or, in this case, vying to assert 
claims about the situated nature of AIM space. 
Destabilizing the authority of AOL’s singular viewpoint about AIM allowed the 
“event of (researcher) understanding” about local Internet site dynamics to be freed from 
presuppositions about achieving logocentric certainty.  By, instead, adopting a 
perspectival view on AIM, the technocultural-historical narrative - located at the end of 
this section - revealed how AOL’s efforts to market AIM as safe, private, and relatively 
unregulated seamlessly passed over AIM’s panoptic and normalizing function.  For 
instance, AIM’s stress upon insuring privacy for AIM users failed, according to Lessig, to 
clarify AOL’s power to trace AIM user activity.  Moreover, it understated the lack of 
absolute privacy afforded to the users of encryption technology.  Such insights clarified 
some of the “strategies” used by AIM to condition and normalize various discourse-based 
practices.   
In the second part of this section, my textual analysis of scholarly works 
addressing broad technocultural-historical trends allowed for the instantiation of a 
hermeneutic circle – or rather, for the instantiation of a method for revising my 
presuppositions about the local world of AIM and the metanarratives about 
technocultural history.  The works of Martin Heidegger, Robert Romanyshyn, Kenneth 
Gergen, and Lawrence Lessig each contributed to enlarging my cultural-historical 
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perspective on technology.  In and through contrasting AIM social practices with the 
macrocosmic perspective on technocultural-historical trends, it then became possible to 
picture how the experiences described by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn were also 
embedded in discourses at work throughout the way stations of history (e.g., modernism, 
Enframing, romanticism).  The technocultural-historical narrative, thus, provided a 
forum for fashioning an integrated narrative about the relationship between local social 
clearings and cultural-historical trends.  It was revealed that as the Internet became an 
increasingly structured space, the local norms and practices came to reflect, not one 
discourse, but a variety of practices associated with the legacies of multiple discourses.  
At core, however, AIM space was limited in advance by the legacy of modernity – a 
legacy which privileges detached, de-sensualized, and de-contextualized modes of being 
in the world with others.  Nevertheless, within the frame of modernity, possibilities for 
non-modern discourse were still at work in AIM space (e.g., romanticism, 
postmodernism).  Hence, the technocultural-historical narrative became a story about the 
multiple threads of discourse woven into the Net – threads which were sometimes neatly 
woven together, and threads sometimes so ill-woven that disentanglement from the Net 
was necessitated in order to be free from its limitations.  
Further ahead, in Section III, I compose the situated global narrative by reuniting 
the interconnected reality of person and world.  This was accomplished by reestablishing 
the dialogic unity between the lived experiences of the research participants and the 




Local Internet Site Data #1:  AOL Critical Themes from Code (Lawrence 
Lessig) 
  
1.  AIM space solicits the Western “self” to increasingly disassociate from the physical 
body and practice virtual identity re-presentation in terms of a postmodern multiplicity or 
modernist/romanticist singularity  
By providing an option for online users to adopt multiple screen names, AIM engenders 
forms of self-practice and self-fashioning potentially untethered to one’s offline embodied 
identity.  AIM thereby participates in producing a subject who can enact her sense of 
fluid postmodern identity or retain a singular modernist/romanticist sense of identity.  
 
•  “. . . When you start an AOL account on AOL, you have the right to establish up to five 
identities . . . 
 So in AOL you are given a fantastic power of pseudonymity that the “code 
writers” of real space simply do not give . . .” 
 
2.  AOL maintains its (panoptic) oversight by loosely enforcing practices of normative 
behavior consonant with a particular cyber-space 
AOL positions itself as the institution with the final word on enabling or disabling online 
social practices in the various AOL communities.  At the same time, AOL allow for a 
diversity of normatively different communities and ways of being to exist within the 
ambiguous framework of “decency.” 
 
• “ . . . Within the limits of decency, and so long as you are in the proper place, you can 
say what you want on AOL.” 
 
3.  AOL’s architecture of sociality and power is asymmetrical.  Where AOL owners 
retain the power to speak to the whole AOL community, each AOL member’s access to 
community platforms for introducing broad based change are substantially restricted 
AOL has created a social field that grants AOL members the limited power to influence 
circumscribed local norms rather than impact the broader regulating authority of AOL 
owners.  Consequently, the “self” in AOL is fashioned to wield limited power to affect 
structural social changes.   
 
• “. . . There is no space where you could address all members of AOL.  There is no town 
hall or town meeting where people can complain in public and have their complaints 
heard by others . . . The owners of AOL, however, can speak to all . . . The rest of the 
members of AOL can speak to crowds only where they notice a crowd.  And never a 
crowd greater than twenty-three.” 
 
4.  AOL members exist within a virtual field of “traceability,” or rather, centralized 
visibility to AOL’s gaze 
The online “self” practices virtual forms of existence while submitting to the awareness 
that various online practices may be under surveillance. 
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• “. . . AOL can (and no doubt does) trace your activities and collect information about 
them.  What files you download, what areas you frequent, who your “buddies” are – all 
this is available to AOL . . . “ 
 
• “. . . . AOL knows (even if no one else does) just who you are.  It knows who you are, it 
knows where you live in real space . . .” 
 
5.  AOL allocates a limited portion of its power to observe other AOL members in the 
form of “buddy lists” 
AOL members are granted limited power to observe other AOL member activities.  AOL 
members may also have some of their online actions observed by selected online 
members - but only if  screen names have been freely disclosed to one another. 
 
• “. . . One wonderful feature of the online space is something called “buddy lists . . .” 
 
 Local Internet Site Data #2:  AOL Instant Messenger (AIM) Critical Themes 
 
1.  AIM advertising produces excitement and immediate access to the technologically 
enabled power, value, and social practice associated with maintaining a constancy of 
virtual interconnectivity with others 
AIM advertising valorizes a multiplication of virtual social practices consistent with the 
modernist and Cartesian de-emphasis upon sensual bodily and worldly significance. 
 
• “Connect with your friends and family – anytime, anywhere!  AIM® 5.2 for Windows, 
Download Now! . . .” 
 
• “. . . AIM Remote™ [buttons]: 
 {I am Online.  Send me an IM.} 
 {Add me to your Buddy List.} 
 {Join my Chat Room.} 
 {Send me E-Mail.} . . .” 
 
• “. . . AIM Express Features:  AIM Express lets you send instant messages directly form 
a Web browser, such as Netscape navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer, to anyone 
who has registered for AIM or who uses the America Online service . . .  
 
2. AIM encourages the employment of prepackaged  online pictorial re-presentations of 
one’s “self” as a way to communicate what is lost by bodily presence in cyberspace  
AIM compensates for what amounts to the modernist and virtual abandonment of the 
flesh by introducing a catalogue of smiley face symbols and images of cultural celebrities 
into online social practice.  In these ways, the virtual social field is filled with re-
presentational traces of embodiment rather than the tone and texture of the sensual flesh 
and world.  The surplus of complexity and dynamism occurring during nonverbal 
incarnate interchanges exceeds what virtual re-presentations can convey.  The “self” in 
AIM space must, therefore, still submit to the diminution of the sensual when employing 
virtual social practices.   
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• “. . . AIM Expressions™ is the exciting way to personalize your AIM
® 
client and 
instant messages . . .” 
 
•  “Buddy Icons . . . Make your IMs display your online personality.  Choose a cool 
Buddy Icon . . . Choose from hundreds of cool Buddy Icons:”  
 
• “Smiley Dictionary:  Ever wonder what people are saying on AIM?  Use the handy 
Smiley Dictionary to keep up . . .” 
 
3.  AIM reproduces the Enframing  (Ge-stell) of modern technology by promoting an 
instrumental (means-end), efficient, and expedient relationship to language 
AIM encourages language practices based on expedience and convenience rather than 
upon practices which privilege fulsome modes of revealing. 
 
• “. . . Acronym Dictionary:  Get your message across quickly and save some 
keystrokes, too . . . you’ll be communicating faster than ever with friends, family, and 
colleagues.” 
 
4.  Within AOL’s extensive virtual social community exists a centralized list of norms 
which frame parameters for the production of  norms in local cyber spaces  
AIM empowers individual online users to enact personal and local norms.  By contrast, 
AOL codifies broadly applicable normative rules and guidelines comprised of 
suggestions and legal injunctions.  Within different virtual spaces, netizens are free to 
practice a plurality of ethics (postmodern?) within the limits of legal norms (modernist?) 
 
• “Block members who misbehave.” 
 
• “. . . Please review our chat rules and guidelines.” (See Appendix N for AIM Chat 
Room Rules and Guidelines) 
 
5.  AIM promotes a subset of social practices which are relatively free from the visibility 
of the virtual field 
AIM encryption allows Instant Messaging social practices to instantiate a postmodern 
space largely free from the encroachment of non-local norms.  Encryption technology, 
free of backdoor decryption options, would go further to insure against interference from 
large institutionalized systems (e.g., government). 
 
• “Encrypted IM:  Now you can send and receive encrypted IMs . .  .” 
 
6.  AOL prompts an incitement to speech in virtual interactive domains 
AOL’s incitement to interactive online speech results in a social saturation which can 
contribute to the “self’s” exposure to broader ways of being a “self. 
 
• “AIM Chat Rooms . . . Hot Chats . . . Hobbies and Interests . . . International . . . Love 
& Romance . . .” 
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7.  AOL’s addition of the AIM-mobile phone interface furthers the production of social 
practices increasingly disconnected form body and world 
AOL creates a wireless architecture promoting easier wireless crossovers from voice-
based communication space to virtual communication space.  Impediments to the “self’s” 
immersion in virtual sociality are overcome. 
 
• “. . . Sending IMs to mobile phones just got easier.  Now you can create nicknames for 
your Buddies’ mobile numbers . . .” 
 
• “. . . Have Instant Messages delivered to your cell phone, when you’re away from your 
PC . . .” 
 
 Technocultural-Historical Themes #1:  “The Question Concerning 
Technology” (QCT).  Having concluded the critically informed analysis of local AIM 
social practices, I took up the task of exploring the broad horizon of Western discourses 
in the technocultural-historical textual analyses below.  In the first of four scholarly text 
analyses, Martin Heidegger’s essay, “The Question Concerning Technology,” provided 
the widest or most historically panoramic understanding of modern technology vis á vis 
the other scholarly texts I examined.  Here, Heidegger reached as far back as Socratic 
Greece to inaugurate ”thinking” about how the enframing of modern technology opens up 
a disclosive space which narrowly reveals things as “standing reserve.”  By contrast, the 
technē of the pre-Socratic Greeks brought into freer disclosure that which was prevented 
from presencing within an instrumental perspective.  In corollary fashion, it was later 
seen that Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s difficulties with arriving at clarity about the 
virtual others they encountered were situated within the constricted social practices 
linked to Enframing (Ge-stell).   
Below, Heidegger’s cultural-historical understanding of modern technology has 
been articulated under two broad thematic categories.  The two broad thematic categories 
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to be considered in this section will address forms of being a “self” and forms of relation 
with the world occasioned by modern technology. 
 Themes:  Forms of being a “self” 
A.   Modern technology solicits the self to order the world (as standing-reserve) [QCT] 
The theory of nature found in the modern physics of the seventeenth century prefigured 
the essence of modern technology, Enframing.  With the rise of machine-power 
technology in the eighteenth century, Enframing occasioned a clearing where the modern 
self participated in marshalling the world to come to presence in a narrowly ordered 
fashion.  The modern self’s capacity to reveal a richly variegated significance of the 
world was correspondingly eclipsed. 
  
• “The essence of technology lies in Enframing.  Its holding sway belongs within 
destining.  Since destining at any given time starts man on a way of revealing, 
man, thus under way, is continually approaching the brink of the possibility of 
pursuing and pushing forward nothing but what is revealed in ordering, and of 
deriving all his standards on this basis” (p. 26). 
 
• “Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets 
upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as 
standing-reserve” (p. 24). 
 
• “Modern technology as an ordering revealing is, then, no merely human doing.  
Therefore we must take that challenging that sets upon man [sic] to order the real 
as standing-reserve in accordance with the way it shows itself.  That challenge 
gathers man into ordering.  This gathering concentrates upon ordering the real as 
standing-reserve” (p. 19) 
 
• “Modern physics is the herald of Enframing . . .” (p. 22). 
 
B.  The instrumental view of technology gives rise to a self understood as the master of 
technology (QCT)  
The instrumental view of modern technology, as a means to an end, “conditions” the 
human self to manipulate technology for the ends which modern technology serves.  In 
this way, modern technology and the human activity of the modern self are regulated.  As 
a way to overcome the lack of a free relationship to modern technology, the human self 
views its self as the master of the technology it has been “ordered” to employ. 
 
• “Technology is a contrivance, or in Latin, an instrumentum” (p. 5). 
  
• “As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but 
does so, rather, exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of 
objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he comes to 
the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is he comes to the point where he himself 
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will have to be taken as standing-reserve.  Meanwhile man, precisely as the one so 
threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.  In this way the 
impression comes to prevail that everything man encounters exists only insofar as 
it is his construct” (pp. 26-27). 
 
• “ . . . modern technology . . . is a means to an end.  That is why the instrumental 
conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right 
relation to technology.  Everything depends on our manipulating technology in 
the proper manner as a means . . . The will to mastery becomes all the more 
urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control” (p. 5). 
 
• “So long as we represent technology as an instrument, we remain held fast in the 
will to master it.  We press on past the essence of technology” (p. 32). 
 
C.  The essence of technology invites the self to reflect freely in an ongoing mode of 
revealing (QCT) 
The essence of technology was prominent during the era of pre-Socratic Greece as 
technē.  The ancient understanding of technē freed the human self to bring-forth truth, 
not as a fixed representation, but rather as a free revealing of what presented itself.  The 
human self was attuned to the shared participation of conventional modes of knowing 
(e.g., objectivity) and aesthetic sensibilities in the process of unconcealment. 
 
• “From the earliest times until Plato the word technē is linked with the word 
epistēmē.  Both words are names for knowing in the widest sense” (p. 13). 
 
• “Once there was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was 
called technē.  And the poiēsis of the fine arts was called technē. 
In Greece, at the outset of the destining of the West, the arts soared to the supreme 
height of the revealing granted them” (p. 34). 
 
• “Because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection 
upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, 
on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology . . .  
Such a realm is art.  But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part, does not 
shut its eyes to the constellation of truth . . .” (p.35). 
 
• “The relationship will be free if it opens our human existence to the essence of 
technology” (p. 3). 
 
 Forms of relation with the world 
 
A.  In modern technology the world is understood as a resource to be stockpiled as a 
standing-reserve (QCT) 
Amidst the sway of modern technology, the world is revealed as a potential energy 
resource to be store housed for future human use.  The disclosure of the world is typically 
confined to its value as a readily available material support for human existence. 
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• “ . . . man in the technological age is, in a particularly striking way, challenged 
forth into revealing.  That revealing concerns nature, above all, as the chief 
storehouse of the standing energy reserve . . . Modern science’s way of 
representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces” (p. 
21). 
 
• “And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not 
unfold into a bringing-forth in the sense of poiēsis.  The revealing that rules in 
modern technology is a challenging [Herausforden], which puts to nature the 
unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as 
such” (p. 14). 
 
• “The revealing that rules throughout modern technology has the character of 
setting-upon, in the sense of a challenging forth.  That challenging happens in that 
the energy concealed in nature is unlocked, what is unlocked is transformed, what 
is transformed is stored up . . .” (p. 16). 
 
• “Everywhere, everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, 
indeed to stand there just so it may be on call for further ordering” (p. 17). 
 
B.  In modern technology the world is understood as having a singular essence (QCT) 
From the time of Socrates forward, the essence of the things of the world was thought to 
have been predetermined and unalterable.  Truth-claims, grounded in the assumptions of 
Western metaphysics, posited a singular essence for the things of the world.  In this way, 
the being of the world was debilitated by human forgetfulness about the dynamic 
unfolding of the world’s significance.  
 
• “Socrates and Plato already think the essence of something as what essences, 
what comes to presence in the sense of what endures.  But they think what 
endures remains permanently [das Fortwährende] (aei on)” (p. 30). 
 
• “But it can never in any way be established that enduring is based solely on 
what Plato thinks as idea and Aristotle thinks as to ti ēn einai (that which any 
particular thing has always been), or what metaphysics in its most varied 
interpretations thinks as essentia” (p. 30). 
 
• “It is technology itself that makes the demand on us to think in another way 
what is usually understood by ‘essence’” (p. 30). 
 
C.  The essence of technology allows the world to be revealed through a continuous 
process of “unconcealment” (QCT) 
The “danger” of modern technology encompasses the loss of free unconcealment as a 
human practice. Such a “danger” amounts to losing touch with the essence of technology 
as a way of revealing the world through continuous cycles of disclosure and 
concealment.  The plentitude of the world’s significance can show itself when the “saving 
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power” to recover open-ended unconcealment is revitalized by the imminent threat of 
such a loss.  
 
• “Bringing-forth comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into 
unconcealment.  This coming rests and moves freely within what we call 
revealing [das Entbergen].  The Greeks have the word aletheia for revealing.  The 
Romans translate this with veritas” (pp.11-12). 
 
• “Technology is therefore no mere means.  Technology is a way of revealing.  If 
we give heed to this, then another whole realm for the essence of technology will 
open itself up to us.  It is the realm of revealing, i.e., of truth” (p. 12). 
 
• “The question concerning technology is the question concerning the 
constellation in which revealing and concealing, in which the coming to presence 
of truth, comes to pass” (p. 33). 
 
• “Thus the challenging Enframing not only conceals a former way of revealing, 
bring-forth, but it conceals revealing itself and with it That wherein 
unconcealment, i.e., truth, comes to pass” (p. 27). 
 
• “Thus, where Enframing reigns, there is a danger in the highest sense. 
 But where danger is, grows 
 The saving power also” (p. 28). 
 
Technocultural-Historical Themes #2:  Technology as Symptom and Dream  
TSD.  In this, the second scholarly text analysis, Robert Romanyshyn’s Technology as 
Symptom and Dream stands as a chronicle of discourses emerging from the world of art, 
anatomy, and physical science circa the fifteenth through seventeenth centuries.  
Romanyshyn demonstrated how the latter fields of study crystallized practices positing 
the self as a spectator, the world as a spectacle, and embodiment as a specimen.  
Technology’s corollary dream followed suit by extolling a detachment from both the 
earthly world and the incarnate self. 
After I compared the cultural-historical themes outlined by Romanyshyn with the 
local site analysis of AIM, it became clear that while the local AIM space similarly 
privileged practices linked to disembodiment and disconnection from the physical world, 
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AIM practices also allowed Internet users to engage in practices partially offsetting the 
loss of bodily presence (e.g., AIM Expressions, emoticons) and worldly context.  In this 
way, AIM’s virtual communication practices both reproduced and challenged the 
modernist assumptions informing the architecture of virtuality  
In the themes outlined below, Romanyshyn’s cultural-historical understanding of 
the technological world and its cultural project have been articulated under three broad 
thematic categories.  The three broad thematic categories considered in this section will 
address living the body, forms of being a “self,” and forms of relation with the world.   
 Themes:  Living the body 
A.  Modernity solicits abandonment of the flesh (TSD) 
The fifteenth and sixteenth centuries are marked by the rise of knowledges and practices 
(e.g., Brunelleschi and Alberti’s codification of linear perspective vision in painting) 
which “seeded” the current technological world’s estranged way of knowing and 
inhabiting bodily being.  Embodiment was understood as a hindrance, an impediment, 
and an obstacle to knowing one’s world. 
 
• “.  .  . within the space of linear perspective vision and under the fixed gaze 
which stares at the horizon, the human body is taken up into the heady eye of 
mind . . . Our senses will make increasingly less sense of the world as the body 
matters increasingly less than thought” (p. 48). 
 
• “Indeed the daring Copernicus’ imagination, ‘which lifted him from the earth 
and enabled him to look down upon her as though he actually were an inhabitant 
of the sun,’ lies in his willingness to dispense with the body in order to achieve a 
vision of things no longer misled by appearances” (p. 95). 
   
• “Descartes . . . completed another work, in 1649, entitled The Passions of the 
Soul, in which he continued to elaborate the relations between the conscious 
person and the estranged body” (p. 141). 
 
• “. . . the telos of technology’s dream to refashion the body is toward 
abandonment      of the body, toward disincarnation” (p. 20). 
 
• “. . . the human body has become something quite unknown to us, unfamiliar, an 
alien abstraction . . .” (p. 103). 
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• “In leaving the body behind, the self behind the window can better realize its 
vision of the world, a vision purified of the flesh, sterilized, if you will, a vision, 
we might say, without taste” (p. 114). 
    
B.  The modern body is experienced as an object (TSD) 
In the modern imagination, the individual’s body is meant to matter from a detached 
perspective.  The modern discourse understands the human body anatomically, as a 
sanitized, depersonalized corpse or specimen.  At the individual level, one is thereby 
invited to understand living flesh as an object comprised of mechanical functions.  
Forgetfulness about the sensual, emotional, and mortal horizons animating the flesh 
conceals how the body gathers meaning about its vital involvement in the world. 
 
• “In 1543 [Andreas Vesalius] created modern anatomy.  Before Vesalius the non-
living body was a dead body.  After Vesalius, the dead body became a corpse.  
Corpses are designed to be open for inspection . . .” (p.16). 
 
• “[William] Harvey resurrects the corpse.  In 1628 he reanimates it by making 
the heart into a pump.  A crude machine . . .” (pp. 16-17) 
       
• “In offering us an image of life as mechanism, as technical function, the corpse 
hides death and conceals the living body as an e-motional involvement and 
relation with the world” (p. 132). 
 
• “ . . . the eye as the paramount organ of distance comes to represent humanity 
which, in increasingly removing itself from the world, becomes less and less 
touched by it . . we shall say that the body abandoned is free to become the corpse 
. . .” (p. 44) 
 
• “ . . . the corpse hides life as well as death . . .” (p. 127). 
 
• “ ‘With the beginning of anatomy,’ van den Berg writes, ‘the distinction 
between life and death becomes obscure’ . . . The corpse removes the smell of 
death, and in this respect the corpse becomes the only thing it can become, neither 
a living nor a dead body, but a lifeless thing” (p. 127).   
 
• “The body which we have invented to fit the space of the world opened up by 
the linear perspective vision is a body of technical functioning.  It is an 
anatomical object . . .” (p. 114). 
 
• “ . . . to retreat within the defined spaces of my anatomical arm, the more my 
arm becomes an arm, like any other arm”  (p. 105). 
 
• “ . . . our invention of the anatomical body has helped us forget:  the body is a 
situation and as such changes” (pp. 108-110). 
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Forms of being a “self” 
 
A.  The modern self is prone to become a detached spectator (TSD) 
The “window” of linear perspective vision in art and the objective stance of the scientist 
of modernity both participate in producing the detached way in which individuals relate 
to their world.  Modernity solicits a passive relation to one’s world.  Humanity thereby 
becomes an observer, a dispassionate spectator of its worldly horizon.  Lacking 
investment in and communion with a world richly animated by meaning and sensuality, 
humanity reproduces a space of literalized interiority that forgets its productive powers 
of imagination and reflection.  The spectator sees without fully understanding. 
  
• “The window which Alberti imagined between the viewer and the world has 
become a style of consciousness marked by our retreat and estrangement from the 
world” (p. 68). 
 
• “In the space of linear perspective the viewer is imagined to be looking at the 
world as if through a window.  The window is our habit of mind . . . Behind the 
window we have become distant and detached, a self separated and isolated from 
the world, a neutral observer and recorder of the world’s events” (p. 67). 
 
• “The spectator self who trains his or her fixed gaze upon the world also practices 
a singular vision.  It is that single vision of Newton’s sleep from which the poet 
Blake begged deliverance, a literalizing vision which forgets the play of 
imagination, which was Blake’s point.” (p. 99) 
 
• “Behind a window, it is easier to imagine that one is only an on-looker of the 
world, a detached and non-involved spectator” (p. 67). 
 
• “Cool, detached, impartial, and objective, the self of distant vision becomes 
increasingly indifferent to a world it views from afar” (p. 89) 
 
• “ . . . the distance which separates our knowledge of the world from our 
experience of it has increased” (p. 68). 
 
B.  The modern self is prone to take itself up as a “master” of its world and of nature 
(TSD) 
Modernism places emphasis upon the self’s detachment from the world.  The Western 
self’s experience of distance from the world has given rise to a human self imbued with 
the belief in its centrality and omnipotence.  The ensuing belief in the power to control 
and recreate nature serves as an attitudinal backcloth influencing the modern self to 
ignore finitude and its symbiotic relation with the vital landscape of life.    
 
• “ . . . in becoming increasingly detached it becomes increasingly possible to 
imagine that one is in charge and in control of things.  With increasing distance it 
becomes easier to believe that one is really at the center” (pp. 44-47). 
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• “Having dominated the earth out of our increasing distance from it, we have 
come to believe that we are masters, and even creators . . . In this respect, we have 
lost something of the religious sense of human life . . . the sense that we are 
already bound, and connected to, and limited by something beyond ourselves” (p. 
25). 
        
• “[Frankenstein] is made by man [sic] and is manmade.  As made by man the 
monster is the product of a human vision which would master, tame, and even 
remake nature” (p. 161). 
  
C.  The self of modernity tends to reject its “sensual” capacities (TSD) 
Linear perspective vision and scientized/mathematicized ways of understanding nature 
promote epistemologically based practices which shape the self as a head-centered 
rational organism.  Humankind is thereby sent on a way of knowing which devalues the 
rich sensory ground supporting the reflections of mind.  The human self then finds itself 
inhabiting abstractions rather than the sensual flesh of its body-world entwinement.   
 
• “There is in this [scientific and mathematicized] attitude a decisive rejection of 
the sensuous world and its sensible appearances, a turning away from the fleshy 
world of appearances, and even a distrust of how our bodily sense of the world 
makes sense of the world, a distrust which is destined to become the methodic 
doubt of the world which lies at the heart of the modern scientific attitude . . . . 
Doubt occupies in modern thought the same central position which wonder in the 
face of the world occupied in Greek thought” (p. 78). 
 
• “Indeed, to set the earth in motion Copernicus had to forget the sensuous body, a 
feet for which Galileo gave him much praise.  Copernicus had to abandon his 
body, he had to leave it behind, he had to become, so to speak, the first astronaut” 
(p. 135). 
 
• “.  .  . within the space of linear perspective vision and under the fixed gaze 
which stares at the horizon, the human body is taken up into the heady eye of 
mind . . . Our senses will make increasingly less sense of the world as the body 
matters increasingly less than thought” (p. 48). 
 
• “In addition to this separation between perceiver and world, the window initiates 
an eclipse of the body.  Looked at from behind a window, the world is primarily 
something to be seen.  Indeed, a window between me and the world tends not 
only to emphasize the eye as a means of access to the world but also to de-
emphasize the other senses . . . [M]y vision of the world from behind the window 
tends to lose touch with the sounds, tastes, smells, and feel of the world” (p. 42). 
  
• “Our sense will make increasingly less sense of the world as the body matters 
increasingly less than thought” (p. 48). 
 
• “ . . . the body increasingly becomes a matter of the head” (p.48). 
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D.  The self of modernity tends to be “unconscious” of  “gestural” meaning and 
emotional significance (TSD) 
Seventeenth century discourse “reanimated” the body of anatomy as a collection of 
reflexes.  Depersonalizing embodiment in this way divorced bodily action from the 
motivations of the person.  The modern self, solicited to forget that a plentitude of 
meaning infuses its actions, progressively lost sight of the desires, emotions, memories, 
and feminine possibilities motivating its living connection to the world.  In banishing the 
significance of desire, emotion, memory, and the feminine to the concealing shadows of 
forgetfulness, these nonobjective experiences survived in the modern self’s existence as 
distressing and ambiguous feelings of anxiety or as disturbing symptoms of disease (e.g., 
neurosis, hysteria, anorexia).      
 
• “ . . . within fifty years of Descartes’ speculations about [the reflex] body, the 
English philosopher John Locke, in 1691, makes desire a matter of interior 
uneasiness, a restlessness carried inside . . . [A] body whose desires have lost their 
place in the world casts a shadow.  The reflex body forced to bear its burden of 
desire by itself, apart from the world, becomes the mesmerized and hypnotized 
body of the eighteenth century” (p. 144).  
 
• “ . . . Freud’s hysterics, whose neurotic symptoms betray how they suffer from 
reminiscences, from memories which have no place in the world, make their 
appearances respectively at the very beginning of the twentieth century and at the 
end of the nineteenth” (p. 142). 
 
• “At this cultural threshold, then, the pantomimic, gestural body of everyday life, 
the body which is always more than an objectified technical function, is forgotten 
and remembered, and as such it is present as a cultural symptom.  For just as an 
individual symptom, like anxiety or depression, both reveals and conceals a 
conflict of emotions, these shadows of the abandoned body reveal and conceal the 
animate flesh of daily life, the body of desire, memory, and movement, the 
individual, personal body of character in relation to the world from which we 
have all taken flight.  As symptoms, then, these figures of the body haunt and 
shadow our cultural dreams of escape and reincarnation” (p. 148) 
 
• “Our reigning vision of the world as a space where everything, lying on the 
same plane, is a matter of objective fact has been able to appropriate [lived 
experience], either by confining it to the world of art, which, it assumed, has little 
if anything to do with real life, or by indexing to it the adjective ‘subjective’ . . . 
But in doing so we miss the all-important truth that these landscapes are the 
unconscious of our age, symptoms in need of our attention” (p.183). 
 
• “In the horizon-tal space of linear perspective vision the idea of progress and the 
reality of the unconscious are born” (p. 44). 
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• “The madman or madwoman is a body out of control, and the grinning face of 
the fool is a mockery not only of a life which would deny death but of a kind of 
reason that would leave the body behind” (p. 152). 
 
• “It should be noted, however, that insofar as the shadows of the abandoned body 
are predominantly feminine in character, we might venture the notion that the 
discovery – invention of the abandoned body is, psychologically speaking, a 
masculine enterprise” (p. 151). 
 
E.  The modern self tends to function repetitively and mechanically as if it were a “robot” 
(TSD) 
The scientific discourse of the seventeenth century understood the motion of objects as 
driven by the laws of “mechanism.” This mechanical understanding of motion was 
employed to explain the behavioral “movements” of human beings as well.  Moreover, 
this dehumanized understanding of human action, reframed mechanized ways of being as 
a means to transcend nature. Thus the human self eventually found itself anchored in a 
world that solicited automatic, efficient, and productive behaviors.  The modern self was 
no longer invited to act in accord with its horizon of manifold possibilities.   
 
• “With Kepler in 1609 we discover that the motion of the planets is an ellipse.  
But what matters to our story is not the exact geometric shape of the motion, but 
the fact that the motion as geometric prescribes a movement, a circulation 
regulated by mechanism.  Earth and body obey a new law of circulation, and each 
begins to move with a mechanically regulated rhythm” (p. 136). 
 
• “ . . . Descartes’ vision . . . is made quite explicit in his work La description du 
corps humain, written in 1648 . . . In this work he offers an explicit formulation of 
the body as machine . . .” (p. 140). 
 
• “ . . . the robot as such enters the stage of history in 1928 as a dramatic character 
in a play by Karl Capek entitled R.U.R., Rossum’s Universal Robots . . . . What 
Capek saw . . . was the mechanization and dehumanization of humanity.  And 
what he described in his drama was the robot worker, efficient, free from the 
distractions of memory and desire, with the body of a man or woman remade and 
now superior to nature – a body designed to work, a body whose death would 
simply mean the absence of motion” (p. 146). 
 
• “The industrial worker is an explicit incarnation of the reflex body and the robot 
is an image of this worker taken to its full degree.  The idea of the robot is, of 
course, older than the industrial age, but the specific sense of the robot in relation 
to labor, and the word itself, belong to the time frame of this history of the 
abandoned body” (p. 145). 
 
• “The body reanimated via reflex is a machine, and hence its motion has a 
mechanical, repetitive character . . . It is a motion which lends itself to being 
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broken into its parts – a motion, then, which allows or invites fragmentation” 
(p.144). 
 
• “The automatically functioning body behaves without reference to its situation  . 
. . . A body, moreover, which is insensitive to its situation, is also a body acting 
repetitively” (p.141). 
 
• “The robot would be a being which would transcend nature.  It would rise above 
the flesh” (p. 147). 
 
• “The eclipse of the difference between the heart as a pump and the human heart, 
between technical functions and human activity is the issue” (p. 18). 
 
Forms of relation with the world 
 
A.  Things of the world come to matter as a spectacle of objects (TSD) 
The window of linear perspective vision participated in producing a detached, de-
animated view of the world. The human gaze thereby came to understand the spectacle of 
the world as an exhibit comprised of discrete objects.  Humankind’s culturally acquired 
style of modern perception took cultural, psychological, symbolic, and imaginal distance 
from the world of perceptual objects resulting in a de-vivification of matter. 
  
• “What linear perspective vision achieves is a kind of geometrization of the space 
of the world, and within that space we become observers of the world which has 
become an object for vision” (p. 33). 
 
• “The gaze of the observer . . . leads to a distancing gaze of scientific 
observation, and the consequence, in both cases, is that the thing becomes a 
specimen and a spectacle” (p. 67). 
 
• “ . . . the self, as spectator of the world with a body which has become a 
specimen, already practices that distance which prepares for departure from a 
world which has become a spectacle” (p. 57). 
 
• “The spectator self who trains his or her fixed gaze upon the world is also 
practicing a singular vision . . . a literalizing vision which forgets the play of 
imagination . . .” (p. 99). 
 
• “Insofar as we become accustomed to single vision, to that vision addicted to a 
fixed perspective or point of view, to a single angle of interpretation . . .” (pp. 99-
100). 
 
B.  The world becomes place to depart from (TSD) 
The intensification of the boundary between human being and world, occasioned by 
linear perspective vision, contributed to humanities retreat from the world – a departure 
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wherein humankind emotionally withdrew from a world it was neglecting.  In this way, 
humanity perpetuated a sense of homelessness amidst its earthly landscape. 
  
• “The condition of the window implies a boundary between the perceiver and the 
perceived . . .  a formal separation between a subject who sees the world and the 
world that is seen, and in doing so it sets the stage, as it were, for that retreat or 
withdrawal of the self from the world which characterizes the modern age” (p. 
42). 
 
• “ . . . the telos of technology’s dream to refashion the body is toward 
abandonment of the body, toward disincarnation.  The dream is, however, 
inseparable from the dream of departing earth.  Disincarnation is a moment of 
departure” (p. 20). 
 
• “Indeed, the fires of nuclear catastrophe are the symptomatic side of the fires of 
departure.  Wedded in this fashion, departure takes on the character of 
psychological necessity.  On an earth wired for destruction, space flight becomes 
a means of escape” (p. 23). 
 
C.  The world becomes a place to explained (TSD) 
The linear perspective vision gave rise to modernity’s relation to the world as something 
to be observed, measured, analyzed, and explained.  The production of objectively 
informed perception, as a cultural habit, thus reduced the qualitative thickness and 
richness of the world to categories suitable for rational, scientific understanding and 
explanation. 
 
• “ . . . the world on the other side of the window is already set to become a matter 
of information” (p. 42). 
 
• “ . . . a linear perspective vision is one which places everything on the same 
level and in this respect the imaginal eye of the artist has already prepared the 
space for the sixteenth-century emergence of the scientific world of explanations” 
(p. 43). 
 
• “When we adopt a look which scales the world to its quantities, the world is 
leveled of its qualities.  In mapping the world we thereby explain it” (p. 83). 
 
• “In the space of explanation, we turned our eye toward the future and turned our 
back on the past.  Progress and not history was destined to matter” (p. 180). 
 
D.  The world is leveled down to its value as energy resource and commodity (TSD) 
Behind the window of linear perspective vision, the displaced world was set to be emptied 
of its significance and revalued as a matter of consumption and economics.  Modernity 
put the world to use as source of energy to be used as the “light” of the human world.  In 
addition, the extraction of resources from the earth sustained humanity’s reliance upon 
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an economics tied to the system of production and consumption for the sake of acquiring 
capital. 
 
• “The convergence of economics and science into one vision of reality, the 
convergence of truth as explanation and worth as price, the convergence of money 
and things, is perhaps the most obvious way in which we have lost touch with 
things and things have lost their place” (p.195). 
 
• “Amidst all the events images, inventions, and instruments which belong to our 
technological world, the one item which is perhaps the most fundamental is the 
equation E=mc
2
. Nothing perhaps has had more of an impact on our lives, or 
indeed on the history of humanity, than this mathematical formula, which has 
become the symbol of our age . . . this equation is the code by which the energy of 
the stars is released from the ordinary matter of earth” (p. 186) 
 
• “We are energy producers and consumers, and it is energy and our need for it 
which most characterize our age” (p. 187). 
 
• “The interest, meaning, and even desire of our relationships with things are 
broken, and we find ourselves in a landscape of commodities and consumer goods 
subject to the laws of supply and demand” (p. 196). 
 
Technocultural-Historical Themes #3:  The Saturated Self (SS).   In this, the 
third scholarly text analysis, the aperture of historical analysis is narrowed to the 
twentieth century.  Herein, I thematize Kenneth Gergen’s, The Saturated Self, which 
stood as an examination of technological developments in media, travel, and 
communication as occasions for the advent of postmodernism.  Gergen described how the 
prior discourses of romanticism and modernism came into question as twentieth century 
technologies brought the individual into contact with an increasing array of non-local 
worldviews.  Said differently, Gergen described how a plurality of previously 
marginalized perspectives were paradoxically admitted into consideration by practices of 
modernity.  The ensuing influx of diverse perspectives allowed postmodern discourse to 
gain credibility whereas romantic and modernist discourses descended, more or less, into 
dubitation. 
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With Gergen’s cultural-historical analysis in mind, the technocultural-historical 
narrative developed at the end of Section II integrated the critically evaluated local AIM 
data with Gergen’s characterization of romanticism, modernism, and postmodernism.  By 
doing so, it was revealed that Internet practices instantiated practices pertaining to each of 
the three historical discourses, rather than instantiating one discourse to the exclusion of 
the other two. 
In the themes developed below, Gergen’s cultural-historical understanding 
regarding technology’s impact on constructions of the self and sociality have been 
articulated under two broad thematic categories.  The two broad thematic categories 
considered in this section address forms of being a “self” and forms of relation with the 
world.   
 Themes:  Forms of being a “self” 
  
 A.  The self of romanticism and modernity is undergoing dissolution (SS) 
As contemporary technologies open the way for broader social involvements – for social 
saturation – the Western self is allowed to “internalize” and enact a plurality of 
alternative selves.  What once counted as the essential deep self of romanticism and the 
rational self of modernism is now giving way to ambiguous possibilities for being in the 
emerging postmodern era. 
 
• “It is the process of self-population that begins to undermine the commitments 
to both romanticist and modernist forms of being.  It is of pivotal importance in 
setting the stage for the postmodern turn” (p. 69). 
 
• “ . . . there is little hope that the past can be recovered.  Our best option, then, is 
to play out the positive options of the postmodern erasure of the self” (p. xiii). 
 
• “ . . . the eroding of the identifiable self is both supported by and manifest in a 
wide range of beliefs and practices” (p .7) 
 
B.  The self, linked to communication technologies, becomes multiphrenic as the self is 
infused with social saturation (SS) 
As the self embraces a “symbiotic interdependence” with technologies enabling social 
saturation, the self becomes immersed in landscapes filled with multiple, disparate, and 
contradictory voices.  On the way to early postmodern self-consciousness, the multiply 
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populated self can become multiphrenic.  In this state, the erstwhile selves of romanticism 
and modernism might undergo experiences ranging from feeling unstable, unbalanced 
and cautious to feeling free, expansive, and receptive to otherness. 
 
•  “There is a populating of the self, reflecting the infusion of partial identities 
through social saturation.  And there is the onset of a multiphrenic condition, in 
which one begins to experience the vertigo of unlimited multiplicity.  Both the 
populating of the self and the multiphrenic condition are significant preludes to 
postmodern consciousness” (p. 49). 
 
• “ . . . there is a cyclical spiraling toward a state of multiphrenia.  As one’s 
possibilities are expanded by technologies, so one increasingly employs the 
technologies for self expression; yet, as the technologies are further utilized, so do 
they add to the repertoire of potentials.  It would be a mistake to view this 
multiphrenic condition as a form of illness, for it is often suffused with a sense of 
expansiveness and adventure” (p. 74). 
 
• “ A multiphrenic condition emerges in which one swims in ever-shifting, 
concatenating, and contentious currents . . . The possibility for committed 
romanticism or strong single-minded modernism recedes, and the way is opened 
for the postmodern being” (p. 80).   
 
C.  Waning commitments to traditional notions of self lead to enactment of the 
postmodern relational self (SS) 
Upon embracing postmodern ways of being, the self is more readily attuned to the fluid, 
dynamic, and relational qualities of self-realization.  Rather than experiencing internal 
conflicts over identity definition, the traditional notion of the self - as discrete and self-
contained - gave way to a lived understanding of the self as continually unfolding 
through dialogue with various others. 
 
• “As the self as a serious reality is laid to rest and the self is constructed and 
reconstructed in multiple contexts, one enters finally the stage of the relational 
self.  One’s sense of individual autonomy gives way to a reality of immersed 
interdependence, in which it is relationship that constructs the self” (p. 147). 
 
• “As the modernist is drawn into the socially saturated world . . . the concept of 
the true and independent self – whether constituted by a deep interior or 
machinelike rationality – loses its descriptive and explanatory import.  One is thus 
prepared to enter a third and final stage, in which self is replaced by the reality of 
relatedness – or the transformation of “you” and “I” to “us” (p.156). 
 
• “For the postmodern, life is rendered more fully expressive and enriched by 
suspending the demands for personal coherence, self-recognition, or determinant 
place, and simply being within the ongoing process of relating” (p. 134). 
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Forms of relation with the world 
 
A.  Objective and rational modernist worldviews are still prevalent despite their conflicts 
with emerging postmodern viewpoints and receding romanticist perspectives (SS) 
The current cultural zeitgeist instantiates the shifting dominance of various historical 
worldviews.  Presently the self is conspicuously solicited to relate to the world from the 
rational-objective standpoint of modernism. 
 
• “Modernist assumptions of rationality, objectivity, and essentialism have been 
under attack . . . Yet even without a sustaining rationale, the modernist 
perspective continues to dominate Western culture” (p. 231). 
 
• “ . . . in the three-way conflict of discourses, each simultaneously compels and 
repels.  Romanticist discourse is inviting in its intimations of profound mysteries 
of the person, love, commitment, inspiration, and the like.  At the same time, 
modernist discourse engenders a promising sense of security and optimism with 
its emphasis on the rational, reliable, knowable, and improvable aspects of the 
person.  And the newly emerging  postmodern perspective opens the way to a 
fascinating play of potentials and an increased sense of relational reality” (p. 229). 
 
B.  The postmodern views of the world imbue the erstwhile certainty of modernist 
perspectives with doubt (SS) 
The emerging postmodern self doubts the apodictic certainty regarding the identity of 
persons and things.  The postmodern self respects the impermanence and indeterminacy 
of identity and meaning as a positive quality belonging to a world bound up with 
inexhaustible profiles of significance. 
 
• “ . . . as the range of our relationships is expanded, the validity of each localized 
rationality is threatened.  What is rational in one relationship is questionable or 
absurd from the standpoint of another” (p. 78). 
 
• “In effect, one’s self becomes populated with others.  The result is a steadily 
accumulating sense of doubt in the objectivity of any position one holds” (p. 85). 
 
• “Indeed, with the shift from objects to objectification, from reality to 
constructions of reality, we cross the threshold into a virtual vertigo of self-
reflexive doubt” (p. 134). 
 
• “ . . . as one becomes increasingly aware of multiplicity in perspective, things-
in-themselves disappear form view” (p. 112). 
 
• “ . . . social saturation brings with it a general loss in our assumption in true and 
knowable selves” (p. 16). 
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• “ . . . the very technologies giving rise to the pluralism of postmodernism also 
serve to undermine the potentials of these resources for solidifying cultural modes 
of understanding and action” (p. 201). 
 
C.  Embracing broader opportunities for relatedness with others alters the forms of social 
intimacy (SS) 
Social involvements with a broader range of people is possible amidst the social 
saturation enabled by modern communication technologies.  Compensatory 
transformations in social connection include partial intimacy, accelerated pacing of 
relationships, or sporadic yet intense encounters. 
 
• “ . . . social saturation and self-population throw traditions into disarray; 
committed forms of relationship become antiquated, and a multiplicity of partial 
relations is favored” (p. 182).  
 
• “ . . . a new form of relationship emerges in which family members attempt to 
compensate for the vast expanses of nonrelatedness with intense expressions of 
bondedness.  As many understand it, quantity is replaced by quality” (p. 66). 
 
 • “The occasional meeting is intensified by its shortness” (p. 67). 
 
• “The pace of relationships is hurried, and processes of unfolding that once 
required months or years may be accomplished in days or weeks” (p.62). 
 
            Technocultural-Historical Themes #4:  Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 
(COLC).  In the last of the four scholarly texts, Lawrence Lessig’s Code and Other Laws 
of Cyberspace was selected for its micro historical analysis of the constructed nature of 
cyberspace.  Lessig articulated a short history of cyberspace by demonstrating how the 
situated nature of cyberspace is conditioned by the interaction of software code, laws, 
norms, and markets.  More to the point, Lessig emphasized that the Internet is best 
characterized as a mosaic of cyber spaces.  Rather than being understood as a single 
space, Lessig contended that each cyber space is differently normed, in part, because its 
netizens could play a role in defining the values and the architecture governing these 
spaces.  The inclusion of Lessig’s micro historical analysis in the technocultural-
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historical narrative illuminated the ways in which Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn either 
challenged, bypassed, retreated from, and/or submitted to AIM social practices,   
In the themes developed below, Lessig’s contemporary cultural understanding of 
cyberspace and the discourses impacting the software code of Internet spaces have been 
articulated under two broad thematic categories.  The two broad thematic categories 
considered in this section will address forms of being a “self” on the Internet and forms 
of relation amidst Internet worlds (spaces).   
Themes:  Forms of being a “self” on the Internet 
 
A.  Anonymity and code allow the self to take on a wider range of multiple identities 
(COLC) 
An Internet Provider’s (IP) software code allows the self to come into online presence in 
potentially multiple and divergent ways.  Where code enables one to adopt multiple 
screen names, the self is freed to explore an indefinite range of identities not necessarily 
expressible offline.  Thus, if one maintains relative anonymity about one’s offline identity, 
the online persona is free to experiment with personifying traits incongruent with one’s 
offline self.  
 
• “As a member of AOL you can be any one of five people . . . When you start an 
account at AOL, you have the right to establish up to five identities, through five 
different “screen names . . . “ (p.67). 
 
• “ . . . you are given a fantastic power of pseudonymity that the “code writers” of 
real space simply do not give.  You could, of course, try in real space to live the 
same range of multiple lives . . . [b]ut unless you take extraordinary steps to hide 
your identity, in real space you are always tied back to you” (p. 68). 
 
• “In real space you reveal your sex, your age, how you look, what language you 
speak, whether you can see, whether you can hear, how intelligent you are.  In 
cyberspace you reveal only an address, and one that has no necessary relationship 
to anything else about you” (p. 33). 
 
• “The selections about code are therefore in part a selection about who, what, 
and, most important, what ways of life will be enabled and disabled” (p. 66). 
 
B.  The self conducts itself with the awareness that its online activities may be monitored 
(COLC) 
While relative anonymity can exist between social agents on the Internet, the self is more 
or less aware that its activities can be surveilled by the architects of Internet code.  In 
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this way, the activities of the online self can be potentially codified and regulated by 
direct or indirect means.   
 
• “If AOL does not like certain behavior, then in at least some cases it can 
regulate behavior by changing its architecture.  If AOL is trying to control 
indecent language, it can write routines that monitor language usage; if there is an 
improper mixing between adults and kids, AOL can track who is talking to whom 
. . . “ (p. 70). 
 
• “If a common cookie identifies you across a number of sites (because its sites 
have subscribed to a common tracking system), then, in principle, if you have 
revealed information about yourself in one of those places, the other places could 
know it as well” (p. 35). 
 
• “In the government’s most recent proposals, the authors of encryption code 
would be regulated directly – with a requirement that they build into their code a 
back door through which the government could gain access” (p. 48).  
 
 • “What exactly should we think about constant electronic monitoring” (p.150)? 
 
 •“The system watches what you do; it fits you into a pattern” (p. 154). 
 
Themes: Forms of relation in different Internet worlds (spaces) 
 
A.  The self can simultaneously inhabit more than one discursive world (COLC) 
On the Internet, one may inhabit multiple discursive spaces.  In so doing, the world of the 
Internet allows the self to “leave” its immediate normative space and enter an alternate 
social clearing.  Though the self may choose to psychologically escape its offline world, 
the self is not fully free from its offline world of competing normative forces. 
 
• “When you ‘go’ somewhere in real space, you leave; when you ‘go’ to 
cyberspace, you don’t leave anywhere. You are never just in cyberspace; you 
never just go there.  You are always both in real space and in cyberspace at the 
same time” (p. 21). 
 
• “Cyberspace gave Jake the chance to escape Ann Arbor norms and to live 
according to norms of another place.  It created a competing authority for Jake 
and gave him a chance to select between these competing authorities merely by 
switching his computer on or off” (p. 21) 
 
• “Spaces have values.  They express these values through the practices or lives 
that they enable or disable” (p. 64). 
 
B.  The Internet world is composed of many constructed worlds (COLC) 
The world of the Internet is not ipso facto a space of incontestable freedom; nor is it 
necessarily a place of fixed essence.  The Internet is, instead, an array of differently 
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normed spaces which have been constructed.  Essence does not define the Internet.  
These spaces can be regulated and governed.  Although a normative structure may 
emerge, actions of resistance can contribute to the co-construction of these spaces if 
netizens dialogue not only at the level of social interaction, but also at the level of code.        
 
• “There is certainly a way that cyberspace is.  That much is true.  But how 
cyberspace is not how cyberspace has to be.  There is no single way hat the Net 
has to be; no single architecture defines the nature of the Net” (p. 25). 
 
• ‘ . . . “the nature of the Net is set in part by its architectures . . . the possible 
architectures of cyberspace are many” (p. 30). 
 
• “ . . . cyberspace is not a place, it is many places’ (p.82). 
 
• “The networks differ in the extent to which they make behavior within each 
network regulable.  The difference is simply a matter of code – a difference in the 
software” (p. 27). 
 
C.  Cyberspaces are influenced by discourses which have impact through and beyond 
software  code (COLC)  
Each Internet space is infused with values.  These values are multiply conditioned.  The 
discourses converging on the code writer and the discourses embedded within the social 
spaces of the Internet commingle to influence the forms of relatedness unfolding in a 
particular Internet space.  Forces such as the market, the legal system, the norms 
operating within a given Internet space, and architectural code may support a given 
discourse or, instead, re-present competing discursive regimes. 
  
• “’For citizens of cyberspace, . . . code . . . is becoming a crucial focus of 
political contest.  Who shall write that software that increasingly structures our 
daily lives” (p. 60)? 
 
• “Laws, norms, the market, and architectures interact to build the environments 
that ‘Netizens’ know.  The code writer, as Ethan Katsh puts it, is the ‘architect’” 
(p. 90). 
 
• “Constraints work together, though they function differently and the effect of 
each is distinct.  Norms constrain through the stigma a community imposes; 
markets constrain through the price that they exact; architectures constrain 
through the physical burdens they impose; and law constrains through the 
punishment it threatens . . . . The same model describes the regulation of behavior 
in cyberspace” (p. 88). 
 
 Technocultural-Historical Narrative 
Western Internet technology gathers discourses around Net users and their styles 
of understanding self and other.  The Western self, given over to cyberrelations, is therein 
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stitched into the fabric of pre-Socratic, Socratic, romanticist, modernist, and postmodern 
constructions of self and reality.  While the cultural-historical backcloth informing the 
Net user’s sense of self is woven into a history of sometimes compatible and sometimes 
conflicting heritages, the modern self, located at the intersection of these discursive cross 
currents, may not be fully aware of their impact on identity construction and social 
practice.  Expansion of cultural-historical consciousness can illuminate the interwoven 
threads producing truth-claims about the very being of the world. 
 
In the first place, the present day Net user is entwined in a long-standing ontology 
about what the world is and an epistemology about how to know the world.  Socratic and 
modern worldviews combined with the Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology and 
the linear perspective vision of fifteenth century art, to solicit detached and objective 
constructions of reality.  Additionally, it came to pass, over two thousand years ago, that 
the Socratic Greeks fashioned an enduring perspective about the being of entities in the 
world.  The beings of the world were rationally deduced to have ideal identities which 
were pre-given, fixed, and unchanging.  Hence a rational way of knowing the world 
solicited humankind to inhabit abstractions about the static “reality” of the world.  The 
dynamic significations of the living world were thereby partially eclipsed by the twin 
towers of rationalist epistemology and essentialist ontology.  The romanticist perspective 
likewise went on to interpret human being as having a core essence tied to nature and 
bound up with systems of morality and ethics.  In turn, modernity incorporated the 
essentialist view of humanity as rational and further extended a blanket over the holistic 
ontology of the world by characterizing the beings of the living world as objective in 
nature.  For instance, the grid of linear perspective vision gave rise to a detached vision 
of “reality” which deanimated the world and re-visioned it as a literal space filled with 
concrete objects.  The Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology further limited the 
presencing of the world as a mere stockpile of resources on call.  And, in the modern 
scientific realm, the “real” world was moreover categorized as a spectacle of material 
objects with measurable physical attributes.  Measurability provided scientific forms of 
epistemology (e.g., laboratory experimentation) with a seemingly certain empirical 
foundation of knowledge.  However, science was faced with an impoverished world made 
up of ‘dying’ objects.  It then followed that the physical science of modernity attempted to 
reanimate brute objects as energetic entities (e.g., Einstein’s equation - E=mc
2
, the 
literary figure of Dr. Frankenstein) mechanistically set into lawful patterns of motion 
(e.g., Kepler on planetary motion, Descartes on bodies as a collection of reflexes).  Thus, 
that which produced motion or motivation was accounted for only inasmuch as it was 
measurable.  As a result, a full understanding of the nonobjective qualities of desire, 
emotion, and spirit also descended into the shadows, though somewhat forestalled by 
pre-Socratic and romanticist appreciation of the passions.  Overall, however, what the 
world is was primarily known in and through structured and unbiased objective-rational 
assessments of physical attributes.  Things became inert substances and living bodies 
became anatomical machines with measurable personality characteristics all brought to 
life under the guise of mechanical principles of action.  Human being thereby abandoned 
the sensuous world and carnal forms of knowing while dreaming about transcending the 
fleshy experience of existence.  It is the recent space of openness to difference in the 
postmodern era which has legitimated the act of doubting the all-to-certain foundations 
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of modernity.  This has not occasioned a doubt which leads to endless skepticism, but 
rather it has instantiated a doubt which places the claims of modernity into the margins 
while marginalized perspectives are retrieved into the center of human awareness. 
Inquiry into the Internet site addressed in this study reveals that AIM instantiates 
some of the broad technological discourses outlined above.  AIM concomitantly solicits 
its netizens to know others primarily through the symbolic mediums of e-text, 
pictographic variations of the “smiley face,” and images of cultural celebrities.  Here, 
static simulations and re-presentations of embodiment replace the presence of the 
expressive human form.  Thus the attempt to know the virtual other is limited to 
abstractions thereby signifying that the excess of context-bound embodied human being 
fails to crossover from the everyday world into the virtual world.  Hence, ontology of the 
virtual other is enframed by a way of coming to presence which is similar to objective re-
presentations.  Specifically, the window of AIM cyberspace de-sensualizes, de-
contextualizes, and makes two-dimensional the being of enfleshed humanity. 
 
The modernist construction of an essentially rational self has delivered 
humankind over to a cascade of related practices.  Philosophical Socratic inquiry, the 
linear perspective vision of art codified in the fifteenth and sixteenth century (e.g., 
Brunelleschi and Alberti), and the physical science of the seventeenth century (e.g., 
Galileo) all served to normalize humankind’s detached contemplation of its world.  
Estranged from the shared world of things and people, humankind rooted its identity in 
the mind’s eye – reason.  As rational head-centered beings, the self of humankind became 
a dispassionate spectator of its shared world.  Detachment from the world corresponded 
with disconnection from aspects of being human.  The self lived an estrangement from 
bodily ways of knowing.  Emotionality, sensual awareness, and the imaginative 
capacities of incarnate existence became impediments to knowing.  The rational self was 
prone to believe that it housed undesirable and strange capacities within.  Non-rational 
ways of being fell out of awareness and practice and became more or less 
“unconscious.”  Aspects of emotionality became ambiguous and even unwanted.  Bodily 
gestures lost their significance as positively meaningful.  Living in a flesh divided meant 
understanding oneself as mechanical and efficient.  Vesalius’ development of anatomy in 
the seventeenth century and Harvey’s resurrection of the anatomical body as a machine-
like body of technical function contributed to disseminating and privileging machine 
driven ways of being human.  Humankind viewed itself as master of the natural and 
technological world.  No longer living symbiotically with its world, the modern self was 
constructed to explain, predict, control, and extract what it needed from its world.  With 
the arrival of postmodernism and the self’s interdependence upon technologies of social 
saturation in the twentieth century, commitments to dominant notions of being a self were 
tested.  The postmodern self, located in a liminal space of potential transformation, was 
allowed to explore its multiplicity.  The early experience of the lived postmodern self met 
with a sense of instability and a disparate sense of dizzying multiphrenia.  It was the 
more experienced postmodern selves, more at ease with difference, that could embrace a 
freer range of expressiveness, a receptivity to otherness, and a sense of familiarity with a 
fluid identity in ongoing dialogue with its changing circumstances.  Hence, the modernist 
ideal extolling a detached, rational, and efficiently ordered self housed a body of efficient 
technological bio-functions that is now given over to a postmodern technical world where 
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the self is saturated with a plurality of possibilities for being otherwise.  The self of 
postmodernism is invited to embrace a variety self-expressive possibilities, and either 
celebrate or struggle with the potential lack of continuity between one enacted possibility 
and the next. 
When the view of virtual “self” construction is narrowed from the broad cultural-
historical perspective down to the pervasive AIM space, it becomes apparent that the 
AIM window allows social practices which create a sense of togetherness and 
simultaneously limits the sense of togetherness by producing detached “self” practices 
for knowing others.  In other words, the AIM window precludes synesthetic bodily ways 
of knowing by narrowly accentuating the bodily powers of eye and cognition in AIM 
space.   It also becomes apparent that virtual “self” expression is solicited to utilize 
multiple screen names and the corollary potential for living out singular or multiple 
identities.  This freedom is set in motion by the virtual ordering of space which 
necessitates the “self’s” detachment from spontaneous full bodied expression followed by 
reliance upon the calculated use of static pictographic re-presentations to replace 
dynamic bodily presence. The online “self” becomes a two-dimensional object amidst a 
spectacle of other two dimensional “self” representations.  In addition, the requirement 
to maintain a continuity between one’s offline embodied self and one’s virtual identity 
becomes optional. This freedom is not, however, absolute.  AIM space is a surveilled 
space.  The virtual AIM “self” is subject to a high degree of visibility by AOL, and to a 
lesser degree of voluntary visibility by AIM “buddies” -  even encrypted communication 
carries with it the latent possibility of becoming visible through hacking or legal 
intervention.   Thus, living out an unbounded freedom to practice identity fluidity is 
potentially monitored; particularly in light of AOL’s prescription for conduct in the form 
of AOL “rules and guidelines.”  In this way, top-down regulations may gradually 
discipline “self” regulation in this increasingly structured frontier of cyberspace. 
 
Relatedness, in the world of modernity, is informed by a distinct cultural habit of 
interacting.  The Enframing (Ge-stell) of modern technology fosters an attitude of 
consumption wherein people and things are disclosed instrumentally.  People and things 
are revealed as a means to an end.  The process of continuous unconcealment is rendered 
inert by such a singular vision that reduces people and things to commodity – to a 
suitable resource.  Modern relations, idled by this constricted way of seeing and being, 
overshadow dynamic ways of being with one another and thereby allowing slippage into 
interactions permeated by distance and estrangement.  Humanity finds itself deskilled in 
the capacity to develop meaningful connections imbued with e-motional resonance.  
Practical instrumental concerns overshadow enduring passionate concerns.  With the 
advent of postmodernism and Internet technology, one can leave one’s immediate world 
and inhabit one or more social clearings.  This simultaneous access to multiple social 
spaces includes the opportunity to inhabit spaces with very different norms and a 
diversity of possible others to interact with.  This exposure to normatively different on-
line spaces or communities opens onto potentially new and unfamiliar relational 
practices.  These alternative relational practices are in turn influenced by the play of 
multiple forces such as the architecture of a website, the norms of conduct, applicable 
laws or policies, and market constraints (e.g., the price of access).  In either case, the 
forms of disembodied intimacy with diverse others allows for the expansion of one’s 
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horizons which may include the experience of newfound freedoms, uncertainties, 
vulnerabilities, and concerns about safety attendant to online encounters. 
While the AIM medium shuts down sensorial modes of being with others, it opens 
onto the enhanced power to virtually connect with others beyond the strictures of 
physical accessibility and beyond the limitations of those with immediate access to 
computers.  AIM incites people to virtual speech through advertising and by linking 
virtual communication networks to computer users as well as to wireless mobile phone 
users.  Crossing over into virtual connectivity becomes more convenient.  The AIM 
window also invites its users to scan the available resource of topic driven chat rooms.  
AIM space becomes an instrumental resource for accessing the available reserves of 
chat-ready virtual others.  A multiplicity of spaces is also available with many 
opportunities to crossover from one normative space to another with a simple click of a 
mouse.  The elaborative and rich use of language is still possible with e-text.  However, 
AIM instructs its users to consult its Acronym Dictionary as a way to convey that the 
efficient and expedient use of language during an encounter is a preferred social 
practice.  Thus, while the freedom to relate to a seemingly infinite variety of virtual 
others is technologically enabled, the medium (as the message) suggests that practices of 
virtual relatedness may weave one into the Net, but not necessarily into the lived fabric of 
self-other experience. 
   
Introduction to the Situated Global Narrative 
Whereas Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s lived experiences were unfolded in Section 
I, Section II contained no comment upon any of the research participants’ experiences.  In 
effect, their lived perspectives were “decentered.”  Instead, it was the practical discursive 
context of their virtual interactions which comprised Section II.  The story about their 
cyberspace encounters became an articulation of the Internet scenes which both invited 
and inscribed their actions and experiences.  In effect, the cyberspace horizon was 
acknowledged as an integral ground for their lived experience – as the there (Da) of their 
situated being (sein).   
In the situated global narrative to follow below, historiographies addressing long-
standing Western symbolic orders and AIM social practices were woven together with 
salient themes form Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s person-centered descriptions and 
interview-based elaborations.  By methodologically integrating analyses of discourse, 
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practice, and lived experience, the dialogic unity between the research participants and 
their cultural-historical worlds was restored.  The resulting situated global narrative thus 
stood as psycho-cultural-historical profile of experience.  As such, it bore out my 
research presupposition that subjectivity is situated within discourse rather than 
exclusively reducible to discourse. 
With the Net as a part of the rich cultural-historical mosaic comprising the 
research participants’ lives, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn found themselves confronting 
choices about inhabiting two very different life spaces – the earth bound sensual 
landscape of incarnate beings and the screenal ‘cyberscape’ of virtual re-presentations. 
As much as these spaces diverged on the lived dimensions of bodily presence and social 
praxis, both of the online and offline milieus were bound up with cultural-historical 
influences.  Moreover, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn exhibited differing degrees of 
commitment to the culture bound practices of virtual intimacy due to the differences in 
their social projects.  For instance, Rochelle was motivated to fill an emotional void in 
her life by seeking interaction, approval, and romance.  Bryce sought to overcome the 
constriction of his offline shyness and expand his online and offline relationships.  Dawn, 
separated from her significant other by geography and work schedules, worked to 
preserve a meaningful connection with her significant other.  Attention to the different 
projects enacted by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn allowed the latent significations 
circulating “in” cyberspace to be revealed – particularly where I thematized 
interpretations pertaining to the threesome’s responses to breakdowns and successes with 
available virtual practices.  Consequently, glimpses of research participant subjectivity 
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and co-construction of meaning were more visible against this backdrop of 
breakdown/fluency and docility/resistance (modification) regarding online practices. 
As way to understand the lifeworld accompanying the research participants’ 
experience, the cultural-historical configuration of the world was taken up as a fluid 
system of power motivated discourses refined by institutions and carried out as practices 
performed by bodies caught up in those institutions.  From this critical perspective, it 
became apparent that the Internet apparatus provided multiple spaces for the emergence 
of modern, postmodern, and – to a lesser degree - romantic discourses vying to invest 
bodies to enact particular practices. Despite the progressive routinization and 
normalization of practices in AIM space, opportunities to rework or transgress discursive 
practices were indeed possible. 
Section III:  Situated Global Narrative 
Life on the Net begins as one gazes through the cyberspace window upon the 
procession of textual and pictographic re-presentations lighting up the virtual world.  To 
look upon and within the glow of the interface window inaugurates the first moment of 
crossing over from the physical world into an AIM space promising sociality as its 
offering.  In this space, the embodied other radiates within the weightless luminescence 
of the cyber window glow as text, emoticon, and reproduced image.  Within this portal, 
multiple discourses become virtual practices, interpersonal graces become serial 
keystrokes, and physical bodies become light. 
 
The Modernist Horizon.  From the modernist perspective, the cyberspace stories 
lived out by Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn were intertwined with a number of modernist 
discursive designs for living.  AIM, in turn, provided the space for disseminating 
practices consonant with the discourses embedded within the research participants’ 
stories. Mind-body division, separation from the incarnate other, detachment from the 
earthly context, detached contemplation, increase in instrumental efficiency, and 
machinic enhancement of human powers were each provided for by the Internet. To be 
sure, these trends in AIM practices sometimes signified, instantiated, and extended 
earlier cultural-historical moments associated with modernism.  
In the fifteenth century, Alberti codified Brunelleschi’s linear perspective vision 
thereby placing humankind before a window gazing, from a distance, into a work of art.  
Humankind was therein solicited to practice seeing the world as a passive and detached 
spectator peering out upon a deanimated realm.  In the moment of adopting Alberti’s 
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vision, humankind was set upon the path to simultaneously abandon its flesh and depart 
from its world as its eye and mind remained to rove over an estranged spectacle of 
objects.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, science breathed ‘life’ into this 
devitalizing discourse.  Vesalius deanimated the human body by advancing an 
anatomical understanding of the body.  Harvey went on to reconceive of the body in 
mechanistic terms while Descarte later re-animated the body as a reflex driven machine 
(cf. B. F. Skinner). With the emergence of modern technology, its Enframing (Ge-stell) 
brought humanity into accord with a narrow disclosure of the world as a standing 
reserve.  The human-technology interface granted humankind with the power to 
efficiently order the world for the purpose of extracting resources.  With technology at its 
service, humankind takes itself as the master of technology and its world.  In doing so, 
humanity became more machinelike.  Hence, the Socratic Greek view of beings as poor 
reproductions of ideal essences existing outside of space and time was replaced by the 
modern technological view of human beings as a more perfect posthuman improvement 
upon nature. 
The Internet apparatus paved the way for disseminating practices of relatedness 
and styles of “consciousness” influenced by modernism.  As a result, full-bodied 
modalities for expression and knowing were de-emphasized during virtual 
communication.  AIM space fostered such practices through an incitement to enact 
virtual speech.  This included dissemination of “free” instant messaging capability, 
centralized access to chatrooms, options to create buddy lists, and an AIM upgrade to 
mobile phone interface with AIM. Within this discourse-tinted AIM window, one could 
realize the promise of accessing a ready reserve of available others.  Inasmuch as e-text, 
emoticons, and pictographic images were relied upon during intimate virtual 
communication, the worldly and sensual contexts for interpreting and making meaning 
were eclipsed.  Meaningful places for interpreting intimate gestures dissolved.  
Increasingly, humankind was called forth to relate to abstractions of otherness in AIM 
space.  Eye and mind – the tools of rationalized virtual practice – were well suited to 
engage such abstractions.  The physical body was consequently relegated to carrying out 
the mechanical know-how to operate Internet technology; a rather limited way for the 
physical body of the master of modern technology to function.  Ironically, the Internet-
based actions of the research participants were sometimes frustrated by the absence of 
embodiment during meaningful communication – a body that was typically downplayed 
in its significance by modernity.  
Poised at the cusp of the twenty-first century Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn sat 
before the AIM window readied for meaningful encounters within the modernist informed 
AIM space.  Initially, the opportunity to interact with somebody and simultaneously no-
body was embraced.  The research participants lived out the Cartesian tinged de-
privileging of the flesh.  They did so either out of the enthusiastic hope of forging new 
relations with previously unreachable others, or at least with the hope of retaining some 
of the texture and immediacy of offline encounters with a previously known other.  In 
either instance, the three research participants were motivated to seek out virtual 
sociality due to a perceived deficit in their life or being (e.g., geographic separation, 
social awkwardness, emotional emptiness).  Conducting relations in the screen mediated 
space of AIM also provided for an initial sense of safety from the unwanted exposure of 
their incarnate self to online others.  In so doing, the research participants sacrificed 
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their bodily hold on the earthly context intrinsic to the offline lives of online others.  At 
the same time, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn acquired an enlarged sense of spatiality 
allowing them to overcome the brute limitations of measured distance.  Some of the 
obstacles found in the natural world were thereby surpassed.  The power to access a vast 
standing reserve of chat-ready virtual others were a mere point-and-click away.  Before 
the research participants could fully savor the space of virtuality, however, breakdowns 
in their cyberspace practices occurred.  As much as these collapses may have signified 
breakdowns intrinsic to the discursive practice themselves, these breakdowns also 
represented breakdowns in the research participants’ willing compliance with 
participation in those practices.  Hence, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn discovered that the 
body-technology fusion enabled gains in mastery and power in cyberspace while also 
being knitted to losses in the body-world powers of being with others.  For instance, the 
research participants each took up the prosthetic possibilities of embracing Internet 
enabled sociality in a way that allowed for expansion beyond their offline bodily 
limitations.  In and through adopting an online identity and virtual modalities of 
communication, the research participants reproduced the discursive turn away from 
attention to body and world.  Thus the modern techno-self was able to leave behind 
unwanted facets of identity associated with embodiment (e.g., the seeable body, the 
sexual body).  At the same time, the offline self significantly severed the tie to sensuality 
and corporeality. 
Breakdowns occurred when virtual others were perceived as misusing the AIM 
forum for disembodied presence by being deceptive about offline identity and/or by being 
demeaning towards the research participant.  In such moments, the full-bodied emotional 
reactions of the research participants were asserted.  Experiences of disappointment and 
dismay occasioned research participant doubts about their initial investment in AIM chat 
practices.  Counter to modernity’s emphasis upon a rational basis for ethics, an 
embodied emotional ethic asserted itself.  For example, each of the research participants 
engaged in strategies to integrate their bodily concerns and needs into future Internet 
practices (e.g., meeting offline, viewing or posting online pictures, increased scrutiny of 
online chat, reflective retreat from online chat).  In these ways, modernity’s 
normalization of detached modes of contemplation of experience were jettisoned.  
Moreover, Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn did not read e-text as passive observers.  Instead, 
they treated AIM space as an interactive space.  When breakdowns occurred, they 
eventually increased their active participation – but only after deciding to reconfigure 
AIM forms of sociality to suit their respective projects.  Thus, modernist detachment was 
not fully reproduced; it was instead replaced by occasional efforts to recoup the loss of 
sensual bodily presence. 
With regard to the majority of the aforementioned modernist practices, the 
research participants integrated responses of both reproduction and resistance.  Where 
mind-body dualism required disavowal of embodiment, the research participants utilized 
virtual communication, but often in order to establish on offline connection.  In other 
cases, the research participants attempted to infuse some kind of gestural signifier (e.g., 
emoticon, image) into their virtual communication.  Embedded within meaningful virtual 
communication practices was, thus, the motivation to retrieve both embodiment and the 
world horizon.  The return to the body and world as the sensual ground for occasioning 
meaningful spaces was also fueled by breakdowns in the naïve and passive contemplation 
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about the virtual other.  Confusion and conflict ensued when unexamined attributions 
about the virtual other were made.  As Dawn suggested, “assumptions” about meaning 
were often made because the body-world contribution to the construction of meaning was 
absent. Intimate communication required increased effort at establishing understanding 
when the contexts of body and world were absent.  Even then, it could not be taken for 
granted that existentially congruent appraisals about the other had been constructed. 
None of the above is meant to suggest that the research participants did not 
benefit from the machinic enhancement of bodily powers.  To be sure, the Internet did 
indeed facilitate the overcoming of offline obstacles to communication.  However, 
conjoining meaningful self-expression with electronically mediated tools was not 
preferred as a primary means of conducting sociality.  Aligning one’s “self” and one’s 
relational life more fully with a machine-like mode of existence did not ultimately hold 
long-term appeal for these research subjects. 
 
The Romanticist Horizon.  The romanticist perspective brought with it the 
discursive assumptions that human being was comprised of a mysterious deep interior 
essence (e.g., nature’s “voice within”).  The knowable “self” was viewed as profound 
rather than rational or machinic.  In its profundity, the romanticist self was not 
knowable through (empirical) observation of surface behaviors and practices.  Instead, 
important aspects of self were to be found beyond what was visible.   Nevertheless, the 
being of the romanticist self consisted of ways of talking which addressed passion, 
depth, meaningfulness, and personal significance.  Values sprang from the deep 
interior of human being rather than from the derivations of reason. 
AIM practices were not altogether consonant with romanticist discourse.  AIM 
provided the online user with the opportunity to create anywhere from one to five screen 
names.  However, it was not required that the act of naming should reflect the deep 
essence of the individual.  Still, an online user could autonomously exercise such an 
option, especially in light of AOL’s effort to discourage “impersonation” and attempts to 
“mislead” others.  Although there was no requirement for the visible presence of the 
online user in AIM space, this de-emphasis did not appear to signify AIM’s valuation 
that a deep interior of the self existed or could in necessarily reveal itself.  Nevertheless, 
emoticons and AIM Expressions disenfranchised the distinctiveness of the embodied 
other by taking recourse to homogenized or popular culture displays of individuality 
(e.g., celebrity facial expressions) and the passions.  With regard to passionate 
expression, AIM did not fully repress such practices so much as AIM encouraged the 
efficient use of language (e.g., Acronym Dictionary).  With regard to value systems, AIM 
did not appear to acknowledged romanticist forms of online value construction.  Rather 
than emphasizing value guidelines congruent with the sensibility bequeathed by a deep 
human wellspring of ethicality (e.g., goodness emanating from nature’s “voice within”), 
AIM stated that “conduct should be guided by common sense, basic ‘netiquette,’ and 
[AIM’s] chat guidelines.”  Moreover, privacy was not guaranteed, though AIM 
professed that it would not monitor chat rooms and it offered encryption technology to 
AIM users.  AIM encryption contained a decryption key thus allowing for the potential of 
virtual practice oversight by AOL owners or the U.S. government. In addition, chatroom 
postings were highly visible endeavors within the AOL community and for those on 
“buddy lists.” 
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Overall, AIM did not instantiate a set of integrated social practices or values 
indicative of romanticist discourse.  If romanticist discourse issued forth from anywhere, 
it was Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn who enacted it.  With regard to meaningful and 
genuine virtual encounters, Rochelle and Bryce responded with mixed feelings of 
frustration and disappointment to mismatches between re-presentations of the virtual 
other and their factical offline presentations of self.  They hoped that the code of conduct 
was imbued with some semblance of fidelity in relation to others.  Moreover, when the 
sexual motivations of virtual others clouded Rochelle and Bryce’s efforts to establish 
meaningful dialogue, the research participants’ felt that a social contract for establishing 
intimacy had been breeched.  If the virtual other was previously known in the offline 
world – as was the case with Dawn - frustrations occurred when it was believed that the 
context of the true “self” and its qualities were forgotten or overlooked during online 
chat.  It also became frustrating when the intended meanings were not as easily grasped 
online as they had been during offline encounters. 
 In summation, the research participant’s brought romanticist assumptions about 
authenticity, the existence of a true “self,” and (possibly) ethics to their meaningful 
online encounters.  When breakdowns occurred, the research participants’ became either 
discouraged, disappointed, avoidant, or at least more effortful in their attempts to be 
faithful to the latter romanticist assumptions – even if AIM space did not readily enable 
the practice of such beliefs. 
 
The Postmodern Horizon.  Postmodern discourse provided yet another discursive 
backdrop to Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn’s AIM experience.  The Internet has been 
understood as a “technology of social saturation” with the potential to expose Net users 
to a plurality of beliefs, perspectives, values, and social practices.  As a result, the advent 
of growth in technology-enabled social connection (e.g., telegraph, radio, telephone, 
television, Internet) gave rise to a “postmodern consciousness.”   For example, it was 
believed that immersion in a pluralistic field occasioned doubts about modernism and its 
beliefs in a bounded identity, in a cohesive essential self, in the existence of objective 
reality, in the necessity of  rational practices, and in the existence of individually 
authored intentions.  A postmodern consciousness was thereby readied to acquire a 
pastiche personality comprised of multiple non-local identities, values, and practices. 
Value was placed on embracing a plurality of possibilities without imposing a 
hierarchical grading of those possibilities.  Thus the breakdown in the narrow 
perspectivity belonging to modernism and modern technology (e.g., Enframing) could 
allow the essence of technology (e.g., presencing) to release the play of signifiers and 
non-traditional perspectives into the foreground of being. 
 Several practices coded within the social architecture of AIM allowed for 
postmodern discourse to be enacted.  The combination of AIM advertising and the AIM 
interface window excited and incited awareness about a variety of electronic social 
mediums – email, instant messaging, centralized chatroom access, buddy lists, and 
mobile telephone access.  These alternatives allowed for enumerable opportunities for 
immersing in postmodern informed encounters with those enacting non-local differences.  
In some cases, postmodern and modern possibilities were latent within the same AIM 
convention.  For instance, the Cartesian separation of identity and body was occasioned 
by AIM’s provision for “screen names” – names, in effect, signifying dis-incarnate 
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screen presences.  Despite the ensuing instantiation of a mind-body split, screen names 
still gathered the potential for postmodern practices.  For instance, the Net user could 
assume from one to five screen names which could reflect partial aspects of one’s 
identity, unlived aspects of one’s identity, or no connection to one’s offline identity.  Thus 
the screen name user could enact identity multiplicity, partiality, authenticity, or 
performativity of morphed traits.  In these ways, the employment of screen name 
practices could reflect multiple discursive latencies rather than a single discursive 
practice.  How one’s practices were structured amidst the presence of multiple discursive 
latencies was another matter in itself. 
This normalization of AIM social practice – through posted “guidelines” - was, 
however, another area where AIM’s regulatory presence was ambiguous enough to 
enable multi-discourse enactments.  Indeed, AOL’s presence as a centralized observer of 
AIM practices was simultaneously enacted and relinquished.  Concordantly, practices of 
freedom and compliance were ambiguously enabled and disabled.  In such instances, 
modernist practices ironically served as a ‘swivel’ sometimes opening on to postmodern 
practices, and sometimes signifying modernist practices.  A single virtual practice could 
index more than one cultural-historical discourse.  For example, the option to 
communicate through encryption provided for some freedom from normalizing 
surveillance.  In this way, the lack of Net user visibility to a centralized observer implied 
that a relatively open clearing for free expression existed.  However, the presence of 
encryption keys allowed for the free space of encrypted communication to potentially 
‘swivel’ over to a space regulated by centralized norms.  Moreover, visibility to one’s 
“buddy list” or “traceability” by AIM delimited that freedom from normalizing gazes in 
other chat spaces.  Even though one’s immediate buddy group could conceivably remark 
upon a narrow range of one’s AOL activities, the final word on norms belonged to AOL 
even though AOL did not always exercise its authority.  In this way, the power to initiate 
change was always already asymmetrical and concentrated within the hands of corporate 
executives.  The power to organize social norms, from a lateral rather than a vertical 
power structure, was overridden by the hierarchy of power pre-programmed into the  
architecture of AIM communication.  And yet, AIM portrayed itself as allowing local 
virtual environments to construct their distinctive social systems.  Instead, it was usually 
the case that AOL provided regulated virtual spaces containing the co-present 
possibilities of postmodern freedom and modernist regulation. 
 The way in which Rochelle, Bryce, and Dawn responded to the postmodern 
possibilities in AIM space added another dimension to the process of intimate virtual 
communication.  For Rochelle and Bryce, the opportunities for expansion of “self” and 
social possibilities in cyberspace gave rise to heightened enthusiasm.  For both Rochelle 
and Bryce, shedding the factical body allowed for the postmodern possibility of 
journeying into a variety of previously unexplored social horizons.  While Rochelle 
sought after dialogue with “older” males for the first time, Bryce was able to access 
casual and potentially romantic chat with gay males at a time when he felt woefully 
inadequate to do so in his offline life.  Despite early positive reactions, Rochelle and 
Bryce’s exposure to non-local differences later gave rise to mixed reactions.  Initial 
enthusiasm about accessing an expanded social horizon sooner or later gave way to 
disillusionment.  Indeed, Rochelle and Bryce’s enthusiasm was eventually clouded by the 
disruptions they encountered in their emerging connections with virtual others.  These 
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disruptions arose when differing values about how to practice meaningful connections in 
and through cyberspace clashed.  Rochelle and Bryce found that alternative social 
patterns in AIM space unexpectedly re-gestalted into frustrating encounters where one 
could feel demeaned, attacked, manipulated, or deceived.  Bryce immediately reacted 
with disdain to the deception he encountered.  Rochelle, on the other hand, gradually 
discovered that her initial desire for approval turned into dissatisfaction with objectifying 
and immature social practices she encountered.  In both instances, Rochelle and Bryce 
subsequently refashioned AIM practices in order to carve out meaningful encounters 
consonant with values of honesty and kindness (romanticist?).  Therein, Rochelle and 
Bryce resisted modernist instrumentality.  In effect, they resisted  means-end forms of 
sociality.  This is not to say that neither Rochelle nor Bryce valued AIM space as a 
postmodern play space.  On the contrary, the exclusion of online bodily presence allowed 
Rochelle and Bryce to undergo “self” contraction inasmuch as disconcerting aspects of 
their offline selves were not re-presented online.  This exclusion of offline characteristics 
allowed Rochelle and Bryce to ironically practice a playful and liberating “self” 
expansion in and through their cyberself personas.  Previously unlived potentials for 
being could thereby be enacted.  In contrast, Dawn’s experience with a previously known 
significant other revealed that when obstacles to face-to-face communication involved 
geography and time schedules rather than body image issues, “calculated” efforts to 
somehow overcome the absence of the embodied ground of communication were enacted.  
In this way, it was revealed that the absence of the gestural body was immediately 
experienced as a significant loss.  The contracted quality of AIM space thereby became 
“tedious” and frustrating rather than meaningful and expansive.     
 Dawn’s frustration highlighted another theme regarding the experience of 
understanding and meaning in AOL’s region of cyberspace.  For each of the research 
participants, re-presentations of “self” and significance in cyberspace became 
problematic, sooner or later.  For Rochelle and Bryce, AIM space re-presentations failed 
to consistently provide clear-cut indications of offline compatibility or incompatibility 
with virtual others.  The lack of important contexts for understanding the virtual other - 
both bodily and worldly - sometimes created impediments to grasping meanings.  Thus 
the smooth unproblematic flow of communication sometimes concealed the lived fact that 
misunderstandings were unknowingly circulating during an intimate online encounter.  
From Dawn’s point of view, AIM space was training the “world to listen with a 
deafening ear.”  The outcome for each of the research participants was the wish to return 
from (post)modern virtual relations to the ground of sensual body-world encounter.  In 
this way, it came to be that an always already existing “discourse” of body-world unity 
ultimately subverted cultural-historical efforts to normalize (post)modern virtual 





 Listed among the research presuppositions I bring to this critical-hermeneutic 
circle of understanding is my view that the human-cyberspace interface reproduced 
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culturally and historically informed practices.  Here I presuppose that cultural-historical 
practices serve as conditions for the possibility of becoming a subject and for the 
possibilities of shaping social relations.  Specifically, I presume that technocultural-
historical discourses and practices contribute to the formation of a disclosive 
(cyber)space – a social clearing or field of power relations – which invest human bodies 
with differing prescriptions for being-in-the-world with others. Beginning with these 
background cultural-historical considerations, I open the Discussion section with a 
Descriptive Summary of the Results.  Therein, I articulate a concise reinterpretation of 
the research findings.  This reinterpretation allows me to fashion the second portion of 
the Discussion section – the Results Re-view.  In the Results Re-view, I construct a 
dialogue between the Descriptive Summary of Results section and the Literature Review 
section.  The circular dialogue between the two sections allows additional understanding 
about the being of cyborg subjectivity and cyborg intimacy to be illuminated.  
Throughout the literature re-view, I periodically address implications for future 
cyberspace study.  Towards the end of the re-view I reflect upon my initial 
presuppositions about the critical-hermeneutic aspects of doing qualitative research.  I 
then conclude the Discussion by addressing the Research Study Limitations and 
suggestions for future research modifications.   
Descriptive Summary of Results 
The techno-social scene of the twenty first century has been cast within electronic 
spaces.  Within these virtual places human participants metaphorically grappled with the 
possibilities of living out virtual cyborg existence.  For those electronically wired into the 
experience of human-machine hybridity, however, such cyber spaces were not marked by 
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neutrality and unbounded freedom.  In this study, I found that AOL’s Instant Messaging 
world offered up a horizon replete with the cultural-historical discourses and practices 
related to modernism, postmodernism, and romanticism.  In addition, AIM space 
gathered together the dreams, values, practices, transformations of existence, and 
shadows associated with the effort to embody such a discourse-infused virtual cyborg 
‘life.’  As such, the cyborg’s “psychic” and social ‘life’ came to reflect the mixing of new 
possibilities and shadowed possibilities circulating within the technocultural psyche.  
Through an interrogation of the research participants’ experiential descriptions of ‘life’ in 
E-merica’s AIM frontier, the lived quality of cultural-historical dreams and conflicts 
came into sharper relief.  
It was found that the kind of subject under discursive construction in AIM space 
was different than the kind of subjectivity emerging when the research participants’ 
engaged in the process of co-constructing identity. At first glance, AIM practices most 
obviously solicited a Cartesian subject (e.g., mind/body as split, instrumentalist attitude, 
disengaged observer) at home within a field of virtual re-presentations which allowed for 
postmodern enactment of alternate identities.   At the level of co-construction, however, 
subjectivity emerged as a virtual cyborg who was both appreciative and ambivalent about 
its technologically expanded powers to connect with a standing reserve of chat-ready 
others.  Indeed, this technologically enabled expansion of spatiality was sometimes 
accompanied by an increased sense of safety and invulnerability.  At the same time, the 
electronic life of a cyborg entailed losses in the bodily power to generate meaningful 
spaces of interaction.  The loss of meaningful spaces gave rise to a cyborg subject with an 
eye that was sometimes “blind” and sometimes “illiterate.”  As a result, the research 
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participants’ co-constructed version of being a virtual cyborg subject resuscitated their 
strong allegiance to the sensual bodily powers of signification – bodily powers which, 
according to Donna Haraway, should have been repudiated by cyborg subjects.  For 
instance, the research participants did not docilely submit to reproducing themselves as 
disembodied virtual cyborg subjects. The research participants, instead, played with 
options to freely cross back over into the lived world of embodied others after having 
initiated crossover into the ethereal space provided for by AIM.  In effect, these virtual 
cyborg practices were not beholden to enacting disembodied social practices 
submissively.  The research participants, instead, took up the meaning of a Cartesian 
discursive practice as if it were a sliding signifier.  The research participants did so by 
periodically re-appropriating Cartesian practices as a vehicle for retrieving practices 
associated with sensuality or embodiment. 
As to the form of electronic relations, the kind of sociality emerging in cyberspace 
was characterized by a normalization of communication wherein research participants 
were remotely present to the partial presence of distant others (e.g., as textual, screen, or 
telepresence).  In these ways, remoteness and partiality of presence contributed to a mode 
of sociality which could include significant disjunctions between chat partners regarding 
the meanings circulating during a virtual encounter. The meaning bestowing capacity of 
signifiers was in “retreat.”  For example, bids for virtual intimacy encompassed instances 
of substantial “undecidability” about basic aspects of a virtual other’s identity.  This kind 
of privative ambiguity resulted in decreased experiences of “being-with” others in a more 
existentially congruent manner, and increased experiences with “being-among” others 
where “[e]veryone is the other and no one is himself [sic]”  (Heidegger, 1962, p. 165).  In 
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order to retrieve the possibility of meaningful relations, the research participants engaged 
in a calculated intensification of virtual social practices, or a modification of discursive 
practices. 
Finally, electronic sociality revealed itself as an interactive practice where a 
profound visibility to peripheral others (e.g., soft surveillance) was unreflectively taken 
for granted.  Despite the potential visibility of an encounter and the modernist framing of 
postmodern possibilities for sociality, the research participants imported some of their 
own ethics into the enactment of virtual relations. 
Having briefly summarized the research results above, the descriptive summary 
below stands as an extended elaboration of the experiences lived out by the research 
participants.  Therein I chronicle their efforts to fashion a social existence at the 
intersection of an AIM clearing infused by a technocultural-historical assembly of 
discursive practices. 
A thematically sketched cyborg story.  The research participants arrived at the 
threshold of cyberspace sociality needful of social connection.  Without the temporary 
prosthetic of the Internet, the offline self was perceived as insufficient to overcome 
obstacles to establishing or maintaining social encounters.  By pre-reflectively becoming 
a cyborg - by temporarily embracing human-computer hybridity – the research 
participants were allowed to leave behind the perceived impediments of the flesh and 
momentarily dream of enhanced powers to connect with distant others.  Previously 
inaccessible, taboo, or feared others were bought within reach.  Thus, a postmodern 
expansion into non-local social spaces coupled with a postmodern expansion of the self’s 
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constricted or unlived possibilities were enabled by this dissolution of ties to 
embodiment. 
The AIM window was initially perceived to be a place from which to launch into 
AIM enabled social connection.  When a research participant’s project was to form new 
relationships, enthusiasm about complying with AIM practices was high.  In Bryce’s 
words, “It was fun, and exciting, and innovative to me” (Appendix G).   A research 
participant’s separation from the incarnate body, as a way to access the standing reserves 
of chat-ready others, was not initially thematized as problematic.  The modernist flight 
from body and world coupled with the postmodern liberation from an identity bound to a 
singular (embodied) identity was pre-thematically experienced as rife with gratifying 
possibilities.  In Rochelle’s words, “You feel really special inside, like you have nothing 
to be afraid of because the person you are talking to isn’t judging you for your looks, just 
solely on how you interact online” (Appendix D).  It was easy to be spellbound by the 
AIM window’s power – a power to enable a relatively safe simulated coexistence with 
previously unavailable simulated others.  The modernist sense of fleshly vulnerability 
was seemingly overcome by integrating a sense of identity with the machinic power to 
expand social spatiality and be simultaneously shielded from unwanted exposure to 
others (e.g., disembodied communication, AIM blocking button). 
Where a strong offline tie to the virtual other already existed, Dawn experienced a 
muted hope of recovering a satisfying semblance of offline immediacy while online - 
“ . . . IM was agreed upon [for] both of us to get back some of what verbal 
communication offered.  IM offered a pseudo-telephone call” (Appendix J).  At that 
point, to be a virtual cyborg and anticipate a valued aspect of offline sociality on the 
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‘other side’ of the AIM window was incentive enough to make the attempt.  Conflicts 
linked to the modern, postmodern, and romantic cultural-historical discursive practices 
were yet to vividly emerge.  For Dawn, the modernist departure from the body-world 
matrix of life was tacitly accepted so long as the promise of establishing a meaningful 
virtual connection with her significant other seemed viable.  Even if no-body was present, 
the desire for the logos of bodily-being-with-others, in some form, did not have to be 
fully surrendered, or so it seemed.  Thus, a bodily-based sensibility was already at work 
in decisions to engage in AIM sociality.    
The AIM window enabled and incited the use of multiple electronic social 
mediums (e.g., email, pictographic representation, buddy lists, centralized chatroom 
access, mobile phone access) through upbeat advertising.  Therein, the modernist call to 
seemingly sever the bond with the body and earthly world was embedded within the 
manifold point-and-click solicitations of the AIM window buttons.  These research 
participants, however, focused primarily upon Instant Messaging, chatroom spaces, 
email, picture posting, and emoticons during their attempts at establishing meaningful 
encounters.  Concurrently, their preference to cross back over into some form of a more 
sensorially informed encounter (e.g., telephone contact, face-to-face meeting) stood as a 
bodily-based practice imported into the AIM clearing.  Here, the research participants had 
not passively and docilely fallen into a slumbering forgetfulness about the bond between 
intimacy and fleshly encounter.  By retaining the option to interlace virtual encounters 
with sensual-bodily aspects of sociality, the research participants retained the choice to 
resist the AIM window call to adopt the detached perspective vision of a spectator. 
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Postmodern and romanticist practices were simultaneously possible within the 
aforementioned chosen practices.  That is to say, various AIM practices were not 
necessarily beholden to a single discourse such as modernism.  An AIM window practice 
could conceivably slide or ‘swivel’ in a way that allowed for a prethematic enactment of 
an alternate cultural-historical practice.  For the research participants, the option to shift 
the referential significance of an AIM space practice was always present, albeit 
prereflectively.  From a research participant’s point of view, however, the prereflective 
choice to shift the index of an AIM practice was “consciously” influenced by feelings 
such as frustration, emotional hurt, and emotional fulfillment.  Again, a sensual-bodily 
ethic asserted itself.  In Rochelle’s words, “You can be yourself, or you can be anyone 
you want to be really.  You can live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are really 
looking for true love, don’t falsify anything, it just makes for a big disappointment in the 
end”  (Appendix D).  The bodily experience of disappointment influenced the ready-to-
hand way in which virtual practices were put to use.  Specifically, Rochelle’s comment 
highlighted how the postmodern freedom to enact false, fantastical, or latent aspects of a 
research participant’s “self” might be solicited by the use of AIM space screen names.  
Alternatively, a romanticist pursuit of love could lead to a re-appropriation of screen 
names for the purpose of enacting “true” (e.g., factically congruent) disclosures about a 
research participant’s offline “self.”  The meaning of a discursive practice was not, 
therefore, unidirectionally determined.  Its significance was, instead, co-constructed.  
Thus, coming into presence in a genuine manner during meaningful encounters could 
hold sway for the research participants despite the modern and postmodern Enframing of 
AIM space practices. 
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Once immersed in AIM space, the research participants fashioned areas of smooth 
functioning virtual practices.  At other times, they experienced points of social 
breakdown sometimes followed by acts of renewed compliance or resistance.  For 
instance, the act of living out a cyborg vision sometimes included resistance to a detached 
(modernist) engagement with the spectacle of virtual others.  Adopting cyborg vision 
could also signify how the virtual self lived through an eye which accustomed itself to the 
partiality of a virtual other’s coming into presence.  In part, it felt safer to both be and 
encounter the partial presence of others as an e-text presence or as a screen reality.  
According to Rochelle, “Nothing bothers you, if you don’t want to talk to a person, you 
can easily block them . . . If the ‘real’ world was this easy, it’d be so nice, you would get 
rid of jerks right off the bat . . .”  (Appendix D).  While distance and partial presence 
hampered bids for intimacy, the safe distance of virtuality reduced the sense of prolonged 
vulnerability.  In the blink of a cyborg eye, the intrusive, deceitful, immature, or abusive 
virtual other (or subject) could be made to vanish. 
As a virtual cyborg subject, acquisition of the modernist power to feel relatively 
invulnerable became an occasion for other social breakdowns.  To be invulnerable in 
cyberspace was to signify that a research participant participated in AIM space as a 
remote presence.  As a remote presence, however, efforts to know the virtual other were 
palpably frustrated.  As Bryce recounted, “My first experience to meet someone new on 
the Internet was horrible because the person lied about his age and appearances.”  The 
research participant assumption that online others enact (romanticist) authenticity as a 
code of conduct was violated.  Consequently, research participant’s could be 
unknowingly deceived about the other’s factical offline bodily qualities.   Here, the 
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virtual cyborg eye sometimes became a partially blind eye.  The cyborg eye could also 
become an illiterate eye.  As a result, difficulty with forming accurate understanding was 
sometimes suffered.  In Dawns words, “I looked at the computer screen in complete 
horror.  He was lashing out at me.  He questioned our entire relationship over my simple 
statement.  All I meant by the statement was how surprised I was . . .” (Appendix J). 
Without the signs of bodily sensuality and worldly context, the remote eye of 
understanding became an eye sometimes lost at sea with linguistic signifiers.  
Specifically, the invulnerable cyborg could become lost in the remote eye of “mind,” – a 
“mind” unwittingly filled with decontextualized fantasy constructions about text-based 
meanings.  Such an eye lost the possibility of immersing itself within the manifold 
significations which faithfully sing the body-world unity indicative of a virtual other’s 
identity.  In such instances, the research participants were motivated to prevent or 
overcome the fantasy constructions occasioned by AIM sociality by shedding aspects of 
their cyborg armor and engaging in efforts to reduce distance from the virtual other.  The 
desire to meet by telephone or in person signified moments of resistance.  In other 
circumstances, the reassertion of effort to intensely scrutinize e-text communication 
occurred - to the point of “tedium” – thus signifying redoubled effort at compliance with 
the modern and postmodern calls to continue the practice of virtual existence in AIM 
space.  Whereas Rochelle resisted reliance upon AIM practices to establish intimacy by 
continuing to insist on face-to-face encounters, Bryce and Dawn engaged more actively 
in AIM chat.  Dawn did so out of an imposed necessity, stating that she had to “calculate 
how to present information” rather than rely upon spontaneous speech acts. 
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Just how the “cyborg self” of AIM space was culturally and historically produced 
involved AIM strategies of normalization and regulation.  One aspect of behavioral 
regulation in AIM space has been addressed through the description of discursive 
practices described heretofore.  Another AIM-based strategy for regulating behavior 
involved AIM’s modernist informed “Rules and Guidelines” posted online by AOL.  The 
“Rules and Guidelines” were modernist inasmuch as they seemed to spring from a 
“common sense” and legalistic sense of justice rather then, for instance, from a 
romanticist sense of a deep interiority connected to nature.  AIM ethics did, however, 
provide for the possibility of some postmodern freedom by emphasizing that chatrooms 
“are NOT monitored.”  AOL’s panoptic surveillance was also limited inasmuch as AIM 
provided “industry standard” encryption for its users; an encryption, however, wherein 
AOL and the U.S. government maintain decryption privileges.  Moreover, AIM 
possessed other pre-programmed capacities to trace AOL member activities on the 
Internet.  AIM also provided “buddy lists” which allowed virtual “buddies” to know 
when another buddy was online and what chatroom that particular “buddy” might be 
found in.  The activities of a virtual cyborg in AIM space were thereby normalized as 
profoundly visible to AOL and selected members.  Therefore, postmodern and romantic 
ethics could be negotiated in a multitude of AOL spaces, but within the confines of 
AOL’s overarching code and modernist informed “Rules and Guidelines.”  In this way, a 
virtual cyborg could potentially become the object of normative discipline.  Thus virtual 
freedom in AIM space could be performed within, of course, a modernist frame. 
Results Re-view  
Response to the literature on cyborgs and physiology.  How have images of the future 
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handed down to Western civilization from its past influenced the human experience of 
cyberspace in the early twenty first century?  The results of this study amended Donna 
Haraway’s early 1990s understanding of what it means to fashion existence from out of 
the cyborg image.  According to Haraway, the cyborg – a hybrid of human and machine 
(e.g., Internet) – was an irreverent and transgressive figure born with the capacity to 
oppose and resist acquiescence to the coding attributed to its origins of “mud and . . . 
militarism and . . . capitalism . . .” 
Initially, the research participants in this study did indeed adopt the prosthetic of 
computer-enabled Internet access in order to establish intimate connections with others.  
However, this human-machine fusion was only a temporary and transitional choice.  The 
wish to retain machinic powers, such as an expanded sense of social spatiality, was 
ultimately relinquished in favor of retrieving some sense of the lost sensual-bodily 
connection.  Rather than embrace a transgressive cyborg existence, even after having 
experienced the embodied self as inadequate, the research participants maintained an 
abiding motivation to return to the “mud” and sensuality of their embodied being.  
Moreover, they preferred to work toward achieving successful unmediated encounters 
rather than submit to modernist (and militaristic?) solicitations to maintain machinic 
detachment or to practice postmodern fantasy enactments during virtual encounters.  In 
this study, cyborgs did not ultimately defy their human “origins” so much as much they 
resisted modern technological discourses associated with their hybridity.  A bodily 
emphasis was re-appropriated as the research participants became distressed about the 
receding relevance of carnal disclosive powers.  Rather than docilely accept such a loss; 
rather than repress, mourn, or become nostalgic about bodily absence, the research 
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participants creatively worked to resist prolonged disconnection from some form of 
sensually informed encounter.  Thus, this study revealed that the prethematic flight from 
embodiment into virtual cyborg subjectivity was enacted ambivalently.  Submission to 
modern technological discourses were at times resisted when the bracketing of bodily 
participation became problematic. 
To be sure, the research participants initially expected the fusion of human-
electronic ‘life’ to enable a safe expansion of power to inhabit non-local spaces.  Therein 
they became cyborg “subjects” outfitted with enhancements over their biological and 
spatial finitude.  As cyborg “subjects,” they could also conceal their offline facticity.  At 
the same time, to prethematically become an electronic cyborg meant that research 
participants sometimes endured strained efforts to retain eclipsed aspects of bodily being 
and power or withstand their diminution.  Here, electronic simulations of presence did 
not successfully tranquilize anxiety about the loss of sensuality. 
Was this sense of sensual-bodily loss and return motivated simply by a wish to 
return to the familiar ground of human flesh?  The physiological understanding of human 
being found in the perennial standard text, Gray’s Anatomy (1989), provided an account 
of the human body as an organic machine.  In summary, this traditional physiological 
discourse produced an objectified understanding of the human body which rendered 
consciousness as a mere epiphenomenon of internal disequilibrium leading to the 
formation of “adaptive” maintenance and survival responses.  The results of this study 
supported Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that this kind of mechanistic and instinctual 
understanding of human physiology is insufficient.  For Merleau-Ponty, human behavior 
and purpose cannot be fully explained by simply relying upon stimulus-response 
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explanations (e.g., behaviorism) and instinctual drive theory.  As discussed earlier, 
Merleau-Ponty described a “human order” of existence that organized biological 
functions through the interpretation of context bound meanings.  In this study, the 
research participants experienced distress during social breakdowns when meaningful 
spaces for intimacy dissolved or did not materialize.  Thus, a wish for fulfillment 
unrelated to mere biological maintenance and instinctual gratification prevailed at those 
times (e.g., resisting sexualized social agendas).  The importance of fulfilling meaningful 
experiences associated with the “human order of existence” took precedence.   
Where the loss of meaningful sociality resulted in breakdowns, it became clear 
what kinds of “subjectivity” the research participants identified with – a meaningful 
bodily-being-in-the-world with others.  This loss also clarified how each research 
participant struggled with bodily absence, as well as how they grappled with the absence 
of non-virtual contexts which typically enrich the sense-making process.  The opportunity 
to construct meanings by integrating sensorially informed experience of the virtual other 
the virtual other’s worldly life context was unhappily absent for the research participants’ 
during bids for meaningful AIM space encounters.  In this way, the images from the 
movie “2001” served as poignant reminders about the lifeless and devitalized shape 
meaningful human existence takes when the earthly horizon of existence is replaced by 
the look and rhythm of technologically saturated ‘life.’ 
Implications for further inquiry into cyborgs and physiology.  The finding 
that virtual cyborg social existence extended spatiality and enhanced the sense of social 
insulation from physical and emotional risks also pointed to the concomitant loss of 
integrated sensorial participation during social encounters.  In this regard, Marshal 
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McLuhan’s (1964) landmark thesis on media extensions of human capacities suggests a 
direction for further research motivated by a cultural therapeutic.  McLuhan reasoned that 
as technological mediums extend human capacities and take over those functions, such 
extensions result in the atrophy or numbing of human abilities (e.g., heaters extend the 
body’s thermostatic function).  For example, Dawn stated that Internet as a tool for 
socializing was “[a]llowing the world to listen with a deafening ear” (Appendix J).  In 
effect, Dawn experienced the Internet as extending and muting the human capacity for 
listening and whole bodied interpretation during social encounters.  Following 
McLuhan’s argument regarding technological extensions of human capacities I, 
therefore, suggest that research addressing biological systems correlated with the 
integration of symbolic and emotional experiences, might clarify how prolonged human-
electronic interface during virtual social interactions impacts brain-body systems.  Jane 
Healy, a researcher in educational computing, has already initiated reflection and inquiry 
into the medical and behavioral implications for widespread computer use by children. 
In Jane Healy’s (1998) work, Failure to Connect:  How Computers Affect Our 
Children’s Minds – for Better and Worse, Healy expressed concerns that time spent on 
the computer displaced time available for physical and interpersonal experience.  Healy 
went on to suggest that research on the brain development of children who spend 
significant amounts of time on the computer might shed light upon such conditions as 
Attention Deficit Disorder and arrested emotional development.  Healy thereby supported 
research examining the limbic system (emotional functions), the prefrontal cortex (self 
control, planning), and the neurotransmitter serotonin (related to aggressive moods), all 
of which she believes are altered by prolonged computer use. 
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Healy did not however address Internet sociality.  With regard to those engaging 
in prolonged involvement in AIM sociality, I would go on to suggest that the sensually 
depleted social environment of AIM space may be indicative of a need for biological 
research into its impact upon tactile readiness for unmediated human contact (cf. 
Harlow’s (1974) monkeys).  I would also suggest that biological research also examine 
the long-term impact of virtual sensual deprivation.  It may be that the impact of 
immersion in virtual sociality may give rise to a dis-integrative effects on human neural 
networks for synthesizing the complex social-emotional information conveyed during 
face-to-face human encounters (e.g., synesthesic sense, corporeal schema).  Thus the 
meaning of being a virtual cyborg may indeed involve a biologically entwined 
“forgetfulness,” or selective inattention to the signifying power of human gestures, 
human emotions, and human desire beyond their adaptive biological functions. 
Response to the technocultural literature.  This study both modifies and 
supports perspectives raised in the review of technocultural literature.  First, I begin with 
images and subtexts bound up with the landmark film, “The Matrix” (1999).  The 
theretofore stunning and unparalleled visual effects found in “The Matrix” were 
undoubtedly seductive in demonstrating the appeal for immersion in simulated existence.  
Whereas the demolished state of the filmed version of the “real” world pales in 
comparison to the renovated visuals of the movie version of the Matrix, it can be asked 
whether or not the disparity between AIM space and the offline world of the research 
participants varied as vividly.   Specifically, and for the purposes of this study, it was 
found that Baudrillard's contention that simulations lacked the capacity to coherently 
signify the “real” garnered support from the research participant protocols. 
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In this study, the notion of the “real” referred to the research participants’ concern 
about the match between their perception of the online and offline identities of virtual 
others; about the match between their experience of virtual rapport and offline rapport; 
and about the match between intended meanings and subsequent interpretations of those 
meanings.  For example, Bryce found the discrepancy between the online and offline 
identity of the other to be a “horrible” experience where deception was involved.  
Rochelle found the discrepancy between online and offline rapport to be unpredictable 
and often “a real let down.” Dawn, on the other hand, found misinterpretations of 
meanings to require a “tedious” amount of effort to rectify or avoid.  The research 
participants’ reactions suggested that a postmodern virtual world filled with identity 
experimentation is undesirable when the overarching project to establish meaningful 
connections with others is already fraught with potential misunderstanding.  Their 
predilection for some kind of modernist certainty about the other’s re-presentations or a 
romantic desire for a level of integrity about their identity was generally preferred during 
virtual interactions. 
The results of this study were in partial accord with the Romanyshyn’s musing 
that the “dream body” of cyberspace serves as a vehicle for the factical body to abandon 
earth.  In similar fashion, this study partially supported Dery’s contention that netizens 
seek to achieve “escape velocity” in order to metaphorically break free of earth’s 
gravitational pull as a way to achieve technological transcendence within the global 
network of cyberspace. 
According to the research participants, the modernist desire to transcend 
embodiment in order that “mind” could merge with the electronic network of cyberspace 
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was at best a temporary project.  Initially, the research participants did indeed seek to 
take a more or less enthusiastic flight into the cyberspace realm of sociality.   However, 
their expectations about the possibilities of life within the electronic frontier were 
dimmed as breakdowns in virtual interactions emerged.  In a variation on the words of 
Herbert Marcuse (1964), the research participants may have initially experienced a kind 
of “euphoria in unhappiness;” a kind of fun and relaxation derived from consuming 
Internet related goods and services.  And yet, such consumption led to unhappy 
realizations about and resistance to an unsatisfying repression of human possibilities.  
Whereas the economic interests of AOL may have converged with modernity’s Cartesian 
incitement to embrace the “false need” to crossover into virtual worlds, it turns out that 
these research participants sought out AIM as a means to cross back over into enacting a 
discourse of meaningful bodily-being-in-the-world with others.  In such moments, the 
research participants enacted a retrieval of the marginalized desire for holistically 
contextualized sensuality.  It is therefore no surprise that the research participants’ initial 
perception that their embodied presence was a nuisance to offline social connection gave 
way to the alternative realization that virtual re-presentations (“dream bodies”) of self and 
other became a nuisance by inducing confusion during virtual chat. 
Ironically, transcendence or excessive immersion into the sociality of the Internet 
became a potential obstacle to meaningful intimacy for virtual cyborgs.  As stated earlier, 
the virtual cyborg eye becomes an eye often blinded to the presence of others.  It also 
became an illiterate eye during times of confusion about the meaning of decontextualized 
signifiers in AIM space.  Sometimes dim-sighted and lost in the translation of e-relations, 
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the “mind” of a research participant was occasionally reminded of its incompleteness 
without the complement of its bodily powers.  
Implications for further inquiry into virtual technocultural.   The research 
participants’ descriptions of their respective online behaviors tended to challenge 
Foucault’s (1978) notion that the power of discourses are merely “productive” social 
practices.  Whereas technocultural historiographies can benefit from an examination of 
how human conduct is “drawn out, revealed, isolated, intensified, [and] incorporated by 
multifarious power devices ” (1978, p. 48), it can also benefit from an examination of 
how alternate human experiences and practices may be marginalized or indeed 
“repressed” after power “measured the body, and penetrated modes of conduct” (p. 48).  
From Heidegger’s point of view, it is also important to realize that where one possibility 
(or mode of conduct) is revealed (or produced), another possibility is necessarily 
concealed (or marginalized).  Even in The History of Sexuality, Foucault did indeed 
acknowledge that the “inducement to speak” or to “confess” eventually enabled power to 
“manage”” and “normalize” practices – “ [T]he pleasure discovered fed back to the 
power that encircled it” (pp. 44-45).  Although Foucault objected to the notion that 
“essential” aspects of human being could be “repressed” and subsequently “liberated,” 
the relevance of a cultural therapeutic would diminish if all emotional and bodily 
indicators of health were trivialized as mere effects of social construction. 
In light of Foucault’s argument that all truth-claims vary because they are situated 
within different power/knowledge formations, any consideration of counter claims 
asserting the existence of universal bodily needs and desires amidst EMRs warrants 
caution – especially since non-Western religious and ethno-cultural groups may differ.  
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Thus a more conservative experience-near argument might, instead, suggest that the 
research participants’ “desire” for embodied contact arose from a perceived “lack.”  And 
such a lack may not have been due to the absence of mere anatomical bodies.  Rather, the 
experience of desire and lack may have been occasioned by the absence of encounters 
with historied bodies, bodies that signify historically informed meaning and identities 
through physical and gestural signs.   This would of course point to the possibility that 
human desire and historied bodies may have a contemporary, if not lasting importance for 
humankind in the West.  Thus, historiographies about the burgeoning culture of 
simulation would do well to maintain narrative openness to the possibility that desire for 
encounters with embodied others may indeed arise for an indefinite period of time in the 
West.  This would of course invite considerations in the area of “normative” or “ethical” 
cultural-hermeneutics.  Moreover, it would strengthen justification for suggesting 
modifications to future virtual technologies on the grounds of psychological health and 
well-being.  As the psychoanalytic historian, Daniel Burston (2000) summarized in his 
scholarly account of R. D. Laing’s theories in The Crucible: 
[Laing] referred to ontological security as the ‘normal’ state 
of affairs and argued that the ability to identify with one’s body, to 
sustain good-enough interpersonal relationships . . . and to enjoy some 
congruence between one’s being-for-oneself and being-for-others 
are constitutive of mental health . . . (p. 135) 
The failure to identify with “the communal self [as] perforce corporeal” (p. 134), 
according to Burston, may lead one become enveloped in a phantasy world.  And where 
the experiences described by the research participants in this study can be deemed 
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relevant, meaningful bodily being-in-the-world with others might be counted as a situated 
constant in the area ethical critical-hermeneutics.   
A useful example of such a project is Robert Kugelmann’s (1992) study of the 
relationship between the discourse of modernity and the “archaic” body in Stress:  The 
Nature and History of Engineered Grief.  From Kugelmann’s perspective the “stress” 
experienced by the human body signifies an implicit critique of modernity and its 
emphasis on progress.  Kugelmann argues that modernity’s form of progress alienates 
humankind from the lived body. Whereas modernity focuses upon reasoned efficiency 
and productivity, the lived body asserts its care for societal growth which is in accord 
with carnal earth-bound considerations.   Here, Kugelmann’s emphasis upon the lived 
body as a potential foundation for resisting aspects of modernity’s progressive discourse 
stands as useful touchstone for research motivated by a cultural therapeutic sensibility. 
Following from Kugelmann’s work, it would profit the field of psychology to 
remember that the “symptoms” linked to enfleshed subjectivity can inaugurate a valuable 
breakdown of the symbolic order.  One positive outcome of such a breakdown is that it 
can restore values associated with flesh and earth into forms of being-in-the-world with 
others.  For example, Kugelmann argues that the accelerated mechanization of society 
places increasing stress upon humankind.  Such stress does not always call out to be 
mastered (e.g., stress management).  Rather stress may signify the bodily recognition of 
lost worlds, lost forms of intimate personal relationships, lost opportunities for dwelling, 
and lost opportunities for experiencing moments of meaningfully lived time.  Kugelmann 
goes on to suggest that the creation of “empty time,” time freed from the need to be 
efficient and productive, may allow for the opportunity to mourn such losses, or to arrive 
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at choices to resist the burgeoning scarcity of being-in-the-world meaningfully.  Quoting 
again from Herbert Marcuse (1964): 
“Naming the ‘things that are absent,’ is breaking the spell of the 
things that are; moreover it is an ingression of a different order  
of things into the established one – “le commencement d’un monde” 
(p. 68). 
Response to literature on psychological issues.  In the Literature Review, I 
researched a substantial amount of speculative theory about the impact of human 
immersion in cyberspace.  Some of the arguments posed by different EMR thinkers 
included Gergen’s claim that social saturation can occasion multiphrenic experiences, 
Poster’s argument that narcissistic tendencies are solicited by cyberspace, Romanyshyn’s 
discussion of cyberspace-induced depression as an invitation to return “home,” and 
Robin’s concern that cyberspace immersion reactivates infantile omnipotent strivings. 
Whereas the latter theories argue that immersion in electronic sociality might give 
rise to deleterious outcomes, other perspectives allowed for more generative possibilities.  
From a positive psychological standpoint, Robins’ went on to submit that the Internet 
could serve as an imaginal space or a “transitional space” (cf. Donald Winnicott) 
allowing for the diminution of omnipotent tendencies.  Turkle stressed that the outcome 
of cyberspace involvement depended upon one’s purpose.  For instance, Turkle found 
that cyberspace contributed to one’s personal growth when the Internet was utilized to 
work through areas of desired growth rather than merely “act out” a fantasy existence.  
All of the above claims or fore-conceptions about the psychological implications of EMR 
immersion contribute to the following discussion. 
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The findings in this study lent limited support to Gergen’s perspective that 
identity expansion is enabled by electronically enabled social saturation.  Gergen argued 
for a developmental perspective on postmodern identity formation.  In this study, the 
research participants clearly sought out self-expansion as part of their pursuit of 
meaningful virtual encounters.  The kind of expansion they preferred, however, only 
modestly referenced a wish to alter their respective identities by “internalizing” the 
differing qualities of virtual others.  Instead, the research participants sought to live out 
genuine unlived possibilities for being in relation with others.  These possibilities were 
previously unlived because the research participants felt inhibited during bodily 
encounters (e.g., due to judgments about female body-image, shyness).  Bodily presence 
was a discomfiting nuisance. 
Whereas the research participants may have experienced an initial desire for 
exposure to the vast alterity of online others, instead, Rochelle and Bryce eventually 
experienced discontented moods leading them to enact a (romanticist?) search for a 
compatible other.  In such instances, their postmodern desire to infuse their identity with 
a dramatic expansion of values and modes of being a “self” was discarded.  In Bryce’s 
words, “I now know the types of people who are attracted to me and how to approach 
them” (Appendix H).  Bryce was less interested in fundamentally expanding the types of 
persons he related to so much as Bryce sought to determine the kinds of people he was 
compatible with.  During Rochelle’s teenage years, the excursion into the standing 
reserve of different others (e.g., older males) was fraught with misunderstandings, 
misconstrued perceptions about having made successful intimate connections, feeling 
objectified, feeling judged, feeling attacked, and feeling deceived.  In her post teen years, 
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Rochelle found a romantic partner and subsequently retrenched herself in her embodied 
world - “ When I met him, my Internet time went from 2 to 3 hours a day to just minutes 
checking my e-mail, and occasionally responding to them . . . I don’t go into chat rooms.  
There is no need to, I have everything I need in a person” (Appendix D).  In this way, 
Rochelle’s reactions –as well as Bryce’s - supported for Romanyshyn’s contention that 
certain moods can signify a call to return “home” to one’s ownmost being and 
possibilities. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to Gergen’s thesis that social saturation enabled self-
expansion, these research subjects found that the self-expansion was enabled more so by 
the body-concealing architecture of the Internet and its associated technology.  The 
prosthetic of the Internet allowed for a research participant’s identity to be ambiguous 
and only partially present online.  This kind of remote presence was experienced as less 
anxiety provoking.  The decrease in anxiety allowed the research participants to begin 
acting upon their preexisting desires for being-in-the-world with others.  Thus, the call to 
postmodern consciousness and practices had limited appeal for these research 
participants.  In contrast to Gergen’s viewpoint, the journey into postmodern and 
modernist possibilities was instead followed by a return to the comfort-zone of the 
research participants’ embodied possibilities. 
As to Robins’ contention that cyberspace solicited omnipotent infantile strivings 
and Poster’s claim that narcissistic tendencies were likewise solicited, the support for 
these claims is at best ambiguous.  It is not clear from the protocols that the research 
participants intended to engage in behaviors that were distinctly insensitive or 
demanding.  In one instance, it is clear that Rochelle did appropriate her aunt’s credit 
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card without consent, did “sneak” online late at night, and that she did misrepresent her 
age online.  Beyond such practices, Rochelle demonstrated a motivation to correctly 
identify her age online after preliminary chatting with a virtual other seemed as if it might 
lead to further interaction.  In terms of the virtual other’s actions, it is noted that Rochelle 
and Bryce instead experienced online others as variously deceitful, motivated by 
sexualized agendas, “mean,” or “immature.” 
In Dawn’s case, her significant other perceived Dawn as judging him without any 
sense of understanding while online.  Although he experienced Dawn as emotionally 
attacking, it became clear to Dawn that she had been relying on him to utilize 
remembrance of their offline “repertoire” in order to mitigate against such 
misunderstandings Dawn also added that the absence of bodily presence led to reliance 
upon “assumptions” or fantasy constructions to guide the interpretation and response to 
perceived meanings.  Without bodily presence, a fluid revision of interpretations and 
responses was impaired.  According to Dawn, “I wouldn’t know to make adjustments if I 
wasn’t there” (Appendix K).  Thus it was possible that a research participant could 
experience the other person as self-centered and insensitive, in part, because the absence 
of online sensual presence limited the possibilities for conveying fluid responsiveness to 
misunderstandings and unintended inflictions of harm (e.g., relational disjunctions) while 
chatting with the virtually present other.   
This discussion of insensitive online behavior opens on to Robins’ contention that 
cyberspace can be a kind of Winnicottian “transitional” or imaginal space for growth.  In 
some ways, this line of thinking is compatible with Turkle’s finding that online users 
experience personal growth if their implicit project was to work through areas of desired 
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self-development.  The findings of this study supported the latter arguments for the 
growth potential occasioned by the practice of cyberspace sociality.  The research 
participants revealed how they did indeed strive to overcome or learn from the 
disappointments they encountered in the imaginal space provided for by AIM.  The 
experience of social frustrations online helped to dispel the illusion that cyberspace 
sociality was a space of uninterrupted possibilities for gratification.  Though, in most 
cases, there was no responsive (m)other present to aid them in reflectively metabolizing 
such frustrations, the research participants did resist or modify discursive practices as a 
way to continue in their quest to establish meaningful connections.  The one exception 
was Bryce, who reported that offline friends assisted him in working through his reaction 
to feeling “horrible” about the online deception he encountered –  “They told me that not 
everyone would do that if I changed my approach” (Appendix H).  Bryce was indeed 
supported in the process of reorganizing his understanding about AIM space after the 
“moment of illusion” was shattered. 
Implications of the literature re-view on psychological issues.  In summary, the 
re-view of the literature on psychological issues led to a new understanding that the 
achievement of one’s possibilities for being genuine in relation to others may be 
preferred over against the pursuit of postmodern consciousness.  Furthermore, there was 
ambiguous evidence supporting the understanding that cyberspace is populated by those 
exhibiting a social insensitivity motivated by narcissistic and infantile attitudes.  As 
discussed above, cyberspace forms of sociality and meaning production were prone to 
misinterpretations by the research participants or by the virtual others.  Thus, I found that 
some virtual social practices seemed harsh or obtuse, in part, because the AIM 
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architecture included the programmed elision of the sensual body-world background 
thereby disabling fluid responsiveness to shifting meanings and reactions during virtual 
encounters.  In one example of misperceived insensitivity, Rochelle stated, “He swears 
that I blew him off, but if I did, it wasn’t intentional” (Appendix D).  In another example, 
Dawn described her significant other’s indignation following his misinterpretation of her 
Instant Message: 
            ‘Is this what you think of me?  If you feel this way, why 
are you in a relationship with me?’  I looked at the computer 
screen in complete horror.  He was lashing out at me.  He 
questioned our entire relationship over my simple statement.   
(Appendix J)   
On the latter point, it is possible to consider, with reference to Erich Fromm 
(1955), that the positive qualities of AIM space engendered “socially patterned” 
deficiencies for being-in-the-world with others.  By “socially patterned” defect, Fromm 
was referring to a culturally constructed loss of human freedom and spontaneity which 
passed for psychological health.  Fromm claimed that the pervasiveness of such losses 
generally passed by unnoticed as socially patterned defects were prereflectively 
understood to be givens of existence – in the same way, for instance, that email is now 
viewed as a standard form of communication in professional and personal circles.  
Fromm went on to state that socially patterned defects have sometimes been reframed as 
“virtues.”  In that way, the strategy of elevating loss to virtue gained currency because the 
losses were deemed to serve necessary societal ends.  With regard to reframing loss as 
virtue, I found a ready parallel where the unreflective production of dualistic or Cartesian 
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styles of relating in cyberspace reigned.  Here the absence of bodily connection to self 
and others would have achieved the status of “normality” if research participants had 
fully surrendered to narrow Western body-image ideals or Western expectations to place 
workplace commitments ahead of personal relationship priorities. 
In R. D. Laing’s (1965) The Divided Self, Laing discussed the consequences 
associated with conducting relations from an “existential position” which exiled the 
“self” form one’s bodily presence.  Where the basic unity between mind and body and 
other has been experientially divided, Laing suggested that actions emanating from a 
“self [which] avoids being directly related to real persons” (p. 86) can begin to feel futile 
and perceptions can seem unreal.  A phantasy life may then emerge which is increasingly 
divorced from infusions of vital corporeal experiences.  The sense of “self” may then 
become precariously fragile and “unreal” if consistently barred from bodily presence.  
“Schizoid” forms of existence may then come into being.  Where it is indeed possible that 
“schizoid” forms of subjectivity can be stylized by the culturally sanctioned proliferation 
of electronically mediated relationships (EMRs), I suggest that a cultural therapeutic 
should counter the potential for alienation from “self.”  That is to say, from a general 
perspective, that a researcher’s employment of a cultural therapeutic not only asks the 
researcher to identify societal “repression” of possibilities for being human, it also asks 
that the researcher to point toward a pragmatics for retrieving or resuscitating such 
possibilities. 
Although cyberspace may solicit schizoid tendencies, the social evolution of 
Rochelle and Bryce - which emerged from their online experiences - suggests that the 
potential for personal growth in cyberspace can be harnessed for those who are hampered 
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by some form of social anxiety.  Psychotherapeutic interventions can be implemented for 
the treatment of social anxiety by titrating the exposure of anxious individuals to the full 
immediacy of embodied encounters.  For instance, a treatment protocol that begins with 
the less threatening reality of “real time” Instant Messaging might allow persons with 
social anxiety to incrementally work through their reservations about direct social 
encounters.  In effect, persons experiencing social anxiety might find the progressive 
exposure to an embodied social clearing to be less overwhelming.  This kind of therapy 
might also include psycho-education about social-emotional competencies as a way to 
offset the normalization of social deficiencies intrinsic to virtual sociality.  In Dawn’s 
words, “I know a couple of people personally that found it kind of hard to assimilate back 
into real life without having to deal with IM . . . it’s almost like dating all over again” 
(Appendix K). 
Response to the Continental philosophy literature review.  The results of this 
research study tended to support and elaborate Hubert Dreyfus’ view that the “essence” 
of the Internet technology disclosive space is to make things “accessible and 
optimizable.”  The research participants were drawn into the Enframing (Ge-stell) of 
AIM space, in part, by the promise that a standing-reserve (Bestand) of chat-ready others 
would be available.  Bryce underscored the efficiency of their availability in his research 
interview:  
[Y]ou had more choices of people on the Internet.  You had all 
those screen names of people who are interested in meeting or hooking 
up . . . Where in the bar someone could just be having drinks with friends, 
they don’t really want to be bothered with other people or they could be 
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there by themselves just having a drink.  In the chatroom, people want to 
talk.  They want to talk, want to meet people, want to talk about things, 
about politics, sex, music, whatever.  (Appendix E) 
The unequivocal accessibility and availability of others was not in question, unless of 
course someone like Dawn was seeking out contact with a previously known individual.  
In Dawn’s situation, accessibility was nevertheless enhanced by AIM technology, but not 
always – “Because of the hours we both worked, it was kind of hard to pin each other 
down at certain times of the day” (Appendix K). 
 With regard to the other half of Dreyfus’ contention that the essence of the 
Internet was to make things “optimizable,” it turns out that the optimization of virtual 
other’s presence was a substantial challenge for the research participants.  Whereas 
“things” might come to presence in an optimized way, the re-presentations of other’s 
often drifted into undecidability for the research participants. Without the perceptually 
rich background of body and world, the indeterminacy of the virtual other’s identity, as 
well as, the uncertainty about the sustainability of online rapport in the offline world 
could be a source of ongoing uncertainty.  In this way, AIM was not necessarily geared to 
enhance optimized human presence so much as AOL was inciting excitement about 
developing a positive and playful attitude toward the partiality of presence in AIM space.  
For instance, AOL’s high-energy advertising pitched a postmodern emphasis upon 
playing with signifiers regarding an AIM user’s identity.  AOL encouraged the 
implementation of AIM Expressions, Buddy Icons, and the Smiley Dictionary: 
 Put Tom Cruise on your Desktop!  AIM Expressions is the 
exciting new way to personalize your AIM client and instant messages 
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. . . . Buddy Icons . . . Make your IMs display your online personality. 
Choose a cool Buddy Icon . . . . Smiley Dictionary:  Ever wonder what 
people are saying on AIM?  Use the handy Smiley Dictionary to 
keep up!  (Appendix L) 
Thus, a modification of Dreyfus’ stance on the essence of Internet sociality might 
be reworked to specify that the Internet has become a disclosive space which makes chat-
ready others partially accessible and virtually accessorized.  The point being that AOL 
has in effect incited a kind of ‘fashion consciousness’ with regard to outfitting the virtual 
cyborg.   In other words, AOL’s strategy for marketing virtuality has enacted a 
pictographic ‘beautification’ of virtual cyborg presence.  The construction of virtual 
cyborgs is enfolded in a strategy which incites a postmodern exhilaration about adopting 
and encountering re-presented identities progressively disconnected from immediate 
bodily referents. 
The Continental philosophy literature re-view implications.  As stated earlier, 
the implications of successfully carrying out the discursive tactic to normalize and 
fetishize electronic presence have potential repercussions within the area of “socially 
patterned” deficiencies.  
Response to critical literature on cyberspace.  The purpose of employing 
critical-hermeneutic features in this study was to provide a basis for building a history of 
human subject formation as it has been occurring in twenty first century simulated 
spaces. This particular form of historiography attended to the relationship between the 
broad narrative of history and the discourse relations within local virtual contexts.   By 
fashioning this kind of cultural-historical inquiry, I also intended to elucidate meaning 
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construction, lived experience, and social practice choices as they unfolded at the 
dialogical intersection of historically situated discourses and research participant 
motivations.  This entailed an analysis of the new form of “fundamental social 
experience” in Western culture, EMRs.  In and through the window of cyberrealtions this 
study attended to the “mobile and complex power relations” ordering human praxis in 
simulated social spaces.  In this way, an expanded understanding of human experience 
could include a perspective on how cultural-historical discourses participated in creating 
value, assigning meaning, and prescribing social practices.  With such an understanding, 
this study was positioned to make a cultural therapeutic contribution; one which allows 
humankind to modify cultural-historical practices through an awareness of being 
embedded in discourse-laden practices. 
The sole example of extant critical research into “self-fashioning” through 
Internet use was conducted by Alan Aycock.  My research both supported and extended 
Aycock’s methodology and findings.  Through Aycock’s limited  examination of e-text 
speech acts, he found that the netizens interacting on the Bulletin Board Service (BBS) 
for chess players focused on developing a “deep” inner self (e.g., chess skills) akin to the 
discourse of romanticism.  Though I might argue that the skill of chess requires the 
development of the cognitive powers of reason and strategy, and is therefore a modernist 
project, I would support Aycock’s effort to identify the kind of “self” under development 
as a means for locating the discursive regime investing, producing, and subjectifying the 
body.  While I would also support Aycock’s effort to identify historical discourses, I 
would add that Aycock’s identification of a single historical discourse at work on the 
BBS could have been extended into an examination of the “power relations” within 
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which the BBS subjects were situated.  Without attention to the play of power and how 
subjects play with discursive practices, it can appear as if humankind simply submits to 
its subjectification.  It can also become unclear as to whether or not netizens are enacting 
discourses motivated by the local space, or have somehow imported discourses or desires 
which add to the play of symbolic systems.   
By my introduction of a more complex inquiry - which included research 
participant perspectives, cultural-historical literature, and local site analysis - my study 
revealed that the research participants did not necessarily adhere to the enactment of one 
particular discourse.  Instead, the research participants attempted to prethematically 
weave together a variety of discursive practices as a way to achieve meaningful social 
encounters.  In some cases, the research participants utilized a practice typically 
associated with one particular cultural-historical discourse for another discursive purpose 
altogether.  For instance, Bryce began requesting picture postings from virtual others for 
the purposes of moving relationship offline, not for the purpose of submitting to the 
disincarnate sociality occasioned by modernism.  Bryce, in effect, cross-appropriated 
one discursive practice in order to achieve the ends particular to a different order of 
meaning (e.g., bodily presence).  In other cases, research participants submitted to the use 
of virtual sociality reluctantly.  Dawn felt compelled to use AIM because geographical 
distance interfered with maintaining her offline relationship.  Nevertheless, Dawn 
submitted with displeasure – “Well I just think [AIM] is a cold thing because it lacks 
emotion.  I mean, no smiley [face] . . . [takes] the place of what someone says . . . A word 
that’s printed and how it’s said is two different things, has two different connotations”  
(Appendix K).  By introducing the research participants’ voices through protocols and 
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interviews, it was discovered that a virtual practice could signify a multitude of meaning 
systems.  It also became apparent that adopting a practice did not necessarily imply 
submission to the discursive purpose typically associated with that practice.  Instead, the 
research participants in this study maintained their valuation of meaningful bodily-being-
in-the world with others even if the local space of AIM disabled such a practice by virtue 
of its programmed architecture.  Here, the cyborg power of expanded spatiality was 
ambivalently embraced along with the construction of a virtual sociality privileging the 
partial and remote presence of others. 
Implications of  the critical literature re-view of cyberspace.  The implications 
of this critical-hermeneutic approach to research pointed to the way in which 
communities can be empowered to recognize the significance of maintaining a free 
relation to modern technology.  In this way, a community can begin to recognize the 
impact it might have on its future and the future of technology. 
In Disclosing New Worlds:  Entrepreneurship, Democratic Action, and the 
Cultivation of Solidarity (1997), Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert Dreyfus 
refer to such empowerment as “history making.”  For Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus 
history making “changes the way in which we understand and deal with ourselves and 
with things” (p. 2).  The relevance to my research is further extended by the viewpoint of 
Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus that modernism and postmodernism instantiate “living in a 
nonhistorical way” (p. 10).  Whereas modernism demands the reproduction of objective 
practices, postmodernism produces an emphasis on change as mode of existence.  In 
neither instance does a “historical consciousness” lead to a modification of such 
practices.  What Spinosa, Flores, and Dreyfus instead, call for is a process of 
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“articulation” which allows for the “retrieval” of once valuable practices which have been 
marginalized or lost.  From there the “reconfiguration” of current cultural-historical 
practices can occur in such a way so as to allow some version of those erstwhile practices 
back into the relative center of consideration.  Hence, from my perspective, the continued 
effort to generate critical-hermeneutic research regarding virtual technology can enable 
social change by the reintroduction and “resuscitation of our historical skills” (p. 15) and 
awareness thereby allowing for the informed practice of free choice. 
Conclusion 
 My initial presuppositions stemmed from my understanding that the body-world 
dialogue is a fundamental aspect of human existence.  What I did not anticipate was the 
elastic way in which the research participants put virtual practices to use in order to 
regain a sense of body-world unity.  As a result, I gathered a new understanding about 
how the research participants could appropriate non-preferred discursive practices and re-
gear them for personally desirable ends.  Rather than directly oppose non-preferred 
practices, these research participants appropriated such non-preferred discursive practices 
as a means to reestablish possibilities for bodily being-in-the world with others.  Rochelle 
provided a description of how she prereflectively appropriated the discursive practices of 
Cartesianism and postmodern identity play for non (post)modern ends: 
  You can live a fantasy on the Internet, but if you are really looking 
 for love, don’t falsify anything, it just makes for disappointment in the  
 end . . . I met my boyfriend of a year and a half online . . . When I met him, 
 my Internet time went from 2 to 3 hours a day to just minutes checking my 
 e-mail, and occasionally responding to them.  And to this day that’s how it is. 
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 I still use the Internet to play games, but I don’t go into chat rooms.  There is 
 no need to, I have everything I need in person. (Appendix D)    
In this way, acts of resistance sometimes involved the implementation of the very 
practices which were being resisted.  Acts of submission sometimes enabled acts of 
transgression.  What might this mean about the Enframing (Ge-stell) of virtual 
technology? 
Though my preunderstandings about the subjective and social benefits of 
cyberspace were uncertain at the outset of this study, I have now gained an alternate 
understanding of the insight Heidegger (1977) gleened by quoting the poet Friedrich 
Hölderlin in “The Question Concerning Technology,”  
  But where danger is, grows 
  The saving power also (1977, p. 28) 
 Drawing upon the latter couplet, Heidegger stressed that the “danger” was not modern 
technology per se.  The danger issued forth from Enframing (Ge-stell) and the way in 
which it blocked the dynamic disclosure of truth (alētheia).  Furthermore, the Enframing 
(Ge-stell) of modern technology compounded the danger by denying that it sends 
humankind upon a privative “destining” or path of disclosure.  “[F]or this reason the 
coming to presence of technology cannot be led into the change of its destining without 
the cooperation of the coming to presence of man [sic]” (p. 39). 
On my reading and reflection, it became clear that the danger Heidegger spoke of 
was, instead, humankind’s witting or unwitting surrender of the “saving power” – a 
surrender of the understanding that in order to recover the “essence” of technology’s 
marginalized mode of revealing, one must first articulate the kind of narrow disclosure 
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holding sway in modern technology.  Upon retrieving the capacity to make modern 
technology’s danger intelligible, one could then further the saving power by embracing 
the awareness that anxiety and mood prompt one to faithfully and resolutely practice 
one’s own coming to presence over and against submission to the circumscribed and 
prescribed practices of a constricting discursive regime.  And this, of course, would 
necessitate that humankind maintain a free, non-docile, relation to the modern virtual 
technology of cyberspace. 
Research Study Limitations and Suggestions 
 As the geography of virtual life increasingly overlaps with everyday human 
existence, psychological studies will have to grapple with the transformed anthropology 
of human being-in-the-world with others.  In addition, as the social clearing of 
cyberspace challenges the possibility for meaningful interactions, it is important to recall 
the value of meaning for humankind. 
The research participants have each in their own way alluded to the dissolution of 
meaning and understanding amidst virtual social encounters.  At various points in 
Western history the loss of meaning has challenged humanity as well.  During the later 
stages of the mediaeval age, doubts about religiosity and spiritual dogma gave rise to 
uncertainty about humankind’s worth. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s proclamation that God was dead challenged the existence of 
founded spiritual meanings. Concerns about nihilism notwithstanding, the modern 
technological world now brings computer enabled virtual environments to bear on the 
possibility of creating meaningless human social spaces in the twenty first century.  With 
the juggernaut of virtual world deployment well under way, it is possible that the death of 
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grounded meaning may someday be at stake as humankind continues to embrace a wider 
range of electronic encounters (e.g., mobile phones, text messaging, virtual reality 
immersion).  For the purposes of advancing the project of cultural therapeutics in the 
psychology field, I therefore suggest that this critical-hermeneutic study still has room for 
further differentiating the process of meaning production.  That is to say, I contend that 
another thread of cultural-historical discourse warrants methodological inclusion into 
critical-hermeneutic notions about the structure of meaning. 
At the outset of this research study, I presupposed that meaning and experience 
were comprised of macro and micro historical discourses in dialogue with life situated 
persons.  In reference to Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of language and Murray’s work 
on imaginizing, I also presupposed that the non-literal understanding of language, as well 
as an understanding of the imaginal ground of experience informed interpretations of 
meaning.  I now suggest that I did not go far enough in delineating the range of 
discourses relevant to the practices of online subjectivity, sociality, and meaning 
production.  Indeed, I submit that discourses which are not intrinsic to cyberspace 
technology warrant future research consideration.  Specifically I suggest that, future 
studies would do well to admit into consideration the alternative value systems research 
subjects bring with them to virtual encounters.  This procedural adjustment would allow 
research participants’ religious values, ethno-cultural backgrounds, sexual lifestyles, and 
gender perspectives to be included as part of the play of power at work in cyber space.  In 
this way, Foucault’s effort to clarify the full complexity of the social field can be 
advanced.  This kind of methodological refinement can further safeguard the 
interpretation of person-centered data from the researcher’s faulty assumptions about the 
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cultural backdrop informing social practices.  The process of researcher understanding 
and interpretation can thereby achieve a more synthetic level of refinement. 
This procedural adjustment could be accomplished by modifying the process 
outlined for interviewing research participants.  Rather than simply mirror and amplify 
research participant statements, researchers can go further by actively soliciting research 
participant reflection upon the values informing their practices.  Drawing upon Michael 
White’s (1993) understanding of how to introduce deconstruction into psychotherapy 
practices, the researcher might make efforts to clarify which value systems the research 
participants believes they are cooperating with.  A researcher might then be better 
prepared to clarify when a research participant believes she is adhering to, for instance, a 
Gnostic Christian practice of body flight over against a Cartesian motivated abandonment 
of the flesh.  Questions that culturally and historically contextualize practices might 
include: 
1)  “[How] were [you] recruited into this view . . .” (p. 24)? 
2)  “What does this reveal to you about your motives, or about the purposes 
      you have for your life” (p. 45)? 
3)  “What do you think this might reveal to me about what you value 
                  most” (p. 46)? 
4)  “How do you think this spoke to them of who you are, and about 
                 what you believe to be important” (p. 46)? 
Such questions can contribute to the development of a culturally sensitive research 
method which further clarifies the multiplicity of discourses at play in the multi-voiced 
flesh of the human world. 
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                                              Appendix C 
                                    Questionnaire – Rochelle 
 
      For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In 
order to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen 
name. 
 
6) Female  X   Male ____ Other ____ (check one) 
 
7) Age   21 
 
8) Ethnic background  Caucasian                                                                           
 
9) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful 
relationships?   9 years 
 
10) Windows user  X  Macintosh user ____ (check one) 
 
6)  What is your Internet provider name?  AOL/Other web sites via AOL 
 
7)  What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address  
of the site where your encounter took place? AIM, AOL Chatrooms   
 
8)  Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an 
intimate connection with another person on the Internet.  Include in your 
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person 
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person.  Also, 
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful 
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the 
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships 
with others. 

















Written Protocol #1 – Rochelle 
 
In this section, the first research participant’s experiential protocol will be quoted 
verbatim.  Any typographical or grammatical errors will be printed, without revision, in 
order to preserve the potential significance of  “errors” contained in the protocol.  Within 
the text of this protocol, numbers and brackets have been employed as a way to highlight 
sentences suggesting distinct units of meaning. Where the same theme recurs within the 
same protocol, a superscripted number will indicate how many times the theme recurs.  
For instance, the designation “5
2
” signifies that the fifth theme appears twice within the 
same protocol.  If a theme was hermeneutically modified by research participant 
interview material, an alphabetic letter will follow each number (e.g., 1a, 2b).  The 
alphabetic letter will correspond to alphabetic letters placed in the transcript of each 
research participant’s audio taped interview (See Appendices E, H, and K). 
Protocol #1 – Rochelle, 21 y.o., Caucasian, female 
 
1-[It all started when I was in my teens.  My parents had just moved to Provo, I was 
living with my aunt and my grandmother, who I was very close to, was diagnosed with 
severe medical condition.  My best friend at the time lived down the street from my aunt 
so I was over there all the time.  She had just discovered the Internet, and she introduced 
me to something that was going to get me in trouble for the next couple of months.  Her 
brother had the AOL disks and gave me one.  I downloaded it onto my aunt’s computer 
and signed myself up.]  2
2
a-[Using my aunt’s credit card, I authorized the use pretending 
to be her.]  3
3
b-[After about a month and a half she found out about what I had done, but 
with in that month and a half was addicted. I would sneak on late at night, and talk to a 
lot of older guys.]  4c-[I was naive at the time, so I believed pretty much anything they 
told me.  There was this one guy in Nevada who was married, promised he was going to 
come down and visit.  He got caught and his wife e-mailed me to let me know that their 
electricity was cut off, and he wasn’t as rich as he portrayed himself to be.]  5d-[Then 
there were a couple others, and of course I was in love with all of them.]  
        6
3
g-[It’s hard to describe the feeling you get when you do talk to someone online.  
It’s like you are in your own little world, nothing matters except you and the 
person/persons you are talking to.]  7
2
e-[You feel really special inside, like you have 
nothing to be afraid of because the person you are talking to isn’t judging you for your 
looks, just solely on how you interact online.]  8f-[It’s hard to tell someone’s sense of 
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humor online, but usually it goes through.  Sarcasm is a big one though.   Sometimes you 
can’t really tell whether or not the person is being just mean, or sarcastic.]  6
3
g-[But back 
to the feelings.  It’s a relief from everyday life, because you can just be your, and live in a 
fantasy world if you wanted to online.]  2
2
h-[You could portray yourself anyway you 
want, make a completely different life for youself.  It’s free of any of  the hassle you 
would get in the “real” world.]  6
3
g-[Nothing bothers you, if you don’t want to talk to a 
person, you can very easily block them from your buddy list or just ban them from 
talking to you at all.  If the “real” world was this easy, it’d be so nice, you would get rid 
of the jerks right off the bat and not have to worry about anyone’s feelings] 9i-[I guess 
that’s why it is so easy to be jerks online, because they aren’t face to face with you, so 
they just do what they want.]  10j-[But in reality no matter if you are behind a computer 
screen or in person, it hurts just the same.]  11-[I’ve had my share of fights online as well, 




-[Back to my rendezvous; nothing really happened with me meeting anyone until after I 
was out of my aunts house, living in Provo with my parents, and me making the promise 
to my parents that I wasn’t going to meet anyone from online without them knowing and 
only being allowed be online for an hour a day.  Well that didn’t last too long.  I was 
sneaking online after my parents were asleep and after I got home from school when they 
weren’t home yet.  I got in trouble a couple of times, but then I finally calmed down and 
listened to my parents.]  12k-[A little time went by and I finally asked them if I could 
meet someone in person from online.  It took some convincing but they let me as long as 
they met him first.  So they met and I went on my first real date with someone I met 
online.]  13-[It was my first and only date with him, but that was just an icebreaker.  I met 
guys more often after that.]  14
2
l-I even met some guy that I was going to school with in 
the fall.  He turned out to be a jerk also.  Out of all the guys I met online, there weren’t 
too many “nice” guys.  I did have a steady boyfriend for a while, but that was after I met 
the guy I had lost my virginity to.  He was older and I met him online and we only met 
once.  I don’t regret any of the things I have done, or are going to do in the rest of the 
paper; I just take it as a lesson learned.]  3
3
-[You will notice that all the guys I talk about 
are way older than I was at the time, and to this day, still are.  I never once had intimate 
relations with a guy the same age as me.  I’m not going to analyze why that is at this time 
and point but at the time it made me happy so I just went with it.]  1
2
-[So about a year 
went by, I was back in Albuquerque and I was bored and lonely.  My friends and I were 
out of touch, I was in a new neighborhood, and I was going to a school far away from the 
neighborhood, so I really didn’t have any friends that were close by.  So the end result to 
that was I placed personal ads.  I think I placed a couple in different places.  My main 
focus was on AOL though.  I got a few responses here and there.  I met some guys in 
person.  Some I only saw once and others I saw a couple of times, nothing too serious.]  
14
3
-[I did have a couple one-night stands here and there, but I looked at it as me being 
young and just having fun.  I didn’t really know what I was getting into with those kinds 
of situations.  I thought, well hey he wants me to sleep with him he must like me.  So of 
course thinking that I did what they wanted and they got what they wanted and I never 
heard from them again.  It was kind of an emotional roller coaster for me, but I soon 
learned that guys are like that.]  15m-[After a few of those games, I got a response one 
day from a guy that was actually pretty funny.  He made me laugh so I responded.  He 
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responded back, and it was almost as if we knew each other, we had a lot in common and 
I was jus so glad that he wasn’t into the types of things all the others had been.]  16n-[He 
was older, but he didn’t seem to mind that I was 18.  Well that’s what I put on my ad. 
You had to be 18 in order to place an ad, so I told a white lie, but in my second e-mail to 
him, I did tell him that I was only 17, and that in two weeks I would be 18.]  17
2
o-[We hit 
it off, even on the phone.  We talked on the phone almost every day, for hours at a time.  
Finally we decided to meet.  I don’t think I even told my mom I was meeting him, but he 
picked me up from school and we went back to my house because my mom wasn’t home 
and we just didn’t really have anything else to do.  We ended up sleeping together, but  
some how our relatinship wasn’t based on sex.  I think it’s because I had a sixth sense 
about him, and I even heard from him the next day.   That was the start of my second 
longest relationship.]  18p-[Let me tell you about my longest which is going on two 
years.  It was about August 2001 and I still had my person ad out.  One day I got a 
response that wasn’t too exciting, but hey it was a new interest so I wrote him back.  We 
wrote back and forth and we even chated online on AIMs.  We kinda hit it off, it wasn’t 
anything special really.  I don’t know if he was too boring for me at that time in my life 
or what, but I just wasn’t “feeling” it.  So being nice and seeing how we were at least 
getting along, I gave him my phone number and he called.  For some reason though, I 
thought he was too “shady”.  Like he was hiding something or he just really wasn’t into 
the conversation.  At that time in my life I was always partying staying out late, drinking 
underage, and just going with the flow.  He, at that time, was I guess too boring for me.  
The one thing we did have in common though, was that we bothed liked going to a local 
club.  We arranged to meet eachother there, or just in passing, say maybe we’ll see 
eachother there, but we never did meet up] 19-[He swears that I blew him off, but if I did, 
it wasn’t intentional.  Well a coule of months had passed, I would look for him online, 
but he was never online anymore.  So pretty much I just forgot about him.  I had gotten 
into a relationship (again from online) that didn’t last too long, but it did move fast in the 
sense that we were already talking about marriage.  Well I got out of that one quickly, 
and wasn’t really looking for anything, or anyone persay]  20q-[Well in July of 2002, my 
friend and I went to the local club for her birthday.  Neither one of us was really in the 
mood to be there, it was just something to do.  I wasn’t really caring what I looked like, I 
was just there, she was drunk because it was her 21st birthday and I was just pretty much 
laughing at her the whole night.   Well, I went outside for a while, and while I was out 
there, I saw this guy that I noticed kept looking at me, and  I kept looking at him, because 
well hey, he was cute.  So anyway, we “eyed” eachother and then I went back inside.  
Well after I went inside, he followed.  He went back to where he was standing with his 
buddies, and I was just standing there, watching my friend dance with everyone, and he 
actually came over and asked me to dance.  To avoid the awkward silence I introduced 
myself.  He said I think I know you, are you Datsmallmouse?  I said yes, he said, well 
I’m Wu, Smoothdancinguy.  It didn’t hit me until he said his screen name because he 
gave me a different first name online.  So anyway, that was the start of my relationship 
now.  So I guess it goes to show that even if we hit it off online, doesn’t mean we will hit 
it off in person, and vis versa]   
21r-[Ok, now that you know the history of how I became involved in the Internet, let me 
tell you how it makes a person feel.  In general when you are talking to people in chat 
rooms its kind of fun.  Depends on the chat room, and what kind of people you actually 
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engage in conversation with] 22r-[The whole problem I had was just talking to people 
who were mature.  You don’t find that too often in chat rooms no matter what site you go 
to] 23
2
s-[My other problem was my picture.  I’m not a Barbie, and I don’t have the 
Barbie figure, so when people saw my picture they were so cruel; mostly guys and mostly 
guys my age.  Maybe that’s why I never dated guys my age.  Who knows, so I very rarely 
gave out my picture and when I did I had to prepare myself mentally] 24t-[When I posted 
the personal ads I did have my picture on there, but that wasn’t as bad as the chat rooms, 
because of people had a problem with the way that I looked they wouldn’t tell you right 
then and there.  If they didn’t like, they wouldn’t respond to your ad.]  23
2
u-[After a few 
years of that I got tough, or bitter, either way you look at it I learned how people really 
are, and that I didn’t want to associate with people who were that judgmental about the 
way you look as to whether or not they will continue to talk to you.]  25v-[In most cases I 
just wanted someone to talk to, converse in an interesting conversation.  I didn’t want to 
jump everyone’s bones.  I’m sure the guys had a different frame of mind, but I wasn’t 
going to play their games anymore.]  17
2
o-[When you finally get a hold of someone who 
is stimulating you feel a connection.  You think, “Oh wow, we have something in 
common.”  And you want to know more and more about this person.  It’s really 
addictive.  You rush home to see if they have e-mailed you.  You wait online to see if 
they are going to be online the same time you are.  It makes you feel special to know that 
someone has the same interest, or may just be interested in you.  You go from talking 
online, or e-mail, to exchanging numbers, to maybe even dating, or at least just meeting 
in person.]  14
3
x-[And that one person that you do find may look good online, but then 
you get them on the phone and they are completely different, it’s a real let down.  Of 
course you have your expectations, and if they aren’t met, then you start all over again.  
Feeling a little disappointed and taking what you have learned from your previous 
experience you go back out there and see what you can the next day.] 7
2
-[Personal ads 
are, I think, are a great thing if you aren’t into the bar scene or you are a really shy 
person.  It lets you open up to someone with out them staring at you, and with them 
starting at you, you don’t have to worry if you have spinach in your teeth or even worse a 
booger.]  26y-[You can be yourself, or you can be anyone you want to be really.  You can 
live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are really looking for true love, don’t falsify 
anything, it just makes for a big disappointment in the end.] 
27z-[I don’t use the Internet to cruise for guys anymore.  I met my boyfriend of a year 
and a half online, and we have been happy ever since.  When I met him, my Internet time 
went from 2 to 3 hours a day to just minutes checking my e-mail, and occasionally 
responding to them.  And to this day that’s how it is.  I still use to Internet to play games, 








Interview Transcript #1 - Rochelle 
 
Andrew (A) – I am turning on the tape recorder.  Okay.   
      a[Beginning in the first paragraph, about midway through, you mention, “Using my 
aunt’s credit card I authorized the use pretending to be her.”  I wonder if you could say 
more about the experience of pretending to be her. 
 
Rochelle (R) – I wasn’t pretending to be her online.  I was pretending to be her to 
authorize the use of AOL.  So, like, online I was myself, but just to get the usage of AOL, 
I would have to call AOL and verify that I am the person on the credit card to use AOL. 
 
A – Primarily to obtain access. 
 
R – Right.] 
 
A – b[In the next line you said, “After about a month and a half she found out what I had 
done, but within that month and a half I was addicted.  I would sneak on late at night and 
talk to a lot of older guys.””  Could you say more about that experience of feeling 
addicted? 
 
R – I had to get on.  I was always wanting to know if I had email.  I was always wanting 
to know who was online.  And, you know, if it was one of my friends then I would be on 
for hours.  So we’d be talking for hours on end if I didn’t get caught (laugh).  If 
somebody came home early, then I would just turn off the computer and run into my 
room. 
 
A – Are you saying that it felt like you needed to be online - that you couldn’t resist 
being online. 
 
R – Yes.] 
 
A – c[In the next line you say, “I was naïve at the time so I believed pretty much anything 
they told me.”  Perhaps you could say more about that. 
 
R – (Laughter).  Yeah.  Well, they were older guys and they were significantly older.  I 
was sixteen or seventeen at the time and they were like 34, 36 at the time; and the one’s I 
remember specifically, both of them lived in New Mexico and one would tell me that he 
was going to fly me down or that he was going to come down and visit me and you know, 
all this other stuff.  And one of the guys, actually, his wife saw one of the emails that I 
had written him or one of the conversations that we had and she emailed me back saying 
“Oh by the way, he is married, he’s a firefighter, but he is broke since he got cut off last 
week.”  So, yeah . . . that’s pretty much how it went. 
 
A - That’s when you began to realize people were – 
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R – No not necessarily (laughter). 
 
A – Not necessarily then either. 
 
R – No.  It took awhile for me to realize what the intentions of people were online.] 
 
A – d[Then in the following line you say – referring to the married man – “ . . . and of 
course I was in love with them all.”  What did you mean? 
 
R – Yeah.  They gave me false hopes and I guess at the time that’s what I needed because 
my grandma had passed away like a couple months prior to that, but . . . it was like a 
filling-the-void type thing.  And you know, it was the feeling that I needed, because, 
okay, I’m a big girl and I never had a boyfriend and, you know, all of this made me feel 
special, made me feel like I was actually wanted.] 
 
A – e[You talk a little bit more about that in the next line.  You say that, it makes you feel 
“special inside,” like your in “your own little world” and “nothing to be afraid of because 
the person isn’t judging you for your looks just solely on how you interact online.” 
 
R – Exactly. 
 
A – Does that capture the meaning for you?  Is there anything else you would add to that? 
 
R – No, that’s pretty much it.] 
 
A – f[Afterwards, you went on to talk about “sense of humor online.”  You said, “ . . . 
usually that goes through.”  Then you mention, “Sarcasm is a big one though.  I can’t 
really tell whether the person is just being mean or sarcastic.” 
 
R – Yeah.  Right. 
 
A – Are you referring to something about being online and it being difficult to tell the 
difference? 
 
R – Sometimes it is, because, I mean they’re just words on the screen and you have to 
hope that the other person is hoping or thinking that your just being sarcastic.  Or, vice 
versa, the other person might be saying something kind of rude, but you know how 
sarcasm can come off as rude, and vice versa.  It’s kind of hard to distinguish between the 
two online because they’re just words on the screen. 
 
A – If you could add something else to the words on the screen to clarify the meaning of 
sarcasm what would that be. 
 
 
R – Actually there’s really nothing except to tell the person, “Oh by the way, I’m just 
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kidding (laughter).”   You know, or a smiley face like a colon and, what do they call 
them, a parentheses.  You know, like the online faces (laughing). 
 
A -  The emoticons. 
 
R – Right.] 
 
A – g,h[Afterwards you said, “But back to the feelings.  It’s a relief from everyday life, 
because you can just be your . . .” and I presume you mean ‘yourself’ ( R – “Yeah) “. . .  
and live in a fantasy world if you wanted to online.  You could portray yourself anyway 
you want . . . make a completely different life for yourself.”  Can you talk about that 
experience. 
 
R – Actually, I was just generalizing because I’ve never done it.  And, you know, I don’t 
tell people automatically what I look like.  So some people, you know, they’re all gung 
ho about meeting me or whatever, so I either tell them what I look like or I send them a 
picture and then they become a jerk and just stop talking to me automatically, or they say 
a few words and then stop talking to me.  I’ve though about it, you know, saying I’m 
5’7”, blonde hair, big boobs and a wonderful body.  But what’s the point?  Because if you 
really start to like this person, then they’re gonna find out eventually what you really look 
like.  So I’ve never actually done it.  But, it’s a way of getting away and it could be a 
fantasy for some people. 
 
A – You were actually wanting to be known as who you were when you were online.  
You wanted to portray yourself as accurately as possible. 
 
R – Right.  Yeah, I mean I didn’t tell them about everything.  I’d tell them my age and, 
you know, I’d give them a very, very, very vague description if they asked me what I 
looked like.  And, it just typed out automatically really because I was asked so many 
times – 5 feet 6, auburn hair, blue eyes I would say constantly.  I never said anything 
about body type or anything like that.  So some people, would you know, just look at it or 
whatever, but . . . (garbled).  
 
A – Rather then say false things about yourself, you would just leave things out about 
yourself, describe some things and not others. 
 
R – Right. 
 
A – Speaking about “jerks,” You said, “If the real world was this easy, it’d be so nice, 
you would get rid of the jerks right off the bat and not have to worry about anyone’s 
feelings.”  I believe you were talking about the blocking option. 
 
R – Oh yeah (laughter).  It would be so nice in real life (laughing). 
 
A – So that’s actually something that the Internet added to the experience of social 
interaction for you. 
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R – Oh yeah, because on AOL it was very easy to block a certain screen name.  Even if it 
wasn’t just blocking, you could automatically know who this person was and you could 
just hit quick cancel and you wouldn’t even have to talk to that person.    
 
A – You didn’t have to deal with them.  You just click the button and your done. 
 
R – Right.  Kind of like, I’ve had a work experience previously . . . just recently.  There’s 
some ugly people at work.  Ugly, not ugly looking.  There’s some mean hearted people 
that are just out to get you for one reason or another that they have, that you have no idea 
why.  So if it was that easy to just click that person out, life would be so much easier 
(laughing). 
 
A – So the Internet becomes a buffer between you and others, a buffer that you don’t 
have in every day life. 
 
R – Oh yeah.  Because I say my mind, but only to people that I know.  Like, I hate 
confrontations.  I don’t like authority.  Not that I don’t like authority, but it’s hard for me 
to deal with authority if I have a problem with it.  You know, like my boss, she 
contradicted herself a lot.  And, it just bugged the crap out of me and I kept it inside, and 
I vented to other people, but not to her.  I didn’t bring it to her attention because she’s my 
superior, and I guess to me, superiors are not the person to be wrong, so for whatever 
reason, I didn’t bring it to her attention.  So it would eat me at work. 
 
A – I think I’m hearing you say it’s easier to be assertive online. 
 
R – Oh very (laugh).] 
 
A -  i[Speaking more about people who are “jerks” online, you mention, “I guess that’s 
why it’s easy to be a jerk online, because they aren’t face to face with you, so hey just do 
what hey want.”  It sounds like you were coming to some conclusions about how the 
online experience allows people to treat others. 
 
R – Yeah, and also though, you can see what type of person they’ll be in person also, 
because you know how it is, jerks are just everywhere – not everywhere, but there are 
some.  And, if they’re that type of person online, then they’re going to be that type of 
person in person.  And some may say things more outright and more bluntly, you know, 
than in person, but they’re still that type of ugly person. 
 
A – Even if they aren’t as direct in the offline world, they still have that capability to be 
insensitive. 
 
R – Yeah right, because if they’re not saying it to me, they’re probably saying it to a 
friend, you know, something indirectly, not directly to me?  They’d still be that type of 
person, not just directly. 
 
A – So, to you it seemed as if the use of the Internet allowed them to be more direct. 
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R – Oh yeah.] 
 
A – j[You went on to say, even “if your behind a computer screen, it hurts just the same.”  
Could you tell me a little bit about that. 
 
R – Well you know, your just typing words.  And, you know, people say words don’t hurt 
but it’s true words do hurt (laughing).  And, regardless if you know this person or not it’s 
still takes a little hit to you.  And, of course you get up and, you know – “forget about this 
person, they’re just not worth it” – but at that point in time you get mad or you get 
emotions.  You get emotional.  And, instead of just sitting there typing words, there is 
emotion behind it. 
 
A – So even without the person being present, the words can have an emotional impact. 
 
R – Oh yeah.  I remember getting in fights in chatrooms (laughing) over what people 
would say.  It was pretty stupid stuff that you’d think that they’d get over by the time . . .  
because of how old they were.  You know, you’d think they’d get over it, but that’s why 
some people don’t grow up (laughing).] 
 
A – k[Then you move into the third paragraph, and you start to talk about “rendezvous” . 
. .  
 
R – Hmmm (laughing). 
 
A – . . . and you mentioned your parents, “It took some convincing but they let me as 
long as they met him first.”  Could you talk some about the “convincing” that it took. 
 
R – Well it was pretty much just them telling me what I can and could not do to meet this 
person.  Like my very, very, very first date, I was 16 going on 17 and he was like 18.  I 
had met him online and we were just going to go to a movie or whatever, but parents had 
to meet them first.  I couldn’t just go out and meet them.  You know, even in a public 
place they would have to meet them first.  And then like gradually I started meeting 
people behind there backs, like when I started driving (laughing).  I’d you know set up 
meetings – “Well I can do this after work or after school.” -  and my mom wouldn’t know 
blah, blah, blah.  I started meeting people behind my mom’s back so they wouldn’t know 
or whatever. 
 
A – It was important not to have your parents meet them. 
 
R – Depending on what our intentions were, both me and the person I was meeting.  
Depending on what the intentions were.  Like my longest relationship, he picked me up 
from school.  My mom didn’t know.  And, we met and everything and I took him back to 
my house.  We’d been talking for a month and a half online and on the phone, and finally 
had met in person.  My mom didn’t meet him first.  So I met him first, and we kind of 
went back out.] 
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A – l[A little bit later, you went on to say, “Out of all the guys I met, there weren’t too 
many “nice” guys.”  I wonder if you could talk about that. 
 
R – Well, you know online they would sweet-talk you.  I guess it’s no different than guys 
in real life.  I wouldn’t generalize all guys and be all “They’re jerks,” or whatever, but 
there are some guys that, yeah, they sweet talk you and you know, say the right things to 
get you to do what they want you to do.  And that’s what they did.  They, you know, “I 
can’t wait to meet you, I enjoy talking to you.”  And they’d either meet me and have their 
way with me pretty much and then they’d never call me again.  Or , you know, yeah 
they’d never call me again. 
 
A – And in that sense the lack of follow-up was inconsiderate and unkind in your eyes. 
 
R – Right.] 
 
A – m[A little later in that paragraph, you talked about one person you met.  You said, “It 
was almost as if we knew each other.  We had a lot in common”  I wonder if you could 
talk about the experience of being online and feeling as if you knew each other – getting 
that feeling even though you were communicating through the Internet medium. 
 
R – Well pretty much he had the same sense of humor I did.  So I didn’t have to worry 
about saying something sarcastically or kind of off-the-wall and him not getting because, 
you know, there are some people who just don’t get it, and he got it.  We’d make fun, 
poke fun, you know, just like poke fun at each other, you know, just back and forth, and 
you know, he had a good sense of humor.  It was like mine and kind of sarcastic but you 
know, funny in the same way, and we’d just bounce off each other.  You know, I’d say 
something, he’d say something back and we’d go back and forth at it. 
 
A – On the one hand, he understood your meanings, and on the other hand he seemed to 
think in the same way and respond in a way that was familiar or easy for you to relate to. 
 
R – Right.] 
 
A – n[You go on and talk about another person.  You mention, “You had to be 18 in 
order to place an add, so I told a white lie, but in my second e-mail to him, I did tell him 
that I was only 17.”  I wonder if you could talk about that. 
 
R –  Okay.  I just felt I needed to be straightforward and let him know just in case he was 
older than he said he was, you know; and, to let him know just in general.  I think it was 
November or December when he responded to my add, and my birthday was in January, 
so I wasn’t to far away form 18, but I just figured I should tell him up front and let him 
know instead of lead him on. 
 
A – Somehow, you made a decision that at some point you should let him know. 
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R -  Oh yeah.  I think I told every body that responded to my ads that I was 18, I mean 17 
instead of 18. 
 
A – You would do that with anyone you started chatting with. 
 
R – Oh yeah.] 
 
A – o[You go on to say, “We hit it off even on the phone.”  I wonder if you could talk 
about how you got the sense you were hitting it off on the phone. 
 
R – The sense we’re hitting it off on the phone is that we’re having a good conversation.  
There’s energy there instead of, “Okay, what do I talk about now.”  You know, there’s a 
good conversation going.  He makes me laugh, and I in return make him laugh.  So that’s 
a good conversation for me.] 
 
A – p[You then went on to talk about the longest relationship you had been in at that 
point.  You mentioned that in the phone conversation, “For some reason though, I 
thought he was too ‘shady.’  Like he was hiding something or he really wasn’t into the 
conversation.”  I wonder if you could talk about how you were picking that up over the 
telephone. 
 
R – He wasn’t really talking and that could mean – you know, if he’s interested in me, if 
we’re interested in each other, then there’s going be more to talk about than just asking 
me questions like, “So, what do you do for work?” – just very, very vague questions.  
And, actually I think we only talked once, but we were talking online on the phone and I 
wasn’t really interested.  I think I accidentally on purpose lost his phone number and I 
never called him again and he never called me.  So I lost contact with him in that way, 
and then we met in a club (laughs).] 
 
A – q[At the end of the paragraph you say, “So I guess it goes to show that even if we hit 
it off online, doesn’t mean we will hit it off in person, and vice versa.”  Can you tell me a 
little bit more about coming to that conclusion? 
 
R -  Well, like the two longest relationships I’ve had, you grow to learn about a person 
both online, or on the phone, or in person, and you know, you can hit it off really well 
with a person online.  But then you meet them, and there’s just nothing to talk about.  
You know, you just have nothing in common.  But you meet a person you thought you 
had nothing in common with and you hit it off greatly.  You know, you just find 
something and go with it (laugh).  You run with it actually (laughing). 
 
A -  The rapport you develop can be really different online and offline. 
 
R – Right.  That’s how I ended up with my boyfriend now.  I wasn’t really interested with 
him online and on the phone.  And that’s why I kind of backed off.  He got in trouble at 
work for having AOL and instant messaging and stuff, so that was are only way of 
communication, so that kind of ended.  So six months later we met in person, and we 
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didn’t realize who each other was until I introduced myself.  Then we started dating in 
person, and it just went from there.  I found out that being shady is part of his character.  
He’s very cautious; I guess you’d say not shady, cautious.] 
 
A – r[As you go into the next paragraph, you described talking in chatrooms as “fun,” but 
“depends on the kind of people you actually engage in conversation with.”  You then add, 
“The whole problem I had was just talking to a people who were mature.”  I wonder if 
you can tell me a little more about that. 
 
R – Yeah (laughing).  You could always tell the mentality of a person by what they say 
online, how they act online, and what they do online.  You know, they have their stupid 
little games, or stupid little things where you can scroll.  That’s what they call it, scrolling 
in the chatrooms where they put up stupid pictures or print things over and over and over 
again and take up the whole screen.  It would interrupt people actually trying to talk in 
the chatroom, so I viewed those people as being immature because they’re just doing it 
for the hell of it.  You know, they’re  not there to chat.  And also, people in general, what 
they would say.  If you make a comment in the chatroom and they say something really 
stupid, you could generally tell that they’re a teenager or that they’re stupid (laughing).] 
  
A – s[In the next few sentences, you talk about not posting your picture.  You said, “Who 
knows, so I very rarely gave out my picture and when I did I had to prepare myself 
mentally.”  I wonder if you can talk about that need to prepare yourself. 
 
R – I’d just have to wait, you know, in the few seconds of waiting for them to actually get 
the picture in their email and then wait for their reaction.  So it’s kind of anticipation.  
And then, the whole time your anticipating what they’re going say you have to be 
prepared for a come back.  Because if their going to say, “Oh your fat and ugly,” 
sometimes if they say that, I’d just cancel and never talk to them again.  Other times I’d 
be really mad and I’d fight back with them.  And I actually made a friend doing that 
(laughing).  I was really feisty at the time and I started fighting with him.  He was like, he 
made a comment about my weight and I don’t exactly remember the conversation, but I 
just remember that after yelling at him back and forth we actually just calmed down and 
we actually just started talking s people and we started talking online.  Never met him, 
never talked to him on the phone or anything, he was just an online chat buddy. 
 
A – So how you responded made a difference. 
 
R – Yeah 
 
A – It sound s like there is a moment of anticipating approval or disapproval when 
communication moves from text to image. 
 
R – Oh yeah.] 
 
A – t[We’re in the last paragraph right now.  You talked about posting the personal ads.  
You said, “ . . . I did have my picture on there, but that wasn’t as bad as the chat rooms, 
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because of people had a problem with the way that I looked they wouldn’t tell you right 
then and there.  If they didn’t like you then they wouldn’t respond to your ad.” 
 
R – Yeah. 
 
A – That made it easier. 
 
R – Oh yeah.  Because, I mean, if your looking through pictures, you know, say, just 
hanging on your wall, and you pick up one and your interested, so - we’re back to the 
adds – so you reply and then it’s great.  But if you don’t, then you know, whatever.  So if 
your looking through something if your not interested, then you don’t have to bother that 
person.  You don’t have to tell them or give them, you know, insults or anything.  It’s just 
passed on, go to the next one.  So it’s spared feelings (slight laugh).  Really spared 
(laughing).] 
 
A – u[Well, then you go on in the next line and say something interesting.  You said, 
“After a few years of that I got tough, or bitter, either way you look at it I learned how 
people really are, and I didn’t want to associate with people who were judgmental . . .”  
Could you say more about that. 
 
R – Well, you have a type of person that you want to be friends with, that you want to 
hang out with, that you wanna just be around.  And, just, there are a lot of people online 
that I particularly do not want to be around.  So, you know, I guess it made me realize 
that if I stopped going on there I could actually spare my feelings; get some of my self 
confidence back because, you know, actually go on with life and meet people in a 
different way.  And just going to work or whatever, you can feel out people that way too.  
I didn’t have to rely on being in chatrooms, being online, checking my email every five 
minutes.  I didn’t have to rely on that.  There’s actually a real world out there, and I 
realized that (laugh).] 
 
A – v[You go on to say, “In most cases I just wanted someone to talk to, to converse in 
an interesting conversation . . . I’m sure the guys had a different frame of mind, but I 
wasn’t going to play their games anymore.”  I wonder if you could talk about the kinds of 
games you perceived were going on. 
 
R – That’s like I said earlier.  Like, guys want to talk to you and get you interested and 
then meet you and then have other things in mind.  And, that’s pretty much what I meant 
by playing their games.  Because, it’s you know, it’s a cycle really.  Because you meet a 
person, you start talking to them, your interested, you meet them, you know.  They call, 
they don’t call; and then if they don’t call your back at starting to talk to people again, 
you know.  So it could be just a cycle. 
 
A – It sounds like you were becoming clearer that they had a different agenda than you 
had. 
R – Oh yeah.  Unfortunately, it became clearer too late (laugh). 
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A – You wish you had picked it up sooner. 
 
R – Oh yeah.  But I give people benefits of doubt.  So if it’s a new person, okay, maybe 
your different.  You know, and it’s a different situation.  You know, your not as tall, your 
not as old, your not as young; either way, I’d give people the benefit of the doubt, but it 
would always come back and kick me in the ass (laugh).] 
 
A – x[A little later, you say, “. . . you do find someone who may look good online, but 
then you get them on the phone and they are completely different, it’s a real letdown.”  I 
wonder if you could talk more about perceiving that difference between how they look 
online and how they are coming across offline. 
 
R – You know something, you look good on paper (laughing).  That’s pretty much what 
it was.  You know and then in reality it just doesn’t pan out the way you want it to.  
That’s pretty much what I’m saying there.  It looks all good on paper, but you get it and 
it’s just doesn’t work out for ya. 
 
A – How they were offline seemed like reality. 
 
R – Well it’s a wake up call (laugh).  You get to talk to somebody online of course you 
know, they may be very book smart, but when it comes down to it, if they don’t have any 
common sense and they don’t know what your talking about, then it’s just a kind of an 
end right there.  Because, they’re not going to understand what your talking about, 
common sense or no common sense.  You know, I have more common sense, than I do 
book smarts, but I still understand stuff.  And so, I understood their book smarts online, 
but when it comes to talking to a person in real life, it’s common sense and sense of 
humor that was pretty much lacking on the computer that I didn’t pick up. 
 
A – Was it possible to pick that up online? 
 
R – Umm, common sense is actually pretty hard because there’s a lot of smart people out 
there but when it comes down to it, you can’t really tell until you actually meet the person 
or talk to the person on the phone.  And, you know common sense is just a big turn off 
for me.  If I didn’t see it or hear it on the phone (laugh), I wasn’t really interested.] 
 
A – y[Among the last few sentences, you said, “You can be yourself, or you can be 
anyone you want to be really.  You can live a fantasy life on the Internet, but if you are 
really looking for true love, don’t falsify anything . . .”   I wonder if you could talk more 
about that. 
 
R – Well yeah, you can post a picture – I can cut and post a picture from any magazine 
and some people will actually respond to that add and actually spark a conversation.  Of 
course, they’re talking to you as a person, or not you know.  You can go with whatever 
image you pick.  When it comes down to it, they’re eventually gonna want to meet you.  
If it comes to that point, then they’re gonna be disappointed and your probably gonna be 
more disappointed in yourself for doing that in the first place (laugh) because you’re not 
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going to be that person at all.  There’s really no point in falsifying anything.  If anything, 
the biggest thing I can think of is maybe age.  That’s not a big deal, at least that’s not a 
big deal for me.  Whether they were older or younger, I preferred older, not that if they 
were older or younger it didn’t matter.  As long as they could talk to me as a person, not a 
piece of meet or whatever.  So falsifying isn’t really what I suggested to do online 
(laugh).   Especially if you play games with people, that’s a totally different story. 
 
A – It sounds like you were more interested in the quality of the interaction. 
 
R – Oh yeah.  I mean, I’m not going to say I’m a loner, but I have moved a lot.  I don’t 
have a lot of long-term friends.  I’ve gone to fourteen schools in ten years and you know 
every year I had to make new friends and new friends, so I don’t have a lot of friends.  In 
general, I just want friends to hang out with, to go do stuff with.  In general, online, it’s 
pretty much male talking to female, or female talking to male.  There’s no same sex 
conversations going on, and if there were, that’s a different ball game too.  I was just 
looking for a conversation, for friends, for anything.  I pretty much got into the wrong 
crowd – a crowd, quote unquote online.  So I got into that habit and it just took off from 
there.] 
 
A – z[In the last lines, you talk about meeting your boyfriend of one and a half years, and 
being happy ever since.  You close out the description you sent me  by saying, “I still use 
to Internet to play games, but I don’t go into chat rooms.  There is no need to, I have 
every thing I need in a person.”  I wonder if you could talk more about the significance of 
those lines. 
 
R – Now I have a friend, I have somebody to do stuff with and in the chatroom it’s pretty 
much a meat market.  Even if you talk to some person, they’re eventually going to want 
to meet you and start dating you or whatever.  So, you have this intention when you go 
into a chat room to meet somebody.  It’s a dating scene.  It’s not a chatting, “Let’s all be 
friends” type thing.  It’s a chatting, I mean, a dating game.  Like in the Provo chat I told 
you about, everybody dated everybody else.  Everybody knew who everybody else was 
because everybody had dated one of them at one time or another.  It sounds like a love 
triangle, but it’s more like a love octagon (laughing) type thing; because this person is 
this person’s ex-boyfriend, girlfriend, whatever, but this person also knows this person 
because they dated and you know it just goes on.  I don’t do that any more because 
there’s no need to.  I have no need to fill that void that I had when I first started chatting.   
 
A – It sounds like you were using the Internet to try and have meaningful conversations 
all along. 
 
R – Right.  At the time, I probably didn’t know (laughing).  At sixteen or seventeen you 
don’t know what you’re doing.  You’re just – “This is cool, it’s a new thing,” you know.  
And then as it goes, you still don’t know what the hell you’re doing, but once you find it, 
it all comes together – “Oh, that’s what I was doing (laughing).” 
A – It became clearer over time. 
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R – Right, right.  Of course, “This is fun, I’m chatting with lots of different people,” 
(coughing) – excuse me – but now that I have what I was looking for apparently, I don’t 
need to go look for it some more.  The initial reason I was online was to find somebody.  
So I had fun chatting while I was online, but in that process I was still looking.] 
 










































                                            Appendix F 
                                    Questionnaire – Bryce 
 
      For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In 
order to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen 
name. 
 
1)  Female ____  Male  X  Other ____ (check one) 
 
2) Age  27 
 
3) Ethnic background  African-American 
 
4) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful 
relationships? 1998-2001 
 
5) Windows user  X  Macintosh user ____ (check one) 
 
6)  What is your Internet provider name?  Verizon 
 
7)  What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address  
of the site where your encounter took place?  AOL Instant Messenger 
 
8)  Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an 
intimate connection with another person on the Internet.  Include in your 
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person 
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person.  Also, 
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful 
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the 
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships 
with others. 
















                                            Appendix G 
                                Written Protocol #2 – Bryce 
 
In this section, the second research participant’s experiential protocol will be 
quoted verbatim.  Any typographical or grammatical errors will again be printed, without 
revision, in order to preserve the potential significance of  “errors” contained in the 
protocol.  Within the text of this protocol, numbers and brackets have been employed as a 
way to highlight sentences suggesting distinct units of meaning. A thematic analysis of 
each grouping of highlighted sentences will immediately follow the protocol printed 
below.  Where the same theme recurs within the same protocol, a superscripted number 
will indicate how many times the theme recurs.  For instance, the designation “5
2
” 
signifies that the fifth theme appears twice within the same protocol.  If a theme was 
hermeneutically modified by research participant interview material, an alphabetic letter 
will follow each number (e.g., 1a, 2b).  The alphabetic letter will correspond to alphabetic 
letters placed in the transcript of each research participant’s audio taped interview (See 
Appendixes E, H, and K). 
 
Protocol #2 –  Bryce, 27 y.o., African-American, male 
 
1a-[I first started meeting people by going into chatrooms, using my yahoo messenger to 
communicate. It was fun, and exciting, and innovative to me.]  2
2
b-[I am a shy person at 
first, so it is hard for me to meet new people but, the Internet gave me an outlet in which 
to communicate.  I could say almost anything without feeling odd.  I could ask questions 
I wouldn’t normally ask someone if they were standing before me.]  3c-[I would talk 
about sex, politics, and other things that appealed to me.]  4d-[I found that the Internet 
made it easy for me to be acquainted with someone.]  5e-[My first experience to meet 
someone new on the Internet was horrible because, the person lied about his age and 
appearances.  When that happened, I immediately stop using the Internet as a way to 
meet a partner.]  6f-[A few months past and I weren’t meeting people on my own so, I 
decided to go back to the Internet.]  7g-[I met a really nice guy; we would instant 
message each other all day until the day we met.  I learned many things about him 
through the Internet so by the time we met I knew many things about him.  That meeting 




h-[I’ve found that socializing on the internet has impacted my personal growth by 
giving me more opportunities to meet people that I wouldn’t normally talk to, or be able 
to talk to because, of my shyness.]  8-[The Internet also gave me more places such as 
clubs, groups, bars, nightclubs and sporting events, to meet people.]  9i-[It has also given 
me more courage and confidence in my off-line relationships because; I now know the 










































                                            Appendix H 
                             Interview Transcript #2 – Bryce 
 
Andrew (A) – Okay. The tape recorder is on. 
 a[In the first paragraph, you mention that you are using Instant Messenger to 
communicate.  In the second sentence you say, “It was fun, and exciting, and innovative 
to me.”  I wondered if you could say more about that. 
 
Bryce (B) – At that time it was new to me.  It was new.  I was experiencing someone 
talking to me and I’m not, let me see . . . It was fun having someone talk to me and I not 
know what they look like, you know, not knowing anything about them.  Just talking, 
being very frank with them about anything – my personal life and other things. 
 The technology was exciting to me also because at that time I became more 
educated on computers.  It was also a learning process for me – how to download things 
how to talk, how to use all the symbols that you can use like smiley faces and different 
stuff. 
 
A – The learning process intrigued you. ( B – Yeah.).  And if I understand you, not 
knowing what they looked like made it fun.  Also having online others not know anything 
about you made it interesting. 
 
B – Yeah.] 
 
A – b[Right after that third sentence you say, “I am a shy person at first, so it is hard for 
me to meet new people but, the Internet gave me an outlet in which to communicate.”  I 
wonder if you could talk more about the kind of outlet the Internet provided you with. 
 
B – I would say, because, in person me meeting people was hard because of rejection; 
because I think I’m basically like any other person, but I was very shy.  I didn’t grow up 
going out, hanging out with a lot of people.  Being on the computer where I could be 
myself, or not myself, and being out of my character was fun and it was something new 
for me, and talking with people.  You know there are all kinds of things on the Internet.  
That was pretty much it.  I was shy in person, but on the computer, I wasn’t shy at all. 
 
A – Somehow you weren’t shy at all.  You go on to say, “I could say almost anything 
without feeling odd.  I could ask questions I wouldn’t normally ask someone if they were 
standing before me.”  I wonder if you could talk about what it was that allowed you to 
talk in these ways. 
 
B – Because I wasn’t in the person’s face.  I wasn’t looking into their eyes.  They weren’t 
hearing me talk.  I wasn’t hearing them talk.  They couldn’t tell or sense nervousness in 
me.  I couldn’t sense it in them.  It was just . . . that was basically it.  Just being able to 
not stand in front of someone looking into their eyes.  That was the thing that would 








A – c[In the next line you say, “I would talk about sex, politics, and other things that 
appealed to me.” 
 
B – Yup!  Well, I would talk about sex – the kinds of things they like and I like when it 
comes to sex.  We basically were just talking about sexual fantasies and things that I 
would normally not talk about when you first meet someone and you can do that on the 
computer because they’re not in front of you.  You can ask the questions you really want 
to ask when there’s someone in front of you – and you don’t want to ask those questions 
because it seems odd to talk about that when you first meet someone. 
 With politics, just talking about politics in general, I mean, that wasn’t a big thing 
because I can talk about politics with just about anyone whether I’m in front of them or 
not.  But that was something, another outlet.  But sex was a main factor in that. 
 
A – In a way, you felt less inhibited.  You could talk about things a bit sooner than you 
would face-to-face (B – Yes.)]  d[In the next line, you say, “I found that the Internet 
made it easy for me to be acquainted with someone.”  Would you add anything more to 
that? 
 
B – The only thing I would add to that would probably be that I repeated myself because 
it was easier for me to meet people because you had more choices of people on the 
Internet.  You had all these screen names of people who are interested in meeting or 
hooking up or whatever.  Whereas if you go out to a bar to meet people, it’s much harder 
or difficult to strike up a conversation and all of this stuff. 
 
A - In a sense, you knew there were people there looking for someone to chat with. 
 
B – Yeah, looking for someone to chat with.  Where in the bar someone could just be 
having drinks with friends, they don’t really want to be bothered with other people or 
they could be there by themselves just having a drink.  In the chatroom, people want to 
talk.  They want to talk, want to meet people, want to talk about things, about politics, 
sex, music, whatever. 
 
A – The intentions of others were clearer to you online as opposed to offline (B – Yes.).]  
e[In the next sentence you say, “My first experience to meet someone new on the Internet 
was horrible because the person lied about his age and appearances.” 
 
B – Yeah, that was true.  I had a very bad experience.  Even though that was a bad 
experience it wasn’t so bad, but it wasn’t . . . I don’t know how I’m trying to say this.  It 
was a bad experience, but I kept moving forward because I still met other people and it 
wasn’t that bad.  On top of that, I tried it one more time and I met people that I liked; 
whereas that time it was a bad experience.  Now I’ve had one bad experience about 
coming up on the street or anything.  I just can’t give up with one bad experience. 
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A - Can you say more about what was “bad” about your online experience? 
 
B – The only thing about meeting people on the Internet, if you don’t have pictures a lot 
of people will lie about their age or the way they appear – their appearances.  It’s just so 
many things they can lie about because nobody can see you.  They don’t know you.  I 
think everybody has done it before, maybe not to such an extreme.  I know most people 
have done it, at least once.  When you’re in front of someone you can’t lie about your 
experience.  You may be able to lie about your age.  That’s only if you look good.  But, if 
you look old, you just can’t really lie about that.] 
 
A –f[In the next line, you say, “A few months past and I weren’t meeting people on my 
own, so I decided to go back to the Internet.” 
 
B – Yeah, I stayed away, but people told me I wouldn’t meet anyone.  They told me that 
not everyone would do that if I changed my approach.  So I started asking for pictures.  
It’s hard to lie about your appearance with pictures.] 
 
A – g[In the next line you say, “I met a really nice guy, we would instant message each 
other all day until the day we met.” 
 
B – Yeah, that’s been my longest relationship to date.  He talked to me different than 
other people on the Internet.  Um, online people wanted to, would just want to talk to me, 
and a lot of them just wanted to, you know, just hook-up.  And, even if they would talk 
and didn’t like you, they would, you know, keep talking even if they didn’t want to get to 
know you.  They would still want to have sex and whatever.  He talked to me differently.  
He wasn’t about what the others wanted. 
 
A – Something about the way he chatted with you conveyed that he was a “nice guy.” 
 
B – Yeah – he chatted to me.  Even after a while, he would still want to continue chatting.  
We’d talk for long periods and even IM each other.  He wasn’t someone I would 
normally talk to.  He was southern, you know, not city (slick? sheek?).  If he was in front 
of me, he’s not someone I would normally talk to.  He’s from the south.]  
 
A – h[In the next line you say, “I’ve found that socializing on the internet has impacted 
my personal growth by giving me more opportunities to meet people that I wouldn’t 
normally talk to, or be able to talk to because, of my shyness.”  I wonder if you could 
elaborate further. 
 
B – The Internet helped me get to meet people I wouldn’t normally meet.  I like to travel 
so I get to meet people.  On the Internet I could talk to people in Australia or Ireland.  I’m 
a pilot, and I’m going to Australia to meet friends I’ve known or never would have met 
without the Internet.  Um, the Internet has been a bridge, for me, to people who I couldn’t 
have connected with because of geography, or because of my shyness.  The Internet is 
like this place full of people wanting to meet others.  It makes it easier for me to 
overcome my shyness.] 
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A – i[You seem to accentuate that point by saying, “It has also given me more courage 
and confidence in my off-line relationships . . .” 
 
B – Yeah, that’s because I didn’t used to approach people at all.  That was my no-no 
thing to do.  I would not approach anyone.  And recently, I’ve been approaching people, 
just going up to them, dancing with them, or doing whatever.  But, I’m still shy, I don’t 
do it all the time, but when I get my moments I can do it.  And like, I used to be unable to 
do it in the past. 
 
A – Something about the Internet empowered you to approach people more often than 
you normally would. 
 
B – Yeah, because I could see the type of people that I could draw.  I was shy before and 
I would say, “Well, they would never like me.”  And then I saw the kind of people that 
liked me – then maybe I could go up and say, “Hey” or whatever. 
 
A – You learned what kind of people might be more accepting (B – Yeah) or interested 
(B – Yeah) in you (B – Yeah).  In the next line you say, “I now know the types of people 
that are attracted to me (B- Yeah) and how to approach them (B – Yeah).”  I wonder if 
you could elaborate more on what you learned about “how” to approach others. 
 
B - Let me see.  Some people like aggressiveness and some people like the little shy kind 
of thing.  And, I would know which kind of role to play.  In meeting a certain person, 
should I be the overbearing person or should I be the quiet shy kind of person.  And that’s 
how I knew that with people.] 
 





















                                             Appendix I 
                                     Questionnaire – Dawn 
 
      For research purposes, please respond to the inquiries listed below. In 
order to maintain your confidentiality, please do not provide your online screen 
name. 
 
6) Female  X   Male ____ Other ____ (check one) 
 
7) Age  29 
 
8) Ethnic background  African-American 
 
9) How long have you used the Internet as a way to engage in meaningful 
relationships?   Several years now 
 
10) Windows user  X   Macintosh user ____ (check one) 
 
6)  What is your Internet provider name?  AOL 
 
7)  What is the chat room address, Instant Messaging Service, or address  
of the site where your encounter took place?  IMS on AOL                      
 
Please describe a significant time when you attempted to establish an 
intimate connection with another person on the Internet.  Include in your 
description your experience of attempting to understand the other person 
and what you attempted to convey about yourself to that person.  Also, 
describe what you noticed about using the Internet to make a meaningful 
connection with that person. Lastly, please describe how socializing on the 
Internet has impacted your personal growth and your off-line relationships 
with others. 
















                                              Appendix J 
                                 Written Protocol #3 - Dawn 
 
In this section, the third research participant’s experiential protocol will be quoted 
verbatim.  Any typographical or grammatical errors will again be printed, without 
revision, in order to preserve the potential significance of  “errors” contained in the 
protocol.  Within the text of this protocol, numbers and brackets have been employed as a 
way to highlight sentences suggesting distinct units of meaning. A thematic analysis of 
each grouping of highlighted sentences will immediately follow the protocol printed 
below.  Where the same theme recurs within the same protocol, a superscripted number 
will indicate how many times the theme recurs.  For instance, the designation “5
2
” 
signifies that the fifth theme appears twice within the same protocol.  If a theme was 
hermeneutically modified by research participant interview material, an alphabetic letter 
will follow each number (e.g., 1a, 2b).  The alphabetic letter will correspond to alphabetic 
letters placed in the transcript of each research participant’s audio taped interview (See 
Appendixes E, H, and K). 
 Protocol #3 – Dawn, 29 y. o., African-American, female  
 
1a-[Well due to job training updates, I had to interact with my significant other using 
other means of communication.  The long distance telephone call became a bit of an 
expense.  So using the Internet was the next option.]  2b-[For a while emails were 
exchanged.  I found the emails to be very cold and impersonal.  I would assume one thing 
and something else was implied.  This happened on both of us.  Using emails over a 
period of time lead to miscommunication.  Although people can write their expressions, 
verbal communication (i.e. tone and voice inflections) makes words come alive and more 
meaningful.] 
 3c-[With that in mind, Instant Message (IM) was agreed upon both of us to get 
back some of what verbal communication offered.  IM offered a psuedo-telephone call.]  
4d-[So this worked for a while, until an incident happened and made using IM a task.  IM 
started to become tedious.  To list one’s complaints became tedious due to the loss of 
verbal communication.  The complaints were not expressed in a heart-felt compassionate 
way.  When using IM one has to now write from a different perspective.  I was writing 
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like I spoke and not how I wrote.  I found writing one has to calculate on how to present 
information to give readers a clear and concise view of their world or perspective.] 
 5e-[On one particular IM, I felt that my significant other could have handled a 
situation with a co-worker in a different manner than escalating an argument (sparing 
details due to irrelevancy).  I Imed him stating ‘I am surprised at you’.  This statement 
was interpreted as ‘How dare you judge me.  You were not there to see how this person 
reacted.  You are making it seem as if I was totally irrational.  Is this what you think of 
me?  If you feel this way, why are you in a relationship with me?’  I looked at the 
computer screen in complete horror.  He was lashing out at me.  He questioned our entire 
relationship over my simple statement.  All I meant by the statement was how I was 
surprised he got into a confrontation with his coworker because he is usually a jovial 
person.]  6f-[But before I Imed him back a response, I scrolled up to view the beginning 
of the IM where he sated how stressed he was with the training program.  We also briefly 
discussed stress.  So when I Imed him with what I meant by the statement, he apologized 
and reiterated how stressed he was.]  7g-[My example only implied a fraction of how the 
Internet can handicap social interactions with people.]  8h-[Many time after using the 
Internet, many people assumed whatever they wanted to conversation to be without 
actually listening to what the conversation is about.  Assuming and hearing has taking 
social skills be it verbal or written out of the art of conversing.  Allowing the world to 




























                                             Appendix K 
                              Interview Transcript #3 – Dawn 
 
Andrew (A) – I am turning the tape recorder on.  a[In the first few lines you say “ . . . I 
had to interact with my significant other using other means of communication.  The long 
distance telephone call became a bit of an expense.  So using the Internet was the next 
option.”  I wonder if you might say more about the Internet as “the next option.” 
 
Dawn (D) – Well to cut costs really.  That’s what that was about – being the next option.  
Because of the hours we both worked, it was kind of hard to pin each other down at 
certain times of the day. 
 
A – Cost and convenience were considerations. 
 
D – Yes.] 
 
A – b[In the next line you say, “For awhile emails were exchanged.  I found the emails to 
be very cold and impersonal.”  I wonder if you might talk more about the “cold and 
impersonal” aspects of the email exchanges. 
 
D – Well, I mean  because with emails you kind of interpret them any way you want to 
interpret them as opposed to what is actually going on.  You can kind of feed your own 
emotions or whatever – you know, does that help you?  Am I elaborating enough? 
 
A – It seems as if you’re saying there is something about – (interruption) 
 
D – Well I just think it’s a cold thing because it lacks emotion.  I mean, no matter how 
many smiley faces and you know the thousand and . . . million-and-one icons for 
different emotions, it doesn’t take the place of what someone says, you know.  A word 
that’s printed and how it’s said is two different things, has two different connotations.] 
 
A – A couple of sentences later you said, “Using emails over a period of lime lead to 
miscommunication.”  I wonder if you have any recollections about what kind of 
miscommunication. 
 
D – Well, it depends on what kind of day someone was having, and um, saying one thing 
and saying something like “I need more time” and then that other person might be having 
a real stressful day or something – “Well I can’t give you anymore time.  What do you 
expect?  Why would you send me that?”  You know? 
 
A – There is something about the time to devote - (interruption) 
 
D – I mean because if you say something that’s really open, people can kind of judge that 
any way they want to.  Like for instance, there was one email, it was like,  “Well, I need 
to see you.  I need to talk to you about something.”  It was like, “Well, you need to be 
patient.” 
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      “Well I thought that’s what I was being.” 
 
A – Being patient in terms of availability to communicate? 
 
D – Yes.  Or even, ‘cause you know, being patient in terms of being able to communicate 
period - via email or phone conversation. 
 
A – You weren’t always readily available. 
 
D – Right.] 
 
A – In the next line you say, “Although people can write their expressions, verbal 
communication (i.e. tone and voice inflections) makes words come alive and more 
meaningful.”  I wonder if you could talk about how tone and voice inflection make 
communication more meaningful. 
 
D – I think just because of the way how things are said - -just in general.  That’s what I 
meant by that.] 
 
A – c[Then you go into the second paragraph, and you say, “With that in mind, Instant 
Message (IM) was agreed upon both of us to get back some of what verbal 
communication offered.  IM offered a psuedo-telephone call.”  I wonder if – (interrupted) 
 
D – (Laughing) Could you read that statement again? 
 
A –  Sure.  “With that in mind, Instant Message (IM) was agreed upon both of us to get 
back some of what verbal communication offered.  IM offered a psuedo-telephone call.” 
 
D – Well that’s what I think Instant Messages are.  You get that opportunity to 
communicate back and forth almost instantaneously; as if you were talking but it still has 
that email appeal to it.  That’s why I call it pseudo.  It’s not really telephone call but it’s 
kind of like a telephone call. 
 
A – You get to respond in real time to each other – (interrupted) 
 
D – Exactly.  Instead of waiting for somebody to process that thought and send it to you 
like a day later or an hour later. 
 
A – You get more of the immediacy (D – Yes).  And it’s pseudo because it lacks the 
voice (D – Yes.)] d[ In the next line you go on to say, “So this worked for awhile, until 
an incident happened and made using IM a task.  IM started to become tedious.  To list 
one’s complaints became tedious due to the loss of verbal communication.”  I wonder if 
you could talk about the tedious aspect – (interrupted) 
 
D – I mean, it’s kind of hard – well, it’s easier to say everything that’s bothering you, or 
you know, to say it.  But to type it down so that person gets the same feel, as if you’re 
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saying it, because sometimes people talk different than what they write.  So there’s a 
miscommunication in that. 
   
A – They talk different than what they can write. 
 
D – Yes.  They explain in work language or business jargon or whatever. 
 
A -  So the written language is a little more formal. 
 
D -  It could be.  Well cause a lot of times I feel people are so structured to make sure 
what they say comes across, as opposed to just saying it sometimes.  And sometimes 
when you just say it your like, “Ha, I don’t get it.” 
 
A – When it’s more structured, it can be less spontaneous – (interrupted) 
 
D – Exactly, as a telephone conversation can be.] 
 
A – You seem to describe this a little more when writing, “The complaints were not 
expressed in a heart-felt compassionate way.  When using IM one has to now write from 
a different perspective.  I was writing like I spoke and not how I wrote.  I found writing 
one has to calculate how to present information to give readers a clear and concise view 
of their world or perspective.” Can you talk about those statements a little more? 
 
D – I don’t even know what I meant right now. 
 
A – Would you like me to read that back again? 
 
D – Yes. 
 
A -  “The complaints were not expressed in a heart-felt compassionate way.  When using 
IM one has to now write from a different perspective.  I was writing like I spoke and not 
how I wrote.  I found writing one has to calculate how to present information to give 
readers a clear and concise view of their world or perspective.” 
 
D – I still don’t know where I was going with that statement.  I think that still goes back 
to the whole slang thing – how you speak and how you talk and how you write. Um, I 
don’t know (laughing).  I’m sorry, I think I just had a brain freeze. 
 
A – That’s okay.  The point seems t to be that there was a difference for you. 
 
D – Oh definitely. 
 




D - As opposed . . . right.  It’s just like when you write and you just say, “This is how this 
goes.  This is how I felt.”  With the lack of emotion, you can only feel but so much 
through Instant Message. 
 
A – So it’s hard for the person to really feel things even though you are putting thins in 
words. 
 
D – Exactly.  And feeling is a part of communication.] 
 
A – e[You go on and describe an incident in the third paragraph – “On one particular IM, 
I felt that my significant other could have handled a situation with a co-worker in a 
different manner than escalating an argument.  I Imed him stating, ‘I am surprised at 
you’.  This statement was interpreted as ‘How dare you judge me.  You were not there to 
see how this person reacted.  You were making it seem as if I was totally irrational.”  As 
you close out this section, you said, “I looked at the computer screen in horror.”  I 
wonder if you could talk about the horror you experienced. 
 
D – Well I think because I felt as if we’re in this together, and we’re just talking – it’s 
called conversation.  It’s not to say one person is right and one person is wrong, but if I 
say that “Well, you know, I’m surprised you responded that way,” meaning because I 
know you as a different person, I can see you as a different person from that.  Like, I 
thought we knew each other and we don’t. 
 
A – You were kind of relying on him to understand what you meant beyond – 
(interrupted) 
 
D – Right.  I assumed that part because we had a repertoire together, but that’s not what it 
was. 
 
A – With that kind of repertoire, you didn’t feel as if you had to be more explanatory – 
(interrupted) 
 
D – Exactly.  Because your treating it as if it’s a telephone conversation.  I mean, it’s the 
same thing, it’s just in a different mode.  We’re still communicating.] 
 
A – And then you said, “I looked at the computer screen in complete horror.” 
 
D – Well, it’s because I felt as if I was being put on defense mode when I shouldn’t be.  
If we’re on the same team, and you know, I have this opinion, then let’s just discuss it.  
Let’s not jump to the opinion, “Well you wasn’t there, you don’t know what went on and 
that wasn’t what happened.”  But I think on his part as well, I didn’t get everything from 
him and he didn’t get everything from me. 
 
A – The information was incomplete on both sides. 
 
D – Right.  Yes.] 
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A – f[Next, you say,  “But before I Imed him back a response, I scrolled up to view the 
beginning of the IM where he stated how stressed he was with the training program.”  I 
wonder if you could talk about your decision to scroll back. 
 
D -  Umm, I think it was in context to what we were saying, I think.  Because for him to 
say that like, for me to be like in horror of him not understanding where I was coming 
from, or maybe I wasn’t understanding where he was coming from.  I figured I’d scroll 
back and see if I was on the same track.  It’s like, almost like if you have a phone 
conversation with somebody and then you try to remember what you said in case you 
offended somebody.  But then here, I actually had the words that I said.  I didn’t have to 
think about it.  I could just scroll back and look at it.] 
 
A – “So when I Imed him with what I meant by the statement, he apologized and 
reiterated how stressed he was.” 
 
D – Exactly.  So it’s just like,  you said it but then you forgot for a minute how stressed 
you was and now you remember all over again.  You know.  And this was just a phone 
conversation it wouldn’t have been this intense.] 
 
A – g[Next line, “My example only implied a fraction of how the Internet can handicap 
social interactions with people.”  I wonder if you could just – (interrupted) 
 
D - . . . elaborate on that fraction?  What other areas could possibly . . . ?  Well, I think 
for one, umm, not just a conversation via telephone, via in person, or in the flesh I should 
say, but umm, it’s just humorous because I think people will become so accommodated 
or used to talking to people one way.  Like if this is how we’re gonna do things, then 
we’re gonna communicate via email.  So when I see you, I’m gonna kind of  be like, 
“Okay, what do I say?”  You know. You kind of shy away because you’ve had that 
barrier, that computer in between you.  I know a couple of people personally that found it 
kind of hard to assimilate back into real life without having to deal with IM.  Because I 
think people can say things and write things, but they can’t verbally say it to a person.  
And then it’s like, well, it’s almost like dating all over again. 
 
A – Because it feels awkward again? 
 
D – Yeah (laughing).  “Oh my God, say the right thing.” You know?] 
 
A – h[In the next line you say, “Many time after using the Internet, many people assumed 
whatever they wanted to conversation to be without actually listening to what the 
conversation is about.  Assuming and hearing has taken social skills be it verbal or 
written out of the art of conversing.” 
 
D – Let’s see.  I’m trying to think of a specific thing.  Just assuming umm, that maybe a 
person will either say, “I feel very alone.”  No that’s not going to work. 
       A lot of times people don’t say what’s on their mind.  They assume that the person 
already knows certain things.  It’s something that we take for granted.  I think just in 
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general, like with the Internet thing, you have to spell everything out just to make sure 
everybody’s on the same wavelength.  And that’s a lot of work at one time because you 
have to be detailed oriented sometimes.  If your receiving the text, you can’t very well 
think like that person.  So if you had a stressful day, and you know, and you go and check 
your emails, and it’s just like, “What does this mean?”  You know.  It’s like you already 
have all this aggression going on within you.  And to see something that you really don’t 
understand kind of puts it on a whole other plane.  So you automatically are defensive. 
 
A – You sometimes base your understanding on what’s going on with you because – 
(interruption) 
 
D - . . . because that’s a part of you and you can’t turn that off and on. 
 
A – In your understanding, that is more likely to happen with words on the screen than it 
is when face-to-face. 
 
D – Yes.  Because when your face-to-face you can’t hide everything.  I think your body 
language insinuates what’s, you know, really going on.] 
 
A – I’m going to read the last two lines (D – Okay).  You say, “Assuming and hearing 
have taken social skills be it verbal or written out of the art of conversing.  Allowing the 
world to listen with a deafening ear.” 
 
D – (Laughing)  Oh God, I was being really philosophical right there.  I think a lot of 
times people hear what they want to hear or read what they want to read and they take 
whatever experience they want from that.  But not actually what it is.  And to me, it leads 
to one big miscommunication. 
 
A – That seems more likely on the Internet than off the Internet? 
 
D – Yes.  Because when your face-to-face, when you say something to somebody, you 
kind of have an idea whether they agree with you, don’t agree with you; understand what 
your talking about, or don’t understand – just by body movements, facial expressions. 
 
A – You miss the opportunity to recalibrate what your saying (D – Laughing) based upon 
how the other person is reacting. 
 
D – Yes.  Because, I mean, sometimes when people say things and your like – I might 
say, “I don’t like what your wearing.”  And somebody might take offence to that instead 
of saying, “I don’t like that color on you but I like that style.”  You know, and it’s a 
different way of saying the same thing.  Just one way has negative connotation. 
 
A – And you wouldn’t know to make that adjustment. 
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D – Right.  I wouldn’t know to make that adjustment if I wasn’t there. You know.  
Because a lot of times people think of about how they say things to people.  That’s just 
the way it works.  It’s a hard thing to do.] 
 
A – The last line seemed to address the perspective of the listener – “Allowing the world 
to listen with a deafening ear.” 
 
D – It’s in your interpretation.  It’s like I can hear you but I can’t hear you.  I understand 
what you’re saying, but I’m not comprehending what your saying.] 
 





































                                             Appendix L 
        Local Internet Site Data #1:  America Online (AOL) Analysis 
 
 .  Below, Lawrence Lessig’s description and analysis of the broad domain of AOL 
is reproduced verbatim.   
 
1-[“As a member of AOL you can be any one of five people.  This is just one 
amazing feature of the space.  When you start an account on AOL, you have the right to 
establish up to five identities, through five different “screen names” that in effect 
establish five different accounts.  Some users, of course, use the five screen names to give 
other family members access to AOL.  But not everyone uses an AOL account like this.  
Think about the single woman, signing up for her first AOL account.  AOL gives her up 
to five identities that she can define as she wishes – five different personae she can use in 
cyberspace . . . .  
 So in AOL you are given a fantastic power of pseudonymity that the “code 
writers” of real space simply do not give . . .  
 That is a first feature of the constitution of AOL – a feature constituted by the 
code.]      2-[A second is tied to speech – what you can say, and where. 
 Within the limits of decency, and so long as you are in the proper place, you can 
say what you want on AOL.]  3-[But beyond these limits, speech on AOL is constituted 
in a more interesting way.  Not the constraint of rules.  My point instead is about the 
range of permissible speech governed by the character of the potential audience.  There 
are places in AOL where people can gather; there are places where people can go and 
read messages posted by others.  But there is no space where everyone gathers at one 
time, or even a space that everyone must sooner or later pass through.  There is no space 
where you could address all members of AOL.  There is no town hall or town meeting 
where people can complain in public and have their complaints heard by others.  There is 
no space large enough for citizens to create a riot.  The owners of AOL, however, can 
speak to all.  Steve Case, the “town mayor,” writes “chatty” letters to members.  AOL 
advertises to all its members and can send everyone an e-mail.  But only owners and 
those they authorize can do so.  The rest of the members of AOL can speak to crowds 
only where they notice a crowd.  And never a crowd greater than twenty-three. 
 This is another feature of the constitution of the space that AOL is, and it too is a 
feature defined by code.  That only twenty-three people can be in a chat room at once is a 
choice of the code engineers.  While their reasons could be many, the effect is clear.  One 
can’t imagine easily exciting members if AOL into public action.  One can’t imagine 
easily picketing the latest pricing policy.  There is no place where members can complain 
en masse . . . .]  
 4
2
-[A third feature of AOL’s constitution also comes from its code.  This is 
traceability.  While members are within the exclusive AOL content area (in other words, 
when they’re not using AOL as a gateway to the Internet), AOL can (and no doubt does) 
trace your activities and collect information about them.  What files you download, what 
areas you frequent, who your “buddies” are – all this is available to AOL.  These data are 
extremely valuable; they help AOL structure its space to fit customer demand . . .] 
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 5-[AOL is not exclusive in this enabling capacity.  It shares the power.  One 
wonderful feature of the online space is something called “buddy lists.”  Add someone to 
your list, and when he [sic] comes online you hear the sound of a creaking door and are 
notified he is online.  (The “buddy” need not know he is being watched, though he can, if 
he knows, block the watching.)  If that person goes into a chat area and you “locate” him, 
you will be told in what chat area he is . . . ] 
 4
2—
[Consider one final feature of the constitution of AOL, closely linked to the 
last:  commerce.  In AOL you can buy things.  You can buy things and download them, 
or buy things and have them sent to your home.  When you buy, you buy with a screen 
name, AOL knows (even if no one else does) just who you are.  It knows who you are, it 
knows where you live in real space . . .  
AOL knows who you are – this is a feature of its design.  All your behavior on 
AOL is watched; all of it is monitored and tracked back to you as a user. . . And with this 
[data], and the link it provides to you, AOL is a space that can better, and more 

































                                              Appendix M 
   Local Internet Site Data #2 – America Online Instant Messaging (AIM) Description 
 
Local Internet Site Data #2:  America Online Instant Messaging (AIM) Description 
 The AIM interface window will be described below based upon the AOL.Instant 
Messenger
™
:  Get AIM
®
 (2004) Web page description.  The AIM buttons described in the 
description below are AIM Expressions
™
, Buddy Icons, AIM Remote, Smiley 
Dictionary, Acronym Dictionary, AIM Express, encrypted AIM, AIM Chat Rooms, Send 
IMs to Mobile Phones, and IM Forwarding.  Keystroke functions such as bolding, 
italicizing, font size, and font color options are not addressed on the AIM Web page since 
they are standard functions.  AOL’s discussion of the AIM Developer Programs, AIM 
Bots and Enhanced File Transfer portions of the AIM windows will not be addressed here 
since they do not directly pertain to communication practices on AOL.  That said, the 
AIM description is as follows: 
 1
4
-[“Connect with your friends and family – anytime, anywhere!  AIM® 5.2 for 
Windows, Download Now!  Already an AIM member?  Upgrade Now!] 
 
 22-[Fun with AIM.  Put Tom Cruise on your Desktop!  Download “The Last 
Samurai” Expression . . . AIM Expressions
™ 
is the exciting new way to personalize your 
AIM
®
 client and instant messages!  System Requirements:  In order to use AIM 
Expressions
™
, you will need to install the latest version of the AIM® software.  Click 
here to download now.] 
 
 Buddy Icons . . . Make your IMs display your online personality.  Choose a cool 
Buddy Icon . . . 
Choose form hundreds of cool Buddy Icons: 
   
2 Fast 2 Furious, AM. Symbols, American Wedding, Analyze That, Angels, AOL 
Inside, Brittney Cleary, Brother Bear, Bubble Gum, Bugs, Cartoon Network, ‘The 
Cat in the Hat,’ Charmed, Charlie’s Angels, Classic Movies, Eight Crazy Nights, 
8 Mile, Elf, Final Fantasy XI, Finding Nemo, Flags, Flowers, Freaky Friday, 
Friday After Next, Gilmore Girls, ‘Gothika,’ Grind, Halloween, Hanukkah, Harry 
Potter, Holiday, ‘Honey,’ How To Deal, Hulk, Humor, ‘Intolerable Cruelty,’ Jay-
Z, Johnny English, Kangaroo Jack, Knockaround Guys, ‘The Last Samurai,’ 
Limp Bizkit, Looney Tunes, ‘Love Actually,’ ‘Love Doesn’t Cost a Thing,’ 
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Marine Life, Moods, Music, Music Alt., Music Artists, Nature, NBA, New Year, 
Office, Open Range, Patriotic, ‘Peter Pan,’ ‘Return of the King,’ The Ring, 
Romantic, ‘The Rundown,’ Science Fiction,’ Seasons, Smileys, Sports, SWAT, 
TBS, Tell Them To…, Terminator 3, ‘The Texas Chainsaw Massacre,’ The Two 




-[You can add AIM Remote
 




 {I am Online.  Send me an IM.} 
 
 {Add me to your Buddy List.} 
 
 {Join my Chat Room.} 
 
 {Send me E-Mail,} 
It’s simple and fast to add AIM Remote to your Web site.  Our helpful wizard will 
guide you through six easy steps that take less than five minutes to complete.  Click the 
Start button below.  Start.  AIM Remote works with AOL Instant Messenger 2.0 or 




-[Smiley Dictionary:  Ever wonder what people are saying on AIM?  Use the 
handy Smiley Dictionary to keep up!  Once you’ve got it down, go join a Chat to give it a 
try. 
Note:  You can also use the Smiley pull down menu in your Instant Messenger 
window. 
 
Smiling (Ctrl+1), Frowning (Ctrl+2), Winking (Ctrl+3), Sticking-out-tongue 
(Ctrl+4), Surprised (Ctrl+5), Kissing (Ctrl+6), Yelling (Ctrl+7), Cool (Ctrl+8), 
Money-mouth (Ctrl=Shift+1), Foot-in-mouth (Ctrl+Shift+2), Embarrassed 
(Ctrl+Shift+3), Innocent (Ctrl+Shift+4), Undecided (Ctrl+Shift+5), Crying 
(Ctrl+Shift+6), Lips-are-sealed (Ctrl+Shift+7), Laughing (Ctrl+Shift+8)] 
 
3-[Acronym Dictionary:  Get your message across quickly and save yourself 
some 
keystrokes, too.  Refer to this handy chart for the most commonly used acronyms among 
AIM users and before long, you’ll be communicating faster than ever with friends, 
family, and colleagues. 
 
  AFAIK   As far as I know 
  AFK  Away from computer keyboard (for wireless users) 
  AIM  AOL Instant Messenger, also verb for FTPing files via AIM 
  ASAP  As soon as possible 
  A/S/L  Age/Sex/Location 
  ATM  At the moment 
  B  Back 
  BBS  Be back soon 
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  BC  Because 
  BCNU  Be Seein’ You 




-[AIM Express:  How do you get in touch with your online buddies when you 
are away from your home computer?  How can you send instant messages when you 
can’t download the AIM software?  The answer is simple – AIM Express!  Simply by 
clicking on the button below, you can use this FREE tool to view your own personalized 
list of buddies and send them IMs.  Thanks to AIM Express, it’s never been easier to stay 
in touch! 
Click on the start button below to try AIM Express.  Then, either enter your 
Screen name and password, or click on the register button to sign up for a free account 
today! 
Start . . .  
AIM Express Features:  AIM Express lets you send instant messages directly 
from a Web browser, such as Netscape Navigator or Microsoft Internet Explorer, to 
anyone who has registered for AIM or who uses the America Online service.  AIM 
Express respects your privacy and, best of all, its FREE.  To use AIM Express, you must 
be a registered AIM user or subscribe to America Online . . .  
Key AIM features include: 
• Send instant messages 
• See who’s online in your buddy list window 
• Start of join buddy chats] 
• 4
2
-[Block members who misbehave] 
1
4
-[Any computer with a Web browser that is connected to the Internet can run 
AIM Express . . .] 
 
5-[Encrypted IM:  Now you can send and receive encrypted IMs!  AIM 5.2 
introduces the ability for AIM members to send and receive end-to-end encrypted 
messages – IM, Chat and File Transfer – allowing for message privacy and member 
identification.  Messages are encrypted and decrypted using industry-standard encryption 
methods – messages sent between AIM members can be digitally encrypted and signed.  
For more information on using encryption with AIM, click here (See Appendix O for 




-[AIM Chat Rooms:  Before you chat you must first have AOL Instant 
Messenger (AIM) on your computer.  Click here for AIM. 
4
2
-[Please keep in mind that these chat rooms are NOT monitored. 
Please review our chat rules and guidelines (See Appendix N for AIM Chat Room 
Rules and Guidelines) to make the most of your chat experience.] 
6
2
-[Hot Chats    TV Computers & Science  Family & Home
 Health & Wellness   Hobbies & Interests   International 
Lifestyles    Local     Love & Romance 
More Chats               News     Personal Finance 
Sports & Recreation      Travel] 
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7-[Send IMs to Mobile Phones:  Sending IMs to mobile phones just got easier.  
Now you can create nicknames for your Buddies’ mobile numbers, making it easy to find 
them at a glance.  Just enter an easy-to-remember nickname, when you add a mobile 
phone number to your buddy list. 
 
IM Forwarding:  Have Instant Messages delivered to your cell phone, when you’re 
away from your PC!  With AIM 5.2, you can be online, all the time, anywhere.  Register 
your cell phone with IM Forwarding, and you’ll continue to receive your IMs after you 
sign out of AIM.  To activate or deactivate IM Forwarding for your Screen Name, click 






































                                                 Appendix N 
                      AIM Chat Room Rules and Guidelines 
 
“AIM Chat Room Rules and Guidelines 
          We encourage you to be responsible and to respect our community as well as 
others participating within the community.  Your conduct should be guided by common 
sense, basic “netiquette”, and these chat guidelines. 
 
AIM/Web Chat is not intended for use by individuals under the age of 13. 
 
We discourage any of the following activity that: 
• Repeatedly uses language inconsistent with the community standards of the 
area from which the chat originated. 
• Impedes or otherwise prohibits communication; disrupts the discussion 
including, without limitation, using screen names in topical chats that are 
offensive to the topic and repeatedly posting off-topic comments in a topical 
chat. 
• Contains vulgarities directed toward another individual or group. 
• Depicts violence in gratuitous manner, without journalistic or artistic merit, 
primarily intended to agitate or cause emotional distress. 
• Is intended to victimize, harass, degrade or intimidate an individual or group of 
individuals on the basis of age, disability, ethnicity, gender, race, religion or 
sexual orientation.  Hate speech is unacceptable anywhere on the service. 
• Solicits personal information from a minor (under 18 years old).  Personal 
information includes full name, home address, home telephone number, or 
other identifying information that would enable “offline” contact. 
• Contains or facilitates the transfer of software viruses or any other computer 
code, files or programs designed to interrupt, destroy or limit the functionality 
of any computer software or hardware or telecommunications equipment. 
• Contains material that defames, abuses, threatens, promotes, or instigates 
physical harm or death to others or oneself. 
• Solicits for exchange, sale or purchase of sexually explicit images, and/or 
material harmful to minors; including but not limited to, any photograph, film, 
video, or picture or computer generated image or picture (actual or simulated). 
• Infringes anyone else’s intellectual property rights, including, but not limited to, 
any copyright trademark rights of publicity, rights of privacy, or other propriety 
rights. 
• Attempts to harvest or collect member information, including screen names. 
• Impersonates or represents any person or entity in an attempt to deceive, harass 
or otherwise mislead another member.  You may not pretend to be an employee 
or representative of AOL, or any of the America Online, Inc. family of 
companies, or affiliates. 
• Attempts to get a password, or other private information from a user.  
Remember:  AOL employees will NEVER ask for your password. 
• Links to and/or references content not allowed under these guidelines. 
• Otherwise uses the service in a manner deemed inappropriate by AOL. 
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Note:  It is important to remember safety while online.  Always use caution when 
providing any personal information about yourself anywhere online.  It’s also a good 
rule-of-thumb to check the Privacy Policies of any unfamiliar or new web sites you visit.  
When communicating in a chat room be mindful that many people will be able to view it 
and the inclusion of information such as your name, your address or telephone number is 
never recommended. 
 
Take advantage of AIM’s IGNORE feature. 
            AIM Chat is provided with an IGNORE button.  To stop receiving messages 
from someone in a chat room, select the person’s screen name in the field that lists 
everyone in the chat room and click Ignore.  An X appears next to the selected person’s 
screen name and their text will no longer appear on your screen.  You might consider 
using blocking or filtering software for chat environments like AIM chat, and instant 


































                                            Appendix O 
                      Extended AIM Encryption Description 
 
“Encrypted Instant Messaging 
 
AIM users can now send and receive messages, participate in chats and send files using 
industry-standard digital encryption using AIM (version 5.2.3211 or higher, Windows 
operating systems). 
 
Messages sent between AIM users with security credentials are digitally signed and 
encrypted and remain encrypted during message transmission.  Referred to as “end-to-
end encryption,” the AIM encryption protocol is based on S/MIME e-mail cryptographic 
standard. 
 
Ferris Research Insight Bulletin 
Ferris study looks at the Public Key Infrastructure PKI-based security in AOL’s 
Enterprise AIM Services over SSL-based encryption (PDF) 
 
Enterprise AIM Services 
Our new Enterprise AIM Services
™
 offering provides businesses the services and tools 
needed to manage AIM communications, ensure security and maintain consistent user 
identities across e-mail and instant messaging.  This includes: 
 
AIM:  Desktop communications tool with access to over 195 million registered members 
 
AIM Enterprise Gateway:  Enhances security, management and control for IT 
professionals 
 
AIM Private Domain Service:  Maintains consistent user identities across corporate 
communication tools 
 
AIM Federated Authentication Service:  Authenticates users to the AOL Network from 
your Corporate Directory 
 
AIM Security Credentials:  Digital certificates can provide reasonable assurance of the 
identity of users, and enable encryption exchanges between security-enabled clients.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
